Joel Jaakko Janhonen

In this article, we theoretically explore the role of biophilia for morality, challenging and expanding recent moral psychological models that struggle to account for this relationship. We conceptualize the psychological trait of Nature Relatedness as a comprehensive biophilic orientation or mode of being that enables individuals to integrate nature into their identity and informs their interactions with both natural and social environments. By synthesizing theories of Erich Fromm and Arne Næss with recent research, we claim that biophilic orientation involves not only the transition from a narrow to an ecological self, but also encompasses worldviews, values, and experiences. We develop the idea that dispositional aspects of biophilia and affective-experiential levels of morality interact: Biophilic disposition is both driven by and drives self-transcendent experiences and affect-laden engagements that foster self-other overlap, possibly expanding one’s moral concern. We connect these ideas to moral psychological research on moral intuitions and identity, particularly by discussing Nature Relatedness in relation to Jonathan Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory. One’s subjective relationship and identification with the natural world appear central to moral expansion. Besides extending concern to non-human individuals, parochial, group-cohesion-related moral emotions might be re-channeled. These binding foundations appear generally resistant to moral expansion, yet the biophilic drive to integrate and unite may broaden one’s identification beyond human ingroups. Thus, we propose that Nature Relatedness may expand moral intuitions across foundations, outlining what a non-anthropocentric application of moral foundations and biocentric intuitions might look like. Implications, including prospective interventions, and the need for further research, are discussed.

This article describes an alternative starting point for embedding human values into artificial intelligence (AI) systems. As applications of AI become more versatile and entwined with society, an ever-wider spectrum of considerations must be incorporated into their decision-making. However, formulating less-tangible human values into mathematical algorithms appears incredibly challenging. This difficulty is understandable from a viewpoint that perceives human moral decisions to primarily stem from intuition and emotional dispositions, rather than logic or reason. Our innate normative judgements promote prosocial behaviours which enable collaboration within a shared environment. Individuals internalise the values and norms of their social context through socialisation. The complexity of the social environment makes it impractical to consistently apply logic to pick the best available action. This has compelled natural agents to develop mental shortcuts and rely on the collective moral wisdom of the social group. This work argues that the acquisition of human values cannot happen just through rational thinking, and hence, alternative approaches should be explored. Designing receptiveness to social signalling can provide context-flexible normative guidance in vastly different life tasks. This approach would approximate the human trajectory for value learning, which requires social ability. Artificial agents that imitate socialisation would prioritise conformity by minimising detected or expected disapproval while associating relative importance with acquired concepts. Sensitivity to direct social feedback would especially be useful for AI that possesses some embodied physical or virtual form. Work explores the necessary faculties for social norm enforcement and the ethical challenges of navigating based on the approval of others.

Human rights may feel self-apparent to us, but less than 80 years ago, one of the most advanced countries at the time acted based on an utterly contrary ideology. The view of social Darwinism that abandoned the idea of the intrinsic value of human lives instead argued that oppression of the inferior is not only inevitable but desirable. One of the many catastrophic outcomes is the medical data obtained from inhuman experiments at concentration camps. Ethical uncertainty over whether the resulting insights should be a part of the medical literature provides a chance to consider the seemingly irreplaceable social construct of human dignity. Would any medical benefit justify the utilization of this illicit data? Would utilization even qualify as an insult to the dignity of the exploited subjects, or is this a question about intersubjective meaning? This work discusses the wisdom in blind adherence to human dignity, the possibility of retrospective insults, moral complicity, contrary viewpoints, and possible resolutions.