Joan Liaschenko

“Moral distress” was introduced in nursing ethics to describe the experience of having the moral conviction about the right thing to do while having limited agency to enact it. It exists at the intersection of moral philosophy, moral psychology, and moral communities that influence our desires to act. Although moral distress has significantly impacted bioethics scholarship, it has had almost no presence in business ethics scholarship. We argue that moral distress is useful for understanding important problems of business ethics. We claim it may be missing from business ethics discourse not because it is not present but rather because it is ever-present, an existential condition brought on by the tension between profit maximization and other moral purposes. We consider how the moral communities of medicine and business can be morally supportive or distressing and set forth a taxonomy of moral conditions involving the relationship between knowledge, action, and desire.

Advance care planning (ACP) is a process that seeks to elicit patients’ goals, values, and preferences for future medical care. While most commonly employed in adult patients, pediatric ACP is becoming a standard of practice for adolescent and young adult patients with potentially life-limiting illnesses. The majority of research has focused on patients and their families; little attention has been paid to the perspectives of healthcare providers (HCPs) regarding their perspectives on the process and its potential benefits and limitations. Focus groups were conducted with 15 physicians as part of a larger study of adolescent and young adult ACP in hematopoietic stem cell transplant (HSCT) patients. This study identified two categories important to the utility of ACP in pediatric HSCT patients; (1) the temporal context of ACP and decision making and (2) the limitations of pediatric ACP, with subcategories identified as (a) embodied and witnessed knowing, (b) the impact of clinical cascades—when the treatment of one organ system creates complications in another system that needs to be treated—and a creation of a “new normal” following complications of illness and its treatment in the pediatric intensive care unit (PICU), (c) the balancing of adolescents’ autonomy with their capacity to make informed medical decisions, and (d) the epistemological frames that differ between HCP and patients and their families. These findings support ACP in adolescent and young adult HSCT patients, with a number of implications for practice as this process becomes more common.

The controversy over the so-called Ashley Treatment (AT), a series of medical procedures that inhibited both growth and sexual development in the body of a profoundly intellectually impaired girl, usually centers either on Ashley’s rights, including a right to an intact, unaltered body, or on Ashley’s parents’ rights to make decisions for her. The claim made by her parents, that the procedure would improve their ability to care for her, is often dismissed as inappropriate or, at best, irrelevant. We argue, however, that caregiving is a central issue in the controversy, as Ashley’s need for caregiving is a defining characteristic of her life. In this article, we analyze the ethics of the Ashley Treatment within the context of family caregiving. Through the physical and emotional work of caregiving, families participate in the formation and maintenance of personal identity, a process that Hilde Lindemann recently called “holding.” We argue that, in an intellectually disabled person such as Ashley, who depends on her family for every aspect of her care, the family’s contribution to identity is an essential source of personhood. We believe that the treatment can be justified if it is indeed an instance of appropriate family “holding” for Ashley.

Surgical “buy-in” is an “informal contract between surgeon and patient in which the patient not only consents to the operative procedure but commits to the post-operative surgical care anticipated by the surgeon.”1 Surgeons routinely assume that patients wish to undergo treatment for operative complications so that the overall treatment course is “successful,” as in the treatment of a post-operative infection. This article examines occasions when patients buy-in to a treatment course that carries risk of complication, yet refuse treatment when complications arise. We coin this counter-phenomenon “cashing-out.” Cashing-out may elicit negative feelings among careproviders. We question why patients or families may wish to cash-out. One reason may be the changing epistemological position of patients as they experience a complication. The shift from the hypothetical discussion of complications during the initial informed-consent process to the experience of having a complication represents new knowledge. Patients and families may use this knowledge as the basis to revoke consent for some or all of the remaining treatment course. This article seeks to understand cashing-out in terms of the patients’ experiences. We hope to prompt recognition of this phenomenon across medical contexts and to provide impetus for further work to understand why patients may wish to cash-out.

Moral distress has been covered extensively in the nursing literature and increasingly in the literature of other health professions. Cases that cause nurses’ moral distress that are mentioned most frequently are those concerned with prolonging the dying process. Given the standard of aggressive treatment that is typical in intensive care units (ICUs), much of the existing moral distress research focuses on the experiences of critical care nurses. However, moral distress does not automatically occur in all end-of-life circumstances, nor does every critical care nurse suffer its damaging effects. What are the practices of these nurses? What specifically do they do to navigate around or through the distressing situations? The nursing literature is lacking an answer to these questions. This article reports a study that used narrative analysis to explore the reported practices of experienced critical care nurses who are skilled at and comfortable working with families and physicians regarding the withdrawal of aggressive treatment. A major finding was that these nurses did not report experiencing the dam-Moral Agency, Moral Imagination, and Moral Community: Antidotes to Moral Distress Terri Traudt, Joan Liaschenko, and Cynthia Peden-McAlpine Terri Traudt, MBC, MA, is a Communications Consultant specializing in bioethics at the Center for Bioethics at the University of Minnesota, in Minneapolis. [email protected] Joan Liaschenko, PhD, RN, FAAN, is a Professor at the Center for Bioethics and Nursing at the University of Minnesota. Cynthia Peden-McAlpine, PhD, ACNS, BC, is an Associate Professor in the School of Nursing at the University of Minnesota. © 2016 by The Journal of Clinical Ethics. All rights reserved. aging effects of moral distress as described in the nursing literature. The verbal communication and stated practices relevant to this finding are organized under three major themes: (1) moral agency, (2) moral imagination, and (3) moral community. Further, a total of eight subthemes are identified. The practices that constitute these themes and subthemes are further detailed and discussed in this article. Understanding these practices can help mitigate critical care nurses’ moral distress.

