Joan Mcgregor

The capability approach constitutes a significant contribution to social theory but its potential is diminished by its insufficient treatment of the social construction of meaning. Social meanings enable people to make value judgements about what they will do and be, and also to evaluate how satisfied they are about what they are able to achieve. From this viewpoint, a person’s state of wellbeing must be understood as being socially and psychologically co-constituted in specific social and cultural contexts. In this light, the telos of ‘living well’ which is at the heart of Sen’s version of the capability approach is inadequate and must be modified to a telos of ‘living well together’ which includes consideration of the social structures and institutions which enable people to pursue individual freedoms in relation to others. The policy significance of the capability approach can be further strengthened by paying greater consideration to the political economy of policy decision-making processes and the ways in which conflicts and distributions of power are institutionalized.

The edited volume brings together contemporary work by philosophers, legal scholars, and political theorists. This volume presents relevant understandings of the common good, democracy, liberty, and law, and situates them in the context of contemporary countervailing pressures posed by issues in education, access to medical treatment in a pandemic, and the media. Motivated to ascertain how democracy is threatened by a variety contemporary challenges, the authors examine core aspects of law, representative democracy, and constitutionalism to shed light on worrisome contemporary phenomena such as social media-driven conspiracy theories, unequal access to education and medical treatment, among other topics.

How do we account for the harmful outcomes of the food system, in particular, the differential distributional effects of it? Are those disadvantaged by the food system merely suffering the consequences of their bad choices, or are the disadvantaged merely misfortunate? Rejecting both these accounts, I will argue that there are structural impediments that limit individuals’ capacities to simply “make better choices” and consequently the disadvantages are not just a matter of misfortune and certainly not merely attributable to bad choices of the individuals in those communities. I will argue that the inequalities in the food system are perpetuated by unjust social structural background conditions. Those background conditions severely diminish the opportunities of some individuals and communities in our society. Since these background structural conditions are products of human creation or maintenance and they undermine the capabilities for social freedom, there is a shared responsibility for rectifying these structural injustices.

Organ donation after cardiac or circulatory death (DCD) has been introduced to increase the supply of transplantable organs. In this paper, we argue that the recovery of viable organs useful for transplantation in DCD is not compatible with the dead donor rule and we explain the consequential ethical and legal ramifications. We also outline serious deficiencies in the current consent process for DCD with respect to disclosure of necessary elements for voluntary informed decision making and respect for the donor's autonomy. We compare two alternative proposals for increasing organ donation consent in society: presumed consent and mandated choice. We conclude that proceeding with the recovery of transplantable organs from decedents requires a paradigm change in the ethics of organ donation. The paradigm change to ensure the legitimacy of DCD practice must include: (1) societal agreement on abandonment of the dead donor rule, (2) legislative revisions reflecting abandonment of the dead donor rule, and (3) requirement of mandated choice to facilitate individual participation in organ donation and to ensure that decisions to participate are made in compliance with the societal values of respect for autonomy and self-determination.

The issue of acquaintance rape has been gaining increased prominence in recent years. In this book Joan McGregor analyses the ethical and legal problems that arise in connection with acquaintance rape cases. She discusses with great clarity and precision the complexities involved in notions such as consent, force, autonomy, power, intention and the impairment of responsibility through drugs, alcohol and mental illness. Arguing that criminal rape laws are too narrow, capturing only cases where there is clearly recognized physical violence and resistance from the victim, she sets out a new proposal for how the criminal law should deal with cases of nonconsensual sex which captures the ideals of a liberal political society and in particular the idea of equality. This book explains fully what it means when a woman says no and means no.

Advance health care directives and informed consent remain the cornerstones of patients' right to self-determination regarding medical care and preferences at the end-of-life. However, the effectiveness and clinical applicability of advance health care directives to decision-making on the use of life support systems at the end-of-life is questionable. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) has been revised in 2006 to permit the use of life support systems at or near death for the purpose of maximizing procurement opportunities of organs medically suitable for transplantation. Some states have enacted the Revised UAGA (2006) and a few of those have included amendments while attempting to preserve the uniformity of the revised Act. Other states have introduced the Revised UAGA (2006) for legislation and remaining states are likely to follow soon

In 1968, the Harvard criteria equated irreversible coma and apnea with human death and later, the Uniform Determination of Death Act was enacted permitting organ procurement from heart-beating donors. Since then, clinical studies have defined a spectrum of states of impaired consciousness in human beings: coma, akinetic mutism, minimally conscious state, vegetative state and brain death. In this article, we argue against the validity of the Harvard criteria for equating brain death with human death. Brain death does not disrupt somatic integrative unity and coordinated biological functioning of a living organism. Neurological criteria of human death fail to determine the precise moment of an organism’s death when death is established by circulatory criterion in other states of impaired consciousness for organ procurement with non-heart-beating donation protocols. The criterion of circulatory arrest 75 s to 5 min is too short for irreversible cessation of whole brain functions and respiration controlled by the brain stem. Brain -based criteria for determining death with a beating heart exclude relevant anthropologic, psychosocial, cultural, and religious aspects of death and dying in society. Clinical guidelines for determining brain death are not consistently validated by the presence of irreversible brain stem ischemic injury or necrosis on autopsy; therefore, they do not completely exclude reversible loss of integrated neurological functions in donors. The questionable reliability and varying compliance with these guidelines among institutions amplify the risk of determining reversible states of impaired consciousness as irreversible brain death. The scientific uncertainty of defining and determining states of impaired consciousness including brain death have been neither disclosed to the general public nor broadly debated by the medical community or by legal and religious scholars. Heart-beating or non-heart-beating organ procurement from patients with impaired consciousness is de facto a concealed practice of physician-assisted death, and therefore, violates both criminal law and the central tenet of medicine not to do harm to patients. Society must decide if physician-assisted death is permissible and desirable to resolve the conflict about procuring organs from patients with impaired consciousness within the context of the perceived need to enhance the supply of transplantable organs

Mass media campaigns are widely and successfully used to change health decisions and behaviors for better or for worse in society. In the United States, media campaigns have been launched at local offices of the states’ department of motor vehicles to promote citizens’ willingness to organ donation and donor registration. We analyze interventional studies of multimedia communication campaigns to encourage organ-donor registration at local offices of states’ department of motor vehicles. The media campaigns include the use of multifaceted communication tools and provide training to desk clerks in the use of scripted messages for the purpose of optimizing enrollment in organ-donor registries. Scripted messages are communicated to customers through mass audiovisual entertainment media, print materials and interpersonal interaction at the offices of departments of motor vehicles. These campaigns give rise to three serious concerns: (1) bias in communicating information with scripted messages without verification of the scientific accuracy of information, (2) the provision of misinformation to future donors that may result in them suffering unintended consequences from consenting to medical procedures before death (e.g, organ preservation and suitability for transplantation), and (3) the unmanaged conflict of interests for organizations charged with implementing these campaigns, (i.e, dual advocacy for transplant recipients and donors). We conclude the following: (1) media campaigns about healthcare should communicate accurate information to the general public and disclose factual materials with the least amount of bias; (2) conflicting interests in media campaigns should be managed with full public transparency; (3) media campaigns should disclose the practical implications of procurement as well as acknowledge the medical, legal, and religious controversies of determining death in organ donation; (4) organ-donor registration must satisfy the criteria of informed consent; (5) media campaigns should serve as a means of public education about organ donation and should not be a form of propaganda

The genetic revolution is well underway, with genetic research and knowledge expanding at an exponential rate. Much of the new genetics research is focused on population groups, and proponents of “population genomics” argue that such studies are necessary since genetic “variation” among human populations holds the most promise for technological innovations that can improve human health and lead to increased understanding of the origin of human populations. Population genomic research thus targets specific groups to discover variation that could lead to knowledge about genetic disorders, possible cures, and the origin and migration patterns of distinctive peoples. Research on genetic differences among groups or populations, however, raises many pressing ethical and legal questions. For example, focus on biological differences of racial and ethnic groups has in the past lead to assumptions about superiority and inferiority between groups, and in practice resulted in stigmatization and discrimination. Consequently, attention on groups should raise legal and moral red flags and compel us to move cautiously in this area. Pragmatically, targeting population groups as the object of study requires the determination of the nature and scope of “population groups” for purposes of genetics research.

We respond to Morgan and Feeley’s critique on our article “Mass Media in Organ Donation: Managing Conflicting Messages and Interests.” We noted that Morgan and Feeley agree with the position that the primary aims of media campaigns are: “to educate the general public about organ donation process” and “help individuals make informed decisions” about organ donation. For those reasons, the educational messages in media campaigns should not be restricted to “information from pilot work or focus groups” but should include evidence-based facts resulting from a comprehensive literature research. We consider the controversial aspects about organ donation to be relevant, if not necessary, educational materials that must be disclosed in media campaigns to comply with the legal and moral requirements of informed consent. With that perspective in mind, we address the validity of Morgan and Feeley’s claim that media campaigns have no need for informing the public about the controversial nature of death determination in organ donation. Scientific evidence has proven that the criteria for death determination are inconsistent with the Uniform Determination of Death Act and therefore potentially harmful to donors. The decision by campaign designers to use the statutory definition of death without disclosing the current controversies surrounding that definition does not contribute to improved informed decision making. We argue that if Morgan and Feeley accept the important role of media campaigns to enhance informed decision making, then critical controversies should be disclosed. In support of that premise, we will outline: (1) the wide-spread scientific challenges to brain death as a concept of death; (2) the influence of the donor registry and team-huddling on the medical care of potential donors; (3) the use of authorization rather than informed consent for donor registration; (4) the contemporary religious controversy; and (5) the effects of training desk clerks as organ requestors at the Department of Motor Vehicles offices. We conclude that organ donation is a medical procedure subject to all the ethical obligations that the medical profession must uphold including that of transparency and truthfulness

The left ventricular assist device was originally designed to be surgically implanted as a bridge to transplantation for patients with chronic end-stage heart failure. On the basis of the REMATCH trial, the US Food and Drug Administration and the US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services approved permanent implantation of the left ventricular assist device as a destination therapy in Medicare beneficiaries who are not candidates for heart transplantation. The use of the left ventricular assist device as a destination therapy raises certain ethical challenges. Left ventricular assist devices can prolong the survival of average recipients compared with optimal medical management of chronic end-stage heart failure. However, the overall quality of life can be adversely affected in some recipients because of serious infections, neurologic complications, and device malfunction. Left ventricular assist devices alter end-of-life trajectories. The caregivers of recipients may experience significant burden (e.g., poor physical health, depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder) from destination therapy with left ventricular assist devices. There are also social and financial ramifications for recipients and their families. We advocate early utilization of a palliative care approach and outline prerequisite conditions so that consenting for the use of a left ventricular assist device as a destination therapy is a well informed process. These conditions include: (1) direct participation of a multidisciplinary care team, including palliative care specialists, (2) a concise plan of care for anticipated device-related complications, (3) careful surveillance and counseling for caregiver burden, (4) advance-care planning for anticipated end-of-life trajectories and timing of device deactivation, and (5) a plan to address the long-term financial burden on patients, families, and caregivers. Short-term mechanical circulatory devices (e.g. percutaneous cardiopulmonary bypass, percutaneous ventricular assist devices, etc.) can be initiated in emergency situations as a bridge to permanent implantation of ventricular assist devices in chronic end-stage heart failure. In the absence of first-person (patient) consent, presumed consent or surrogate consent should be used cautiously for the initiation of short-term mechanical circulatory devices in emergency situations as a bridge to permanent implantation of left ventricular assist devices. Future clinical studies of destination therapy with left ventricular assist devices should include measures of recipients' quality of end-of-life care and caregivers' burden.

The value of liberty is one of our most fundamental commitments. Given this commitment, judgments concerning coercion are of profound moral significance. The concept of liberty is usually defined as the absence of coercion; so defined, the very important moral and political value of liberty is safeguarded only when coercion is excluded. Presently, the concept of coercion is inadequately defined, and in drastic need of clear analysis. An important area in which individuals express their liberty is through voluntary agreements made under the law of contracts. The moral defense of the law of contracts rests on the belief that contracts facilitate individuals' opportunities for self-determination; liberty being a necessary condition for self-determination necessitates the exclusion of all forms of coercion in contracts. ;Market interactions have a particular character and occur within a specific institutional framework. Using economic models, I argue that other accounts of coercion have failed to capture the unique character of coercion in market interactions. The "normalcy" criterion, which is the most prevalent approach to distinguishing coercive proposals from noncoercive ones, assumes that a person's status quo is an appropriate point from which to distinguish coercive proposals from noncoercive proposals. I argue that under certain ideal conditions in the market, a perfectly competitive market, this assumption might be legitimate. ;I utilize game-theoretic models to analyze the nature of coercive proposals in an imperfectly competitive market. The bargaining advantages that agents have, which are a function of certain background conditions, give them bargaining power over others with whom they negotiate. I argue that when the following conditions are present coercion can arise in the market: the status quo of an agent is stronger in relation to the agent with whom he is dealing and he takes advantage of his stronger bargaining position, exploiting the deprivation that the weaker agent will face if he does not comply. I apply this analysis of coercion to the law of contracts, specifically, to the doctrines of duress and unconscionability

Does the “free market” foster more freedom for individuals generally and less coercion? Libertarians and other market advocates argue that the unfettered market maximizes freedom and hence has less coercion than any feasible alternative. Welfare liberals, Socialist, and Marxists, in different ways, argue against the claim that the unrestricted market maximizes freedom generally. Both supporters and critics agree that coercion undermines freedom and that that is what is ultimately prima facie wrong with it. Further, they agree that the extent to which an economic system includes coercion provides a serious strike against it. The problem is that there is little consensus on the necessary conditions for coercion. In this paper I will be concerned with the nature of coercive relationships in the market. Market interactions have a particular character and occur within a specific institutional framework. Other accounts of coercion have failed to capture the unique character of coercion in the market because they have failed to take into account certain nontrivial facts about the market which are essential to the analysis of coercive market relations.

The food system impacts many issues of public interests and hence requires that we participate in the governance of it; not only should we act responsibly for our own food purchases, but for the system that produces, manufactures, transports, and disposes of food. This means that society needs to stop treating food choices as merely private ones and not open to democratic governance. We need to stop acting as passive consumers assuming that the system puts out safe, culturally appropriate, and quality products with proper protections for actors in the system and the environment. Instead, we should take responsibility to understand and control the food system through the democratic process and our consumer habits to ensure that the food system is just, supports environmental integrity, is humane to animals, and provides nutritious and delicious food for society.

Background Requirements for organ donation after cardiac or imminent death have been introduced to address the transplantable organs shortage in the United States. Organ procurement organizations increasingly use the Internet for organ donation consent. Methods An analysis of OPO Web sites available to the public for enrollment and consent for organ donation. The Web sites and consent forms were examined for the minimal information recommended by the United States Department of Health and Human Services for informed consent. Content scores were calculated as percentages of data elements in four information categories: donor knowledge, donor consent reinforcement, donation promotion, and informed consent. Results There were 60 Web sites for organ donation enrollment serving the 52 states. The median percent content scores of the Web sites for donor knowledge, donor consent reinforcement, and donation promotion were 33%, 79%, and 75%, respectively. The informed consent score was 0%. The content scores for donor knowledge and informed consent were significantly lower than donor consent reinforcement and donation promotion for all Web sites ( P Conclusion The Web sites and consent forms for public enrollment in organ donation do not fulfill the necessary requirements for informed consent. The Web sites predominantly provide positive reinforcement and promotional information rather than the transparent disclosure of organ donation process. Independent regulatory oversight is essential to ensure that Internet enrollment for organ donation complies with legal and ethical standards for informed consent.

Background Requirements for organ donation after cardiac or imminent death have been introduced to address the transplantable organs shortage in the United States. Organ procurement organizations (OPOs) increasingly use the Internet for organ donation consent. Methods An analysis of OPO Web sites available to the public for enrollment and consent for organ donation. The Web sites and consent forms were examined for the minimal information recommended by the United States Department of Health and Human Services for informed consent. Content scores were calculated as percentages of data elements in four information categories: donor knowledge, donor consent reinforcement, donation promotion, and informed consent. Results There were 60 Web sites for organ donation enrollment serving the 52 states. The median percent (10 percentile-90 percentile) content scores of the Web sites for donor knowledge, donor consent reinforcement, and donation promotion were 33% (20–47), 79% (57–86), and 75% (50–100), respectively. The informed consent score was 0% (0–33). The content scores for donor knowledge and informed consent were significantly lower than donor consent reinforcement and donation promotion for all Web sites (P < .05). The content scores for the four categories were similar among the 11 regions of the United Network for Organ Sharing. Conclusion The Web sites and consent forms for public enrollment in organ donation do not fulfill the necessary requirements for informed consent. The Web sites predominantly provide positive reinforcement and promotional information rather than the transparent disclosure of organ donation process. Independent regulatory oversight is essential to ensure that Internet enrollment for organ donation complies with legal and ethical standards for informed consent

Thomas Reid’s positive account of justice as a natural virtue must be extracted from his polemic on Hume’s theory that justice is an artificial virtue. For Hume, the conceptual analysis of justice is in terms of agreement and hence, it is absurd to suppose that any act is unjust prior to Humean agreement. Hume maintains that no man is obliged to obey the rules of justice unless others agree to do likewise; by implication, there can be no injustices in the state of nature. Reid categorically denies this, and presents sharp criticism of Hume’s account. To refute Hume’s account, Reid must show that there is a conceptual priority of the notion of justice—prior to any convention or artifice of society. In other words, he must show that we have a conception of justice which is not dependent on the conventions of society. Reid, I will show, is successful in showing this. His success in showing that justice is a natural virtue depends not only on his conceptual analysis, but on his arguments from human nature as well. The argument of Reid’s that is the central focus of this paper rests upon the following claim: “As soon as men have any rational conception of a favour and an injury, they must have the conception of justice and perceive its obligation.”