Joanna Lawson

It seems that there is at least one sphere where one has almost unlimited control: oneself. If anything is up to one to decide, who one is is up to oneself. I suggest in this paper that even this control is beyond us. There are important ways in which one’s identity—considered as true answers to the “who are you?” question—is constrained by the larger social context. In particular, I argue that one’s identity is metaphysically determined and existentially constrained by social practices. First, I distinguish between two types of identity: metaphysical identity and existential identity. Metaphysical identity encompasses social categories such as race, gender, and occupation. I argue that metaphysical identity is socially constructed such that societal norms and practices make it the case that one has the traits that constitute metaphysical identity. Existential identity, by contrast, relates to an individual’s deep commitments and values. Although one has much more control over one’s existential identity, this, too, faces socially-imposed limitations. In particular, existential identity is constrained by available hermeneutical resources. I conclude by exploring the ethical implications of this analysis of individual identity.

According to the increasingly popular Content View of de se attitudes, all de se differences boil down to a difference in content. According to a tempting argument, the truth of the Content View is fairly easy to establish just by attending to the notion of ‘content’. The argument goes like this. It is part of the concept of ‘content’ that content explains differences in (i) agents’ behaviors and (ii) the cognitive significance of agents’ attitudes. Accounting for de se phenomena consists of explaining precisely these kinds of differences (in behavior and cognitive significance). Since content, as a matter of conceptual truth, accounts for differences in (i) and (ii) more generally, content must be what explains de se differences in (i) and (ii). Although the argument boasts prima facie plausibility, it rests on an unclear premise about notion of content. The premise admits of both a weak and a strong reading. The weak reading is plausible but does not yield the desired conclusion. The strong reading yields the conclusion but is too strong to be plausible. The result: the road to establishing the truth of the Content View, if there is one, will not be easy.

Kripke thought that the meaning paradox articulated in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language arises due to a logical tension. This diagnosis, however, doesn’t account for the enduring controversy surrounding the paradox. I argue that the meaning paradox stems instead from a tension inherent in two conflicting philo- sophical methodologies: theoretical internalism and theoretical externalism. Inter- nalism, as a philosophical methodology, takes for granted the contents of our minds, whereas externalism takes for granted empirical data and shared notions of common sense. Two of the constraints on a straight solution to the paradox—the Guidance Constraint and the Error Constraint—rely for their plausibility on theoretical inter- nalism and theoretical externalism, respectively. A straight solution thus rests on resolving the tension between these two conflicting philosophical methods. There are, accordingly, two ways to dodge the problem. Kripke’s skeptical solution favors theoretical externalism, but a skeptical solution favoring theoretical internalism is available as well.

It is widely accepted that it counts for a metaphysical theory when the theory is in accord with common sense and against a metaphysical theory when the theory clashes with common sense. It is unclear, however, why this should be the case. When engaging in metaphysics, why should we give common sense any weight? This chapter maintains that it is only against the backdrop of a particular metametaphysical stance that questions about metaphysical best practices become tractable. From the perspective of a metaphysics-as-modelling approach, common sense ought to play a significant, though defeasible, role in metaphysical theorizing. According with common sense is one of a number of theoretical virtues that metaphysicians should strive for. Nevertheless, it is important for the metaphysician to be cautious when appealing to common sense. She should distinguish what actually falls within the bounds of common sense as such from what a particular researcher happens to find intuitive. Furthermore, our best scientific theories may undercut the evidence provided by common sense. Finally, the metaphysician should attend to the context in which she invokes common sense. For some topics of inquiry, common sense ought to play a more expansive role in our metaphysical theorizing than for others.