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34Scriven on The Logic of CauseTheory and Decision 6 (1): 43-55. 1975.In a recent article entitled, ‘The Logic of Cause’ Scriven has presented a series of formidable arguments against the possibility of explicating the concept of cause in terms of the concepts of sufficient condition and necessary condition. Some of his main arguments center on the difficulties of capturing the asymmetry of cause and effect and of handling a certain kind of over-determination he calls linked overdetermination. Scriven's contention that there is no way to capture the asymmetry of c…Read more
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439Epistemic Closure and SkepticismLogos and Episteme 1 (2): 221-246. 2010.Closure is the epistemological thesis that if S knows that P and knows that P implies Q, then if S infers that Q, S knows that Q. Fred Dretske acknowledges that closure is plausible but contends that it should be rejected because it conflicts with the plausible thesis: Conclusive reasons (CR): S knows that P only if S believes P on the basis of conclusive reasons, i.e., reasons S wouldn‘t have if it weren‘t the case that P. Dretske develops an analysis of knowing that centers on CR, and argues t…Read more
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96Conclusive reasons, knowledge, and actionPhilosophical Issues 22 (1): 35-52. 2012.The article presents information on the capabilities of Dretske-style analysis of knowing (DAK) and of several competing analyses with respect to accounting for the apparent facts. It informs that the DAK can ground plausible verdicts about knowledge and ignorance in cases involving lotteries. It further informs that the knowledge-efficacy donor imply the implausible thesis.
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Computer modeling and the fate of folk psychologyIn James Moor & Terrell Ward Bynum (eds.), Cyberphilosophy: the intersection of philosophy and computing, Blackwell. 2002.
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Relevance Logic and Inferential KnowledgeIn J. Norman & R. Sylvan (eds.), Directions in Relevant Logic, Springer. pp. 317-326. 1989.
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324Knowledge as Fact-Tracking True BeliefManuscrito 40 (4): 1-30. 2017.ABSTRACT Drawing inspiration from Fred Dretske, L. S. Carrier, John A. Barker, and Robert Nozick, we develop a tracking analysis of knowing according to which a true belief constitutes knowledge if and only if it is based on reasons that are sensitive to the fact that makes it true, that is, reasons that wouldn’t obtain if the belief weren’t true. We show that our sensitivity analysis handles numerous Gettier-type cases and lottery problems, blocks pathways leading to skepticism, and validates t…Read more
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85Aristotle vs. DiodorusPhilosophy Research Archives 11 41-76. 1985.We develop a modified system of standard logic, Augmented Standard Logic (ASL), and we employ ASL in an effort to show that, contrary to prevailing opinion, both Aristotle and Diodorus presented impressive arguments, having valid structures and highly plausible premisses, in their famous fatalism debate. We argue that ASL, which contains standard logic and a full system of modal and temporal logic emanating from a modicum of primitives, should not only enable one to appreciate the sophisticated …Read more
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335Computer modeling and the fate of folk psychologyMetaphilosophy 33 (1-2): 30-48. 2002.Although Paul Churchland and Jerry Fodor both subscribe to the so-called theory-theory– the theory that folk psychology (FP) is an empirical theory of behavior – they disagree strongly about FP’s fate. Churchland contends that FP is a fundamentally flawed view analogous to folk biology, and he argues that recent advances in computational neuroscience and connectionist AI point toward development of a scientifically respectable replacement theory that will give rise to a new common-sense psycholo…Read more
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21Book reviews (review)Philosophical Psychology 10 (2): 231-257. 1997.Consciousness and experience, William G. Lycan. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. ISBN 0–262–12197–2 (hc)Mind as motion: explorations in the dynamics of cognition, Robert Port & Timothy Van Gelder (Eds). Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford, 1995. ISBN 0–262–16150–8Perception, Kathleen Akins (Ed.). New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. ISBN 0–19–508461 (hbk); 0–19–508462–4 (pbk)Context and consciousness, B. Nardi (Ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996. ISBN: 0–262–14058–6Catching ourselves in the act, Ho…Read more
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468Methods Matter: Beating the Backward ClockLogos and Episteme 8 (1): 99-112. 2017.In “Beat the (Backward) Clock,” we argued that John Williams and Neil Sinhababu’s Backward Clock Case fails to be a counterexample to Robert Nozick’s or Fred Dretske’s Theories of Knowledge. Williams’ reply to our paper, “There’s Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke,” is a further attempt to defend their counterexample against a range of objections. In this paper, we argue that, despite the number and length of footnotes, Williams is still wrong.
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143Towards closure on closureSynthese 188 (2): 179-196. 2012.Tracking theories of knowledge are widely known to have the consequence that knowledge is not closed. Recent arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne claim both that there are no legitimate examples of knowledge without closure and that the costs of theories that deny closure are too great. This paper considers the tracking theories of Dretske and Nozick and the arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne. We reject the arguments of Vogel and Hawthorne and evaluate the costs of closure denial for tracking theories…Read more
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347Beat the (Backward) ClockLogos and Episteme 7 (3): 353-361. 2016.In a recent very interesting and important challenge to tracking theories of knowledge, Williams & Sinhababu claim to have devised a counter-example to tracking theories of knowledge of a sort that escapes the defense of those theories by Adams & Clarke. In this paper we will explain why this is not true. Tracking theories are not undermined by the example of the backward clock, as interesting as the case is.
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66The Fallacy of Begging the QuestionDialogue 15 (2): 241-255. 1976.Begging the question — roughly, positing in the premises what is to be proved in the conclusion — is a perplexing fallacy.1 Are not question-begging arguments valid? Yes, we may find ourselves saying, but they are fallacious despite their validity, owing to their inability to establish the truth of a conclusion which is not already known. But are not question-begging arguments sometimes effective in bringing an audience to an awareness of the truth of the conclusion? How can a dialectical maneuv…Read more
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11Autism and the "theory of mind" debateIn George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology, Mit Press. 1994.
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Areas of Specialization
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Epistemology |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |