Johan Dahlbeck

In this paper, my aim is to sketch out a pedagogical concept departing from the existing musical term sympathetic resonance. This is an admittedly experimental endeavor, serving to test out the currency of an already well-established term in a conceptual landscape that is foreign to it. What I hope to attain by this is to open up for a new array of questions for the philosophy of education, indicating a novel approach to the study of pedagogical relations. My hypothesis, such as it is, is that sympathetic resonance stands to offer a conceptual guide for understanding how teaching a group of students can work by teachers (knowingly or unknowingly) offering various overtones to be latched onto and elaborated in different ways by different students. Sympathetic resonance is offered as a conceptual tool for better understanding the complex dynamics of maintaining parallel pedagogical relationships.

In this paper, my aim is to sketch out a pedagogical concept departing from the existing musical term sympathetic resonance. This is an admittedly experimental endeavor, serving to test out the currency of an already well-established term in a conceptual landscape that is foreign to it. What I hope to attain by this is to open up for a new array of questions for the philosophy of education, indicating a novel approach to the study of pedagogical relations. My hypothesis, such as it is, is that sympathetic resonance stands to offer a conceptual guide for understanding how teaching a group of students can work by teachers (knowingly or unknowingly) offering various overtones to be latched onto and elaborated in different ways by different students. Sympathetic resonance is offered as a conceptual tool for better understanding the complex dynamics of maintaining parallel pedagogical relationships.

In this paper my aim is to compare and contrast Linda Zagzebski’s theory of moral exemplarism with a form of fictionalism modeled after Hans Vaihinger’s philosophy of ‘as if.’ The purpose for doing so is to address the pedagogical implications of underestimating affective and social dimensions of modeling moral behavior in a general educational setting. It is suggested that Vaihinger’s fictionalism offers a less instrumental view than moral exemplarism, and that focusing on getting started by way of expedient fictions is a more productive approach in education than focusing on attaining the exemplary via a model of admiration-emulation. Because the role of the teacher in the exemplarist setup is limited to offering narratives portraying exemplars, the pedagogical relation between teacher and student is downplayed in favor of the unidirectional relation between the student and the exemplary narrative. In the fictionalist setup, in contrast, the teacher is tasked with the more demanding and pedagogically rich undertaking of affective attunement, where awakening the curiosity of students through fictions demands an acute sense of how different people with different ingenia can be influenced to strive for the same thing via mind-reading and the imitation of affects. It is concluded that the main challenge for the fictionalist teacher is not to ensure that students admire and emulate what is truly admirable (i.e. to function as a corrective of students’ unreflective admiration), but to endeavor to prevent expedient fictions from turning into dogmas that inhibit moral thought and action rather than promote it.

In this paper my aim is to compare and contrast Linda Zagzebski’s theory of moral exemplarism with a form of fictionalism modeled after Hans Vaihinger’s philosophy of ‘as if.’ The purpose for doing so is to address the pedagogical implications of underestimating affective and social dimensions of modeling moral behavior in a general educational setting. It is suggested that Vaihinger’s fictionalism offers a less instrumental view than moral exemplarism, and that focusing on getting started by way of expedient fictions is a more productive approach in education than focusing on attaining the exemplary via a model of admiration-emulation. Because the role of the teacher in the exemplarist setup is limited to offering narratives portraying exemplars, the pedagogical relation between teacher and student is downplayed in favor of the unidirectional relation between the student and the exemplary narrative. In the fictionalist setup, in contrast, the teacher is tasked with the more demanding and pedagogically rich undertaking of affective attunement, where awakening the curiosity of students through fictions demands an acute sense of how different people with different ingenia can be influenced to strive for the same thing via mind-reading and the imitation of affects. It is concluded that the main challenge for the fictionalist teacher is not to ensure that students admire and emulate what is truly admirable (i.e. to function as a corrective of students’ unreflective admiration), but to endeavor to prevent expedient fictions from turning into dogmas that inhibit moral thought and action rather than promote it.

The aim of this essay is to track two parallel currents in educational theory. These currents have a long-standing and varied history, traceable to at least as far back as ancient Greek philosophy. This essay is not primarily concerned with the history of these currents, however, but is rather conceived as an endeavor to identify and grapple with a persistent tension at the heart of the philosophy of education, one that remains alive and well to this day. The tension in question is between the current of fictionalism and the current of dogmatism. For this tension to make sense, the two different currents (and their respective conceptual landscapes) need to be unpacked. The best way of doing this, to my mind, is via an example that in some ways stands out as paradigmatic within the history of the philosophy of education; Plato’s Republic. It is paradigmatic in the sense that it clearly illustrates how both of these currents or opposing impulses intertwine and collide within the same educational landscape.

The aim of this paper is to offer an account of the teacher as optimistic nutritionist. Drawing on recent theoretical work seeking to identify and elucidate the main components of the optimistic nutritionist as an ethical ideal (by way of Spinoza’s and Nietzsche’s ethical theories), this paper proposes a model of ethical teaching that opts for a different route from that of amodel grounded in moral exemplarism. This route is not oriented around admiration and imitation, but rather around the axioms of selectivity and selfishness. Instead of grounding educational transformation in the student’s ability to emulate the teacher (or the exemplars identified by the teacher), educational transformation is here grounded in an aspirational account where the self-cultivation of the student is influenced and promoted by a combination of practical embodied experimentation and the guidance of the teacher qua optimistic nutritionist.

The aim of this essay is to track two parallel currents in educational theory. These currents have a long-standing and varied history, traceable to at least as far back as ancient Greek philosophy. This essay is not primarily concerned with the history of these currents, however, but is rather conceived as an endeavor to identify and grapple with a persistent tension at the heart of the philosophy of education, one that remains alive and well to this day. The tension in question is between the current of fictionalism and the current of dogmatism. For this tension to make sense, the two different currents (and their respective conceptual landscapes) need to be unpacked. The best way of doing this, to my mind, is via an example that in some ways stands out as paradigmatic within the history of the philosophy of education; Plato’s Republic. It is paradigmatic in the sense that it clearly illustrates how both of these currents or opposing impulses intertwine and collide within the same educational landscape.

The aim of this paper is to offer an account of the teacher as optimistic nutritionist. Drawing on recent theoretical work seeking to identify and elucidate the main components of the optimistic nutritionist as an ethical ideal (by way of Spinoza’s and Nietzsche’s ethical theories), this paper proposes a model of ethical teaching that opts for a different route from that of a model grounded in moral exemplarism. This route is not oriented around admiration and imitation, but rather around the axioms of selectivity and selfishness. Instead of grounding educational transformation in the student’s ability to emulate the teacher (or the exemplars identified by the teacher), educational transformation is here grounded in an aspirational account where the self-cultivation of the student is influenced and promoted by a combination of practical embodied experimentation and the guidance of the teacher qua optimistic nutritionist.

In this paper my aim is to compare and contrast Linda Zagzebski’s theory of moral exemplarism with a form of fictionalism modeled after Hans Vaihinger’s philosophy of ‘as if.’ The purpose for doing so is to address the pedagogical implications of underestimating affective and social dimensions of modeling moral behavior in a general educational setting. It is suggested that Vaihinger’s fictionalism offers a less instrumental view than moral exemplarism, and that focusing on getting started by way of expedient fictions is a more productive approach in education than focusing on attaining the exemplary via a model of admiration-emulation. Because the role of the teacher in the exemplarist setup is limited to offering narratives portraying exemplars, the pedagogical relation between teacher and student is downplayed in favor of the unidirectional relation between the student and the exemplary narrative. In the fictionalist setup, in contrast, the teacher is tasked with the more demanding and pedagogically rich undertaking of affective attunement, where awakening the curiosity of students through fictions demands an acute sense of how different people with different ingenia can be influenced to strive for the same thing via mind-reading and the imitation of affects. It is concluded that the main challenge for the fictionalist teacher is not to ensure that students admire and emulate what is truly admirable (i.e. to function as a corrective of students’ unreflective admiration), but to endeavor to prevent expedient fictions from turning into dogmas that inhibit moral thought and action rather than promote it.

In his From Bondage to Freedom, Michael LeBuffe argues that Spinoza's theory of ethics hinges on a figure that he calls the optimistic nutritionist. LeBuffe sets up the optimistic nutritionist as a thought experiment useful for illustrating how Spinoza's ethical theory can be put into practice. While LeBuffe offers some illuminating examples intended to illustrate how the optimistic nutritionist would function as a pedagogical guide of sorts, the practical aspects of this figure remain vague and underdeveloped. In this paper, the aim is to read Nietzsche's controversial autobiography Ecce Homo as an exemplification of how the optimistic nutritionist might be conceived in situ, in terms of a person applying a systematic form of selectivity to different things so as to determine whether or not they are useful for furthering their self‐preservation and empowerment. This amounts to a practical guide to a form of Spinozistic ethics, where Nietzsche's optimistic nutritionist functions by setting up concrete guidelines for the selectivity of useful things, without succumbing to the hazards of moral universalism and abstract perfectionism.

This paper argues that Rousseau’s lawgiver is best thought of as a fictional teacher of peoples. It is fictional as it reflects an idea that is entertained despite its contradictory nature, and it is contradictory in the sense that it describes ‘an undertaking beyond human strength and, to execute it, an authority that amounts to nothing’ (II.7; 192). Rousseau conceives of the social contract as a necessary device for enabling the transferal of individual power to the body politic, for subsuming individual wills under the general will, and for aligning the good of the individual with the common good. For the social contract to be valid, however, it needs to be preceded by a desire to belong to a moral community that can induce people to join willingly, and that will grant legitimacy to the laws established. If the social contract is the machinery that makes the body politic function, the lawgiver is ‘the mechanic who invents the machine’ (II.7; 191). In this paper we will look closer at the pedagogical functions of Rousseau’s mythical lawgiver by first examining the relationship between the social contract, the general will and the lawgiver. Then, we aim to flesh out a pedagogical understanding of the figure of the lawgiver by way of the two educational dimensions of accommodation and transformation. Finally, we will argue for the importance of understanding Rousseau’s lawgiver as a fictional device allowing for the fundamental and enduring educational task of balancing between the preservation and renewal of society.

In this paper Johan Dahlbeck sets out to propose a pedagogy of “as if,” seeking to address the educational paradox of how students can be influenced to approximate a life guided by reason without assuming that they are already sufficiently rational to adhere to dictates of practical reason. He does so by outlining a fictionalist account, drawing primarily on Hans Vaihinger's systematic treatment of heuristic fictions and on Spinoza's ideas about how passive affects can be made to strengthen reason. Dahlbeck suggests that such an account can help us overcome the problem of assuming that reason needs to be enlisted as an instrument in the educational endeavor to live according to the guidance of reason. The reason this is so is that fictions can use passive affects that are prosocial and that thereby strengthen the sense of community necessary for laying a cooperative foundation for successful joint striving. Dahlbeck suggests further that exemplary teachers are crucial to this endeavor insofar as they can offer educational fictions as imaginative and temporary placeholders for the truth, allowing students to act “as if” they were already guided by reason.

Fictionalism confronts the dual epistemological nature of education. In this book, Johan Dahlbeck argues that all education, at bottom, concerns a striving for truth initiated through fictions. This foundational aporia is then interrogated and made sense of via Hans Vaihinger’s philosophy of ‘as if’ and Spinoza’s peculiar form of exemplarism. Using a variety of fictional examples, Dahlbeck investigates the different dimensions of educational fictionalism, from teacher exemplarism to the basic educational fictions necessary for getting started in education in the first place. Fictionalism will be a valuable resource for anyone interested in the philosophical foundations of education.

