Joanna Komorowska-Mach

This article presents the ethical implications for social science research emerging from our study on interpersonal communication after a laryngectomy. By tracing the evolution of our approach through specific research experiences and participant feedback, we provide empirical support for a flexible, multidimensional, and relational understanding of key ethical concepts, such as vulnerability and the researcher-participant relationship. Our approach has shifted from institutionally imposed rigid categorizations and somewhat stereotypical treatment of both the research group and the researcher-participant relationship to an emphasis on building relationships founded on mutual care and rapport. We argue that this revised perspective fosters ethical collaboration that is beneficial and secure for all parties involved, and we offer practical examples of its implementation in research practice.

In this paper, we analyze the problem of first-person authority and the possibility of disagreement over mental states between first- and third-person ascribers. We explain why discussion on this matter should be preceded by empirical study on the actual strength, scope, and restrictions to such authority. We present a new study in which we show that the type of the ascribed mental state and the kind of interpersonal relationship between speakers both influence the strength of first-person authority. We also suggest that analysis of a disagreement between a first- and a third-person ascriber of a mental state should take into account the intuition that it is possible that neither of these disagreeing speakers is wrong in their ascriptions.

The review tries to summarize the main topics covered by the book "Między redukcją a emergencją" by Robert Poczobut and also to highlight certain points that might be controversial to the philosophically-oriented reader. In particular, Poczobut's methodological claims regarding the boundary between natural sciences and philosophy of mind are brought under scrutiny. While the book presents a broad range of views on matters regarding emergence and reduction, especially with respect to the psychophysical problem, it remains to be proven that the views presented by the author are in reality the most viable option that a philosopher of mind wishing to conform to scientific results has at her disposal

The review discusses the book The Origin of Concepts by Susan Carey, in which she presents three main theses — the innateness of some kind of conceptual representations, the presence of a qualitative change during conceptual development and the existence of a special learning mechanism that achieves that discontinuity called bootstrapping. The general reception of the work is positive. Minor doubts are presented regarding two claims: first, the speculation about the iconic format of core cognition representations, which seems to be underdeveloped and slightly unclear, second, the claim that core cognition representations are innate, which seems to be insufficiently supported by empirical data presented