Jiyao Tang

This essay argues for a rational agency account of transparent self-knowledge. I argue that self-knowledge, the second-order knowledge of one's intentional and cognitive mental states, is grounded on one's first-order understanding of the relevant world-oriented question. My account improves on the previous transparency theories developed by Richard Moran and others in three respects: (1) it accounts for the epistemic warrant of transparent self-knowledge missing from Moran's view; (2) it extends to self-knowledge of other rational beliefs, whereas most existing theories only apply to deliberation-based self-knowledge; (3) it avoids the charge of “voluntarism” since it does not postulate a rational capacity of “deciding what to believe.” My account also comes with far-reaching implications. Most importantly, it will be the upshot of my argument that second-order self-knowledge is constitutive of the very first-order understanding of the world. Moreover,I suggest that at least in the paradigmatic cases, self-knowledge is primarily about one's understanding and knowledge, rather than one's belief, as scholars have commonly assumed.