Jonathan Wolff

Theorists of social equality argue that the inspiration behind egalitarianism is not the idea of the equalization of some currency of justice, but the idea of a society in which all regard and treat each other as equals. On this view, barriers to equality include asymmetric social relations involving hierarchy, exclusion, or oppression. Generally, though, social egalitarians have found it difficult to present a positive theory of social equality, which has been regarded as a weakness. However, according to Amartya Sen, the task of political philosophy is not to provide an ideal theory of justice, but to identify and propose remedies for “manifest injustice.” Hence, on this approach, what looked like a weakness turns out to be a strength. Accordingly, this chapter goes on to consider how to make sense of this position in philosophical terms.

Should political institutions be designed so that individuals reap the benefits of their good choices and suffer the costs of their poor choices? This chapter argues for the ‘weak asymmetry thesis’: that people should be allowed to benefit from their choices that turn out well to a greater extent than they should have to bear the costs of those that turn out badly. The thesis is defended against the practical challenge that it would be impossible to implement and ethical challenges that argue in favour of symmetry.

All parties involved in researching, developing, manufacturing, and distributing COVID-19 vaccines need guidance on their ethical obligations. We focus on pharmaceutical companies' obligations because their capacities to research, develop, manufacture, and distribute vaccines make them uniquely placed for stemming the pandemic. We argue that an ethical approach to COVID-19 vaccine production and distribution should satisfy four uncontroversial principles: optimising vaccine production, including development, testing, and manufacturing; fair distribution; sustainability; and accountability. All parties' obligations should be coordinated and mutually consistent. For instance, companies should not be obligated to provide host countries with additional booster shots at the expense of fulfilling bilateral contracts with countries in which there are surges. Finally, any satisfactory approach should include mechanisms for assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. This assurance enables countries, pharmaceutical companies, global organisations, and others to verify compliance with the chosen approach and protect ethically compliant stakeholders from being unfairly exploited by unethical behaviour of others.

Robert Nozick's _Anarchy, State and Utopia_ is one of the works which dominates contemporary debate in political philosophy. Drawing on traditional assumptions associated with individualism and libertarianism, Nozick mounts a powerful argument for a minimal `nightwatchman' state and challenges the views of many contemporary philosophers, most notably John Rawls. Jonathan Wolff's new book is the first full-length study of Nozick's work and of the debates to which it has given rise. He situates Nozick's work in the context of current debates and examines the traditions which have influenced his thought. He then critically reconstructs the key arguments of _Anarchy, State and Utopia_, focusing on Nozick's _Doctrine of Rights, his Derivation of the Minimal State_, and his _Entitlement Theory of Justice_. The book concludes by assessing Nozick's place in contemporary political philosophy.

This paper surveys the current philosophical discussion of the ethics of risk imposition, placing it in the context of relevant work in psychology, economics and social theory. The central philosophical problem starts from the observation that it is not practically possible to assign people individual rights not to be exposed to risk, as virtually all activity imposes some risk on others. This is the ‘problem of paralysis’. However, the obvious alternative theory that exposure to risk is justified when its total benefits exceed its total costs faces the standard distributional challenges of consequentialism. Forms of contractualism have been proposed as a solution, but how exactly such theories can be formulated remains problematic, especially when confronted with the difficult cases of mass, novel, risk such as climate change.

Ceremonies, such as weddings, funerals, graduations, coronations, presidential inaugurations, and many other celebratory occasions play a central role in human life and society. But while their importance is emphasised in sociology and anthropology, as well as in Chinese, African and other philosophical traditions, ceremonies have received far less attention in Western philosophy, and when discussed are often, though not universally, dismissed as over-elaborate, or expressions of superstition. In this paper I will consider the nature and value of ceremonies, exploring both the positive and negative roles of ceremonies in human life, as well as considering how ceremonies can help us think about individual and group values.

The idea for writing the book dates all the way back to the 1970s. I had read a novel in which a character reads a critical history of political philosophy, and I thought I'd love to work through such a book. But I never found the right one, and so, when eventually I had the chance, I decided to write something like it myself. My training and instincts as a philosopher, rather than a historian of ideas, made it more natural for me to write a problem-based, rather than theorist-based, text, and so this is not exactly the book I wanted to read. Nevertheless, it has found its place as a way into political philosophy for many students. I'm always gratified when I meet people who tell me it was one of the first books of political philosophy they read, and stimulated them to take their studies further. That is the whole point of the book.

In the aftermath of WW2, nationalism was regarded by many political philosophers as an afront to civilized values. Yet at the same time nationalism has been an important means by which former colonies have attained and protected their independence. Once this distinction is made, it is clear that there are different types of nationalism, used in different circumstances, and for different purposes, and many political theorists have attempted to distinguish acceptable and unacceptable forms of nationalism. In this paper, I contribute to this debate by distinguishing four functions of nationalism: purification, privilege, pride, and protection. These functions can be mixed together in different ways, and I claim that purification and privilege are both highly problematic, while pride, and especially protection, are far more defensible.

My paper ‘Hobbes and the Motivations of Social Contract Theory’ was published in this journal in 1994. In this contribution I explain the background that led me to write that paper at an early stage of my career, relating the explanation to my education as a student at UCL, and, briefly, at Harvard and contrasting the methodological approaches I experienced in the two departments. The Hobbes paper itself offers a type of ‘rational reconstruction’ of Hobbes, drawing on the logic of different social contract arguments, and while there is much in the paper I still agree with, it assumes an approach to Philosophy that I would not adopt now.

In a paper published in this journal we proposed a method for resolving disputed land claims between two parties (Steiner and Wolff: 2003). In essence the proposal is to hold an auction between the disputants in which the land is given to the higher bidder, but the receipts of the auction to the under-bidder. We claimed that under such circumstances both parties can walk away happy: the higher bidder happy to pay the price bid for the land; the under-bidder happier to have the receipts of the auction when the alternative is to pay for the land at a higher price.

ABSTRACT Avner de-Shalit has devised a methodology for coming closer to a settled view in political philosophy which he calls ‘public reflective equilibrium’, extending ideas of John Rawls and Michael Walzer. De-Shalit proposes that the philosopher should come to an understanding of views outside the academy through extended interaction with members of the public. These discussions can and do lead to changes in the philosophical theory, from the introduction of new concepts, to new framings of issues or even novel research questions. De-Shalit and I used this approach in our work Disadvantage. Reflecting on our work, I raise five questions: Who speaks for the public? How do you know you are asking the right questions? How should the theorist respond to judgements based on false empirical beliefs? What should be done when the public do not speak with one voice? Is equilibrium a reasonable aspiration?