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21Affordances from a control viewpointPhilosophical Psychology. forthcoming.Perceiving an armchair prepares us to sit. Reading the first line in a text prepares us to read it. This article proposes that the affordance construct used to explain reactive potentiation of behavior similarly applies to reactive potentiation of cognitive actions. It defends furthermore that, in both cases, affordance-sensings do not only apply to selective (dis)engagement, but also to the revision and the termination of actions. In the first section, characteristics of environmental affordanc…Read more
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5Subjectivité et conscience d'agir: approches cognitive et clinique de la psychosePresses Universitaires de France - PUF. 1998.Dans la psychose, les données cliniques montrent que dès l'apparition des premiers troubles aigus, une difficulté caractéristique se manifeste au niveau de l'attribution de la responsabilité causale des actions. Les patients se sentent poussés à agir par les autres tout en ayant aussi le sentiment de contrôler l'action d'autrui. Cette difficulté va souvent de pair chez les schizophrènes avec une modification du sentiment d'identité personnelle. Parmi les symptômes de l'autisme, on trouve des dif…Read more
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26What can metacognition teach us about the evolution of communication?Evolutionary Linguistic Theory 5 (1): 1-10. 2023.Procedural metacognition is the set of affect-based mechanisms allowing agents to regulate cognitive actions like perceptual discrimination, memory retrieval or problem solving. This article proposes that procedural metacognition has had a major role in the evolution of communication. A plausible hypothesis is that, under pressure for maximizing signalling efficiency, the metacognitive abilities used by nonhumans to regulate their perception and their memory have been re-used to regulate their c…Read more
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15Mental ActsIn Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Wiley‐blackwell. 2010.This chapter contains sections titled: Mental Agency as Sensitivity to Reasons Mental Agency as Voluntary Control Mental Agency, ‘Evaluative Control,’ and Metacognition References Further reading.
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1Adaptive Control Loops as an Intermediate Mind-Brain Reduction BasisIn Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain, Ontos Verlag. pp. 191-219. 2009.
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Sens frégéen et compréhension de la langueIn Herman Parret & Jacques Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and understanding, W. De Gruyter. pp. 304-324. 1981.
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95Malfunction and Mental IllnessThe Monist 82 (4): 658-670. 1999.For years a debate has raged within the various literatures of philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology over whether, and to what degree, the concepts that characterize psychopathology are social constructions that reflect cultural values. While the majority position among philosophers has been normativist, i.e., that the conception of a mental disorder is value-laden, a vocal and cogent minority have argued that psychopathology results from malfunctions that can be described by terminology that i…Read more
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2Are Children Sensitive to What They Know?: An Insight from Yucatec Mayan ChildrenJournal of Cognition and Culture 21 (3-4): 226-242. 2021.Metacognitive abilities are considered as a hallmark of advanced human cognition. Existing empirical studies have exclusively focused on populations from Western and industrialized societies. Little is known about young children’s metacognitive abilities in other societal and cultural contexts. Here we tested 4-year-old Yucatec Mayan by adopting a metacognitive task in which children’s explicit assessment of their own knowledge states about the hidden content of a container and their informing j…Read more
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75The foundations of metacognition (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2012.Bringing together researchers from across the cognitive sciences, the book is valuable for philosophers of mind, developmental and comparative psychologists, and neuroscientists.
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21Metacognition and mindreading in young children: A cross-cultural studyConsciousness and Cognition 85 (C): 103017. 2020.
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1612- and 24-Month-Old Infants’ Search Behavior Under Informational UncertaintyFrontiers in Psychology 11. 2020.
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23De la difficulté d’être naturaliste en matiére d’intentionalitéRevue de Synthèse 111 (1-2): 13-32. 1990.
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26XIII-Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist ViewProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3): 241-268. 2008.
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64Réponse à Édouard Machery. Pour une pensée évolutionniste des répresentationsDialogue 44 (1): 161-166. 2005.Dans son compte-rendu de mon livre, Les Animaux Pensent-ils?, Machery objecte que l'évolution n'étant ni hiérarchique ni linéaire, il n'et pas justifié de proposer une analyse hiérarchique des représentations. Je réponds à cette objection, en montrant qu'on peut en effet distinguer des types de représentation par leurs propriétés sémantiques et computationnelles. On peut reconnaître le caractère anagénétique du développement de la cognition sans pour autant légitimer une conception hiérarchique …Read more
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3Ein Lösungsvorschlag zum Problem der repräsentationalen Basis tierischer MetakognitionIn Wolfgang Welsch, Christian Tewes & Klaus Vieweg (eds.), Natur und Geist: über ihre evolutionäre Verhältnisbestimmung, Akademie Verlag. pp. 205. 2011.
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89Les conditions de la connaissance de soiPhilosophiques 27 (1): 161-186. 2000.La connaissance de soi suppose que l'on puisse former des pensées vraies de la forme 'je Y que P', où 'Y' fait référence à une attitude propositionnelle, 'P' à son contenu, et 'je' au penseur de cette pensée. La question qui se pose est de savoir, ce qui, dans le contenu mental occurrent [P], justifie l'auto-attribution de cette pensée. Ce problème dit de la transition soulève trois difficultés ; celle de la préservation du contenu intentionnel entre la pensée de premier et de second ordre ; cel…Read more
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72Time and Action: Impulsivity, Habit, StrategyReview of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4): 717-743. 2015.Granting that various mental events might form the antecedents of an action, what is the mental event that is the proximate cause of action? The present article reconsiders the methodology for addressing this question: Intention and its varieties cannot be properly analyzed if one ignores the evolutionary constraints that have shaped action itself, such as the trade-off between efficient timing and resources available, for a given stake. On the present proposal, three types of action, impulsive,…Read more
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Questions de forme. Logique et proposition analytique de Kant à CarnapRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3): 394-396. 1988.
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310Looking for the agent: An investigation into consciousness of action and self-consciousness in schizophrenic patientsCognition 65 (1): 71-86. 1997.The abilities to attribute an action to its proper agent and to understand its meaning when it is produced by someone else are basic aspects of human social communication. Several psychiatric syndromes, such as schizophrenia, seem to lead to a dysfunction of the awareness of one’s own action as well as of recognition of actions performed by other. Such syndromes offer a framework for studying the determinants of agency, the ability to correctly attribute actions to their veridical source. Thirty…Read more
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5This article summarizes how I came to deal with the subject matter of action, the main claims that I have defended, the prospects for future research, the interdisciplinary collaborations that are needed, and the obstacles to be surmounted.
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8This chapter discusses what is the specific difference of mental function, relative to the general concept of a biological function. It contrasts various approaches of this problem through evolutionary psychology, developmental system theory and neuroscientific growth theory models. It concludes that an holistic, dynamic approach to mental function suggests to reject the traditional division in mental faculties.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Biology |