Joel Bock

This paper engages in an interpretation and critique of Simondon’s approach to technical objects through his concept of alienation. I begin with his argument for why the fundamental source of alienation is “psycho-physical” and explain his critique of politico-economic analyses of alienation. I then explain his proposal for reducing alienation by rethinking work as “technical activity.” I then argue that while Simondon’s analyses of the internal functionality of technical objects provide important contributions to the philosophy of technology, he also overemphasizes the psycho-physical and in turn underestimates the role of politico-economic factors in the ontogenesis of technical objects and production of alienation. Both the psycho-physical and politico-economic, I claim, must be thought together as necessarily interconnected conditions of the ontogenesis of technical objects. On that basis, it becomes possible to engage in philosophical critique of and education about the inner functionality of contemporary technologies and their accompanying risks.

This paper investigates the compatibility of Hegel’s analyses of the mechanization of work in industrial society with Hegel’s notion of freedom as rational self-determination. Work as such is for Hegel a crucial moment on the way to a more complete realization of human freedom, but, as I maintain with Adorno, the technological developments of the last two centuries raise the question of whether the nature of work itself has changed since the industrial revolution. In his Jena lectures, Hegel recognized significant problems that the mechanization of work poses for human freedom that—on my assessment—his later, mature thought does not sufficiently address. One finds, however, a more comprehensive depiction of the same worries that Hegel mentioned in his Jena lectures in Adorno’s critique of the dominant forms of labor in contemporary society and his understanding of technological rationality, which according to Adorno, dominates the contemporary world. I suggest, furthermore, that juxtaposing Hegel’s and Adorno’s thoughts on technology and the mechanization of work reveals Adorno’s philosophy of technology to be an extension, rather than a critique, of the spirit of Hegel’s own philosophical project as immanent critique of the necessary entailments of any given concept.

This paper focuses on the intersections between Jacques Derrida’s thinking of teletechnology, virtualisation, mondialisation and the role that education and the ‘university to come’ can play in coping with the changing landscapes of our increasingly digitised world. This analysis also addresses what I call the pragmatist critique of Derrida, which accuses deconstruction of being incapable of offering any prescriptive norms for how we can actually achieve systemic political change and what those changes should look like beyond a vague or unrealistic utopian hope for an undefinable, unanticipatable ‘event’ to come. I argue, in contrast, that Derrida’s thinking on teletechnology provides one of many examples of the practical implications of deconstruction and can help explain Derrida’s account of how the politico-economic outside functions and conditions the university. Moreover, I explain Derrida’s argument that the ‘how’ of interrupting or breaking the vicious cycle of technoeconomic power structures cannot be solved by a mere list of preprogramed objectives and thus must necessarily be left open to uncertainty, further determination and the possibility of the unknown. At the same time, however, this resistance to preprogramed objectives does not entail an outright rejection of political resistance or education about the power structures at work within various domains of life.