Background: Explicating nurses’ moral identities is important given the powerful influence moral identity has on the capacity to exercise moral agency. Research objectives: The purpose of this study was to explore how nurses narrate their moral identity through their understanding of their work. An additional purpose was to understand how these moral identities are held in the social space that nurses occupy. Research design: The Registered Nurse Journal, a bimonthly publication of the Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, Canada, features a regular column entitled, ‘In the End … What Nursing Means to Me …’ These short narratives generally include a story of an important moment in the careers of the authors that defined their identities as nurses. All 29 narratives published before June 2015 were analysed using a critical narrative approach, informed by the work of Margaret Urban Walker and Hilde Lindemann, to identify a typology of moral identity. Ethical considerations: Ethics approval was not required because the narratives are publicly available. Findings: Two narrative types were identified that represent the moral identities of nurses as expressed through their work: (1) making a difference in the lives of individuals and communities and (2) holding the identities of vulnerable individuals. Discussion: Nurses’ moral identities became evident when they could see improvement in the health of patients or communities or when they could maintain the identity of their patients despite the disruptive forces of illness and hospitalization. In reciprocal fashion, the responses of their patients, including expressions of gratitude, served to hold the moral identities of these nurses. Conclusion: Ultimately, the sustainability of nurses’ moral identities may be dependent on the recognition of their own needs for professional satisfaction and care in ways that go beyond the kind of acknowledgement that patients can offer.

During the last decade, several court cases have focused attention on the moral and legal aspects of withholding or withdrawing food and fluids from certain patients. The courts have not been unanimous in their judgments on these matters. In attempting to explore this issue, this article reviews both the nursing and medical literature on the withdrawing and withholding of food and fluids with particular attention to empirical studies. Several themes which emerge from the literature are used to explore the similarities and differences between the practices of nursing and medicine where nutritional support is concerned

Artificial persons are those who speak and act for others. Nurses speak and act for patients as well as for physicians and institutions, or, more aptly, institutionalized medicine. Yet, acting for institutionalized medicine can be harmful to nurses, due to the psychological experience of moral distress and the loss of integrity of their practice. This paper illustrates the harm to nurses as expressed in narratives of their practice, and suggests some initial steps we might take in resisting the artificial personhood imposed by institutionalized medicine.

Moral distress has been written about extensively in nursing and other fields. Often, however, it has not been used with much theoretical depth. This paper focuses on theorizing moral distress using feminist ethics, particularly the work of Margaret Urban Walker and Hilde Lindemann. Incorporating empirical findings, we argue that moral distress is the response to constraints experienced by nurses to their moral identities, responsibilities, and relationships. We recommend that health professionals get assistance in accounting for and communicating their values and responsibilities in situations of moral distress. We also discuss the importance of nurses creating “counterstories” of their work as knowledgeable and trustworthy professionals to repair their damaged moral identities, and, finally, we recommend that efforts toward shifting the goal of health care away from the prolongation of life at all costs to the relief of suffering to diminish the moral distress that is a common response to aggressive care at end-of-life

One of the most significant changes in modern healthcare delivery has been the evolution of the paper record to the electronic health record (EHR). In this paper we argue that the primary change has been a shift in the focus of documentation from monitoring individual patient progress to recording data pertinent to Institutional Priorities (IPs). The specific IPs to which we refer include: finance/reimbursement; risk management/legal considerations; quality improvement/safety initiatives; meeting regulatory and accreditation standards; and patient care delivery/evidence based practice. Following a brief history of the transition from the paper record to the EHR, the authors discuss unintended or contested consequences resulting from this change. These changes primarily reflect changes in the organization and amount of clinician work and clinician‐patient relationships. The paper is not a research report but was informed by an institutional ethnography the aim of which was to understand how the EHR impacted clinicians and administrators in a large, urban hospital in the United States. The paper was also informed by other sources, including the philosophies of Jacques Ellul, Don Idhe, and Langdon Winner.

The physical nearness, or proximity, inherent in the nurse–patient relationship has been central in the discipline as definitive of the nature of nursing and its moral ideals. Clearly, this nearness is in service to those in need of care. This proximity, however, is not unproblematic because it contributes to two of the most prolonged difficulties, both for individual nurses and the discipline of nursing — moral distress and moral ambiguity. In this paper we explore proximity using both a moral and geographical lens and offer some insights regarding this practice reality. We examine the effect of proximity to patients on nurses’ moral responsiveness, particularly as it affects nurses’ moral distress. Proximity is paradoxical in this regard because, while it propels nurses to act, it can also propel nurses to ignore or abandon. Likewise, we argue that nursing's tendency to define itself in relation to the closeness of the nurse–patient relationship leads to problems of moral ambiguity. Our recommendations include moving others closer to the bedside and thus to the work of nursing in the literal and theoretical sense.