John B. DeBrota

The appearance of negative terms in quasiprobability representations of quantum theory is known to be inevitable, and, due to its equivalence with the onset of contextuality, of central interest in quantum computation and information. Until recently, however, nothing has been known about how much negativity is necessary in a quasiprobability representation. Zhu :120404, 2016) proved that the upper and lower bounds with respect to one type of negativity measure are saturated by quasiprobability representations which are in one-to-one correspondence with the elusive symmetric informationally complete quantum measurements. We define a family of negativity measures which includes Zhu’s as a special case and consider another member of the family which we call “sum negativity.” We prove a sufficient condition for local maxima in sum negativity and find exact global maxima in dimensions 3 and 4. Notably, we find that Zhu’s result on the SICs does not generally extend to sum negativity, although the analogous result does hold in dimension 4. Finally, the Hