Johannes Giesinger

Should children have the right to vote? This question is answered in the negative, in this essay. However, it is made clear that the debate on full political rights for children brings up some unsolved problems of liberal democratic thought. First, it might seem that denying a fundamental right to children is an assault on their status as moral and political equals. More specifically, it can be pointed out that some groups of children or adolescents are denied the right to vote although they are not less politically competent than some adults. Second, there is a problem with regard to democratic legitimacy. Children are not entitled to participate in the political process, but are subject to legal regulations that result from that process. Third, excluding persons from democratic decision-making makes it difficult to adequately represent their interests in the political process.

Der Autonomiebegriff, der ursprünglich dem politischen Kontext entstammt und sich auf die Selbstgesetzgebung der griechischen Stadtstaaten bezog, wurde von Kant zum Grundbegriff seiner Ethik gemacht. Insofern es überhaupt moralische Pflichten geben kann, so Kant, müssen sie in der Autonomie des Willens begründet sein, in der „Beschaffenheit des Willens, dadurch derselbe ihm selbst […] ein Gesetz ist“. Die autonome Person bestimmt sich unabhängig von natürlichen Einflüssen und sozialen Autoritäten selbst, aber das bedeutet gerade nicht, dass sie ihren persönlichen Wünschen oder Neigungen folgt.

This essay starts from the observation that the issue of talent, in relation to the problem of distributive justice, can be approached from two different angles. First, it is common to discuss the justificatory function of talent, that is, its role in the justification of educational or social inequalities. In addition, however, this essay proposes to look at practices of talent ascription and their causal role in the distribution of educational prospects. These practices tend to exacerbate educational inequalities due to social background, especially when they are tied to selective educational settings. There is reason to avoid talent-based selection in education, in order to contain the negative effects of practices of talent ascription.

The philosophical debate on educational justice currently focusses on the Anglo-American situation. This essay brings in an additional perspective. It provides a justice-oriented critique of the segregated education systems in German-speaking countries. First, arguments that are commonly put forward in favour of these systems are rejected. Second, an additional argument against early tracking in education is formulated. It is claimed that segregated education systems tend to undermine children’s ‘right to an open future’. It is also explained that the segregated systems in Germany, Austria and Switzerland are linked to well-established systems of vocational education and training. It is argued, in this essay, that a workplace-based vocational system can be an important element of a just education system. The proposal is, then, to introduce a comprehensive school system in the first 8 or 9 school years that prepares students for both the vocational system and the academic track (Gymnasium). Against this background, a so-called threshold conception of educational justice – that contains two different threshold levels – is formulated.

While Kant's pedagogical lectures present an account of moral education, his theory of freedom and morality seems to leave no room for the possibility of an education for freedom and morality. In this paper, it is first shown that Kant's moral philosophy and his educational philosophy are developed within different theoretical paradigms: whereas the former is situated within a transcendentalist framework, the latter relies on a teleological notion of human nature. The second part of this paper demonstrates that the core ideas of Kant's moral philosophy are also present in his pedagogy. This means that the problem of moral education must be solved within the transcendentalist framework. It is finally claimed that Kant himself outlines a solution to this problem in his pedagogical lectures.

Matthew Clayton claims that ‘comprehensive enrolment’ – raising one’s children in accordance with one’s own conception of the good – is illegitimate. In his argument against comprehensive enrolment, Clayton refers to Rawls’s idea of public reason. In a recent response to Clayton, Christina Cameron not only rejects Clayton’s conclusions, but also denies that the idea of public reason can be applied to the parent–child relationship. This article responds to both Clayton and Cameron: It is stated, first, that political arrangements concerning children’s upbringing must be acceptable in the light of public reason. Second, it is claimed that comprehensive enrolment can nevertheless be considered as legitimate.

This article discusses the educational significance of the moral demand for respect. In Ethics and Education, Richard Peters presents a conception of educational respect that was recently taken up by Krassimir Stojanov. This article responds to both Peters' and Stojanov's contributions and proposes another understanding of educational respect: to respect children is to treat them in a way that enables them to see themselves as persons endowed with dignity; that is, as having the equal standing to make claims on others

To what extent does the common claim that childhood is ‘socially constructed’ affect the ethical debate on the ‘intrinsic’ and ‘special’ goods of childhood? Philosophers have referred to this kind of goods in their critique of overly adult-centred and future-oriented conceptions of childhood. The view that some goods are child-specific, in the sense that they are only good for children, not for adults, seems to presuppose an understanding of what children ‘are’, and how they differ from adults. However, if the social-constructionist view is accepted, it cannot be assumed that childhood is a given. This essay claims that the social-constructionist understanding of childhood does not undermine the debate on the moral status and the goods of childhood, but that nevertheless important lessons can be drawn from the insight that childhood, as we know it, is not a natural and universal phenomenon.

Am Beispiel von Adipositas werden in diesem Beitrag die Konflikte diskutiert, die zwischen elterlichen Rechten und den aus Gerechtigkeitserwägungen erwachsenden Ansprüchen von Kindern entstehen können. Es wird angenommen, dass Kinder Anspruch auf Gesundheit haben, und dass Adipositas sie in ihrer Gesundheit gefährdet. Die Frage lautet, was zu tun ist, wenn das Handeln der Eltern die Entstehung von Adipositas begünstigt. Es werden drei verschiedene Konzeptionen elterlicher Rechte diskutiert. Nach der ersten Konzeption sind elterliche Rechte in den Interessen oder Freiheiten der Eltern fundiert. Gemäß der zweiten Auffassung ergeben sich elterliche Rechte aus elterlichen Pflichten, während der dritte Ansatz die Bedeutung sogenannter Beziehungsgüter hervorhebt. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden zwei Thesen vertreten: Die erste lautet, dass Eltern nicht berechtigt sind, ihre Kinder in einer Weise aufzuziehen, die zu Adipositas führt. Die zweite These ist, dass es trotzdem gute Gründe für Zurückhaltung bei Eingriffen in die Familie gibt.

It is commonly assumed that to educate means to control or guide a person’s acting and development. On the other hand, it is often presupposed that the addressees of education must be seen as being endowed with free will. The question raised in this paper is whether these two assumptions are compatible. It might seem that if the learner is free in her will, she cannot be educated; however, if she is successfully educated, then it is doubtful whether she can be seen as free. Inspired by the current philosophical debate on the compatibility of free will and determinism, this paper spells out two versions of this dilemma. The first version relies on the idea that to be free means being the causal source of one’s actions. The second formulation refers to the notion of freedom as the ability to act otherwise than the way one actually acts. The solution to the dilemma that is developed in this paper, however, uses a third concept of free will—to be free means being able to act on reasons.

In this essay, Johannes Giesinger comments on the current philosophical debate on educational justice. He observes that while authors like Elizabeth Anderson and Debra Satz develop a so-called adequacy view of educational justice, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift defend an egalitarian principle. Giesinger focuses his analysis on the main objection that is formulated, from an egalitarian perspective, against the adequacy view: that it neglects the problem of securing fair opportunities in the competition for social rewards. Giesinger meets this objection by expressing two basic theses: First, he argues that Brighouse and Swift themselves fail to give an adequate account of fair competition; and, second, he shows that the adequacy view provides the theoretical resources to face this problem.