This paper addresses the rift between the teacher’s sense of self as a causal agent and the experience of being in lack of control in the classroom, by way of Hans Vaihinger’s philosophy of ‘as if.’ It is argued that understanding agential control in terms of a valuable educational fiction—a practical (ethical) fiction in Vaihinger’s vocabulary—can offer a way of bridging this rift and can help teachers make sense of the tension between their felt need to strive for control and their experience of suffering from lack of control. A fiction, it is argued, is different from an illusion in that fictions can be affirmed without being believed. Unlike illusions, valuable fictions can be recognized as fictions and still retain some of their affective power over us, thereby allowing us to act ‘as if.’ In education, this is helpful as it means that we can make use of valuable fictions without assuming that these have to be protected from the critical gaze of non-believers. In fact, we can openly acknowledge that we rely on fictions as this is part and parcel of being a human being with a limited cognitive ability.

Douglas Yacek’s recent book The Transformative Classroom proposes a useful aspirational model of transformative education. In this critical commentary, I review this model and suggest that while it succeeds in overcoming some ethical shortcomings of other dominant models of transformative education, I would like to suggest that focusing on more subtle transformative gestures could have the benefit of being less dependent of the teacher’s intention to transform and of being less constrained by the expectation that transformation should take place primarily in the classroom. When transformation is conceived as an educational fiction, it may be conceived as a retroactive experience constructed around memories of the teacher’s transformative gestures, thereby adding to Yacek’s aspirational model by allowing for transformation to continue beyond the walls of the classroom.

In this paper we aim to use the Swedish example of entrepreneurship in education as a springboard to discuss the unexpected alliance between student-centered progressive education and the commercialization of schools. In doing so we wish to highlight the effects of this alliance on the relationship between teaching and learning and, consequently, on the teacher-student relation. In order to do this, we will first examine the conditions for the commercialization of contemporary education, and its impact on the teacher-student relation. Having done so, we will turn to progressive education, examining the curious link between the ideal of student-centeredness and the economization of the role of the student. The paper will conclude with a discussion on some inherent tensions visible in entrepreneurial learning, being at once an effect of the commercialization of schools and a pedagogical project firmly rooted in progressive ideals.

This paper addresses the rift between the teacher’s sense of self as a causal agent and the experience of being in lack of control in the classroom, by way of Hans Vaihinger’s philosophy of ‘as if.’ It is argued that understanding agential control in terms of a valuable fiction—a practical fiction in Vaihinger’s vocabulary—can offer a way of bridging this rift and can help teachers make sense of the tension between their felt need to strive for control and their experience of suffering from lack of control. A fiction, it is argued, is different from an illusion in that fictions can be affirmed without being believed. Unlike illusions, valuable fictions can be recognized as fictions and still retain some of their affective power over us, thereby allowing us to act ‘as if.’ In education, this is helpful as it means that we can make use of valuable fictions without assuming that these have to be protected from the critical gaze of non-believers. In fact, we can openly acknowledge that we rely on fictions as this is part and parcel of being a human being with a limited cognitive ability.

To what extent should teachers promote the view from nowhere as an ideal to strive for in education? To address this question, I will use Mark Twain’s The Mysterious Stranger as an example, illustrating the stakes involved when the view from nowhere is taken to be an attainable educational ideal. I will begin this essay by offering a description of Thomas Nagel’s view from nowhere. Having done this, I will return to Twain’s story, providing some further examples of how access to the view from nowhere comes to influence the educational process in different ways. I will then connect the educational question raised by Twain’s story to two radically different versions of the exemplar found in the works of Benedict de Spinoza: the philosopher and the prophet. These figures will help illustrate how the striving for philosophical truth can sometimes be educationally inapt, as education always needs to account for humans being human, all too human.

This book is a philosophical enquiry into the educational consequences of Spinoza’s political theory. Spinoza’s political theory is of particular interest for educational thought as it brings together the normative aims of his ethical theory with his realistic depiction of human psychology and the ramifications of this for successful political governance. As such, this book aims to introduce the reader to Spinoza’s original vision of civic education, as a project that ultimately aims at the ethical flourishing of individuals, while being carefully tailored and adjusted to the natural limitations of human reason. Readers will benefit from a succinct introduction to Spinoza’s political philosophy and from an account of civic education that is based on careful exegetical work. It draws conclusions only hinted at in Spinoza’s own writings.

The purpose of this article is to add to the debate on the normative status and legitimacy of indoctrination in education by drawing on the political philosophy of Benedict Spinoza (1632–1677). More specifically, I will argue that Spinoza’s relational approach to knowledge formation and autonomy, in light of his understanding of the natural limitations of human cognition, provides us with valuable hints for staking out a more productive path ahead for the debate on indoctrination. This article combines an investigation into the early modern history of political ideas with a philosophical inquiry into a persistent conceptual problem residing at the heart of education. As such, the aim of the article is ultimately to offer an account of indoctrination less fraught with the dangers of epistemological and political idealism that often haunt rival conceptions.

This article turns to the neglected pedagogical concept of ingenium in order to address some shortcomings of the admiration–emulation model of Linda Zabzebski’s influential exemplarist moral theory. I will start by introducing the problem of the admiration-emulation model by way of a fictional example. I will then briefly outline the concept of ingenium such as it appears in a Renaissance context, looking particularly at the pedagogical writings of Juan Luis Vives. This will set the stage for the next part, looking at how early modern philosopher Benedict Spinoza adopts a Vivesian notion of ingenium, adjusting it so as to fit into the setting of his political theory. Next, I will turn to Spinoza’s use of the concept of ingenium in relation to his portrayal of exemplary persons, offering a pedagogical model of moral exemplarism that can counter some of the perceived problems of the admiration–emulation model as it highlights the necessary fallibility of efficient exemplars as well as acknowledges the socio-political dimension of emotions. Finally, I will lay out some preliminary consequences for educational theory, hoping to offer a way of reconciling moral exemplarism with a more realistic pedagogical and psychological framework.

While Spinoza stipulates an ideal moral person in the propositions on the ‘free man’ in Ethics IV, this account does not seem to be intended to function as a pedagogical tool of political relevance. Hence, it does not seem to correspond to the purpose of moral exemplarism. If we look for that kind of practical guidance, Spinoza’s political works seem more relevant. Interestingly, when we approach Spinoza’s political theory with moral exemplarism in mind, we find that instead of constructing his exemplar on the idea of a supremely moral person, he emphasizes the concept of ingenium to chisel out an imperfect model of human behavior. We argue that the purpose of this is to avoid a utopian and inefficient political theory and to work out a moral practice that is capable of assisting people and communities in ethical self-transformation.

In this paper I argue that there are some telling examples from the discourse of education for sustainable development that hint at a reliance on a reversed sense of causality, manifesting itself in a teleological and anthropomorphic understanding of nature. In order to substantiate this claim, I will consider some of Spinoza’s arguments concerning the limitations of human imagination -- and the prejudices that tend to arise from this -- and I will also link this with some of Freud’s claims with regards to the human tendency to deify the forces of nature as a kind of psychological response to the inherent remoteness of said forces. The relation between Spinoza and Freud has been discussed in terms of a mostly implicit affinity grounded in a common metaphysical starting-point that may be labeled a philosophy of immanence. This affinity is most evident, however, with regards to both Spinoza's and Freud’s reliance on a rationalist framework and on their insistence that the human psychological constitution is geared so that when humans are governed by their imagination, and are being confronted with the unexplained, they tend to automatically protect themselves by seeking comfort in the already known, regardless of the unlikeliness of the arrived at explanation. Hence, this paper aims to employ some of Spinoza’s and Freud’s arguments in order to formulate a critique of the anthropomorphic motifs displayed in contemporary educational materials produced within the discourse of ESD.

Given the growing interest in Spinoza’s work in recent years, there is surprisingly little written on the subject of Spinoza and education. There are a handful of journal articles, such as Aloni’s “Spinoza as educator”, Derry’s “The unity of intellect and will”, Puolimatka’s “Spinoza’s theory of teaching and indoctrination” and Dahlbeck’s “Educating for immortality”, and a few notable anthology chapters, such as Genevieve Lloyd’s “Spinoza and the education of the imagination”, but overall the literature on Spinoza and education is quite limited. This paper seeks to add to this work, focusing on initiating a discussion on some of the normative consequences of formulating a philosophy of education based on Spinoza’s ethics of self-preservation. In doing so, it connects with a recent trend in Spinoza scholarship focusing on the ethical core of his philosophy, such as LeBuffe’s From Bondage to Freedom, Kisner’s Spinoza on Human Freedom and Kisner and Youpa’s Essays on Spinoza’s Ethical Theory.

Proposal Information: In this paper it is argued that although Spinoza, unlike other great philosophers of the Enlightenment era, never actually wrote a philosophy of education as such, he did – in his Ethics – write a philosophy of self-improvement that is deeply educational at heart. When looked at against the background of his overall metaphysical system, the educational account that emerges is one that is highly curious and may even, to some extent at least, come across as counter-intuitive in a contemporary setting. This is so because it grounds the greater social and political endeavors of humanity in the individual’s striving for an ever-increasing power of acting. Hence, education, for Spinoza, is a decidedly individualistic affair, but then again, so is the making of society. Since, for Spinoza, every instance of knowledge bears the unique mark of the individual body that expresses it, one might conclude that at the foundation of every social structure is an encounter between concrete bodies; each expressing a particular perspective from where to grasp the world. I would argue, based on this, that one of Spinoza’s main contributions to educational theory is his grounding of larger social endeavors in the striving of the individual. Hinged on the striving to be more rational, as dictated by the doctrine of the conatus, education appears to offer a way of grounding the structure of the human social world in the same principles as those guiding the individual. Spinoza’s doctrine of the imitation of affects thereby offers a way of linking the egoistic striving for power on behalf of the individual with the educational goal of building a sustainable society. It does so as it conditions self-improvement by the human characteristic to imitate what others desire. By being surrounded with people who desire to be more rational, one can utilize this desire for the good and become strengthened in one’s own striving for increasing one’s degree of existence. Consequently, the teaching situation is geared for guiding students towards a more rational life, at the same time as it is geared for the self-improvement of the teacher. This aspect of self-improvement is, ultimately, what will motivate the teacher in striving to enhance the lives of his or her students in the first place. Being unable to self-improve in isolation, the doctrine of the imitation of affects dictates that the rational person will be moved toward a life of generosity, not primarily for altruistic reasons, but out of a desire to become more rational and thus to gain in his or her own power of acting. The question that follows from this, of course, is how does one go about when inculcating a desire to be more rational in one’s students?Education, from a Spinozistic point of view, is ultimately about the cultivation of the potential that lies dormant in each individual, so that a person may live a happier life as a result of understanding, more adequately, their place in the natural world. The challenge, then, becomes one of overcoming the many obstacles that prevent a person from developing their potential. Pedagogy, from this point of view, may be understood in terms of the art of offering the right amount of resistance. This notion is based on the assumption that if a student encounters no resistance – or too much resistance – his or her potential remains just that – a potential. In order to develop this potential the student needs to overcome certain barriers. With regards to this, the role of the teacher may be conceived in terms of the one balancing the amount of resistance so that the student is properly challenged but at the same time not overwhelmed. Methodology or Methods/ Research Instruments or Sources Used: The paper makes for an attempt to outline a Spinozistic philosophy of education based on readings of Spinoza’s texts – primarily the Ethics – and some of the relevant secondary literature such as Della Rocca’s influential reading of Spinoza. As such it is a philosophical inquiry seeking to interconnect some key aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy with some of the major issues of education. Methodologically, this paper argues, in line with Melamed, that rather than turning to the history of philosophy in order to identify ‘precursors to [our] own views’, so as to validate what we already believe we know, it is more fruitful to turn to past philosophers in order to ‘challenge our most basic beliefs and intuitions by studying texts that are both well-argued and strongly opposed to our commonsense’. Accordingly, turning to Spinoza marks an attempt to revisit and reconceptualize some key aspects of educational thought. Conclusions, Expected Outcomes or Findings: A conclusion of this paper is that a Spinozistic philosophy of education would need to focus on resolving the tension between Spinoza’s egoism and education as a social project. To this end it identifies Spinoza’s doctrine of the imitation of affects as a possible link between the individual’s striving for power and the collective agenda of improving human well-being at large. It is also suggested that, in aspiring to inculcate a desire to be more rational in his or her students, the challenge for the Spinozistic teacher is to prompt the students to aspire to reach beyond the temporary satisfactions of the passions so as to acquire a more enduring sense of satisfaction and so that their well-being is more fully under their own command rather than under the command of various external influences. This, in turn, is connected with the notion of resistance in the sense that in experiencing the volatility of fortune – and thereby understanding the instability of relying on one’s passions – a person would appear to be more inclined to strive for a more enduring sense of happiness, even if this would mean giving up on some of the temporary pleasures that one has grown accustomed to. The resistance, then, may be conceived in terms of the overcoming of temporary pleasures that stand in the way of the developing of one’s potential. In this scenario the role of the teacher may be understood in terms of someone offering a well-balanced amount of resistance. This means that to accommodate one’s students – in the sense that one approaches them in terms of prospective customers, aspiring to satisfy their demands – is inimical to education insofar as the wants and desires of students are, generally speaking, caused by passive affects rather than their rational wills. References: Aloni, N.. Spinoza as Educator: From Eudaimonistic Ethics to an Empowering and Liberating Pedagogy. Educational Philosophy and Theory 40, pp. 531–544.Della Rocca, M.. Spinoza. New York: Routledge.Della Rocca, M.. Rationalism, Idealism, Monism, and Beyond. In: E. Förster & Y. Y. Melamed Spinoza and German Idealism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 7–26.Derry, J.. The Unity of Intellect and Will: Vygotsky and Spinoza. Educational Review, 56, pp. 113–120.Lloyd, G.. Spinoza and Educating the Imagination. In: A. O. Rorty Philosophers on Education: Historical Perspectives. London: Routledge, pp. 157–172.Melamed, Y. Y.. Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance and Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Nadler, S.. Eternity and Immortality in Spinoza’s Ethics. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 26, pp. 224–244.Poulimatka, T.. Spinoza’s Theory of Teaching and Indoctrination. Educational Philosophy and Theory 33, pp. 397–410.Spinoza, B.. The Ethics. In: E. Curley A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works. Princeton: Princeton Unive.

Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder is a widely spread diagnosis.The dominant paradigm of ADHD is biomedical where ADHD isdefined as a brain disorder. At the same time, the legitimacy of thediagnosis is being questioned since it is unclear whether or not ADHDcan be deemed a medical disorder in itself. The aim of this article is tocritically assess the merits of understanding the diagnosis of ADHD as amedical condition defined as a brain disorder. This is being done usingthe seventeenth century philosopher Benedict Spinoza’s notions of adequate and inadequate knowledge and his counterintuitivetheory of mental health. Doing so it becomes clear that ADHD, howeveradequate it may seem, is founded on inadequate knowledge and thatthe legitimacy of the individual diagnosis should therefore be questionedon the grounds that on a long term scale it is passivizing andstigmatizing rather that liberating.

Saul Smilansky's Illusionism suggests that some false beliefs are important enough to warrant the indefinite perpetuation of illusions in order to protect the larger moral community from breaking down. In this article I suggest that this position actualises an old educational paradox where education is expected to protect the common moral community (even if this means maintaining some illusions), and at the same time promote the pursuit of truth. Taking Smilansky's position of Illusionism as a starting point, I argue that while Illusionism highlights and addresses an important problem—that sometimes false beliefs can function to maintain social stability where the truth threatens to unsettle it—relying on indefinite illusions is problematic from an educational point of view. It is difficult to justify that education, being at least in part motivated by truth-seeking, should (or even could) be grounded in illusion. Taking seriously the fact that a dimension of education concerns maintaining social stability, I suggest that Spinoza's notion of fiction can complement Smilansky's view in that it can be conceived in terms of an instrument for maintaining social stability and promoting truth-seeking without assuming that one end is pursued at the expense of the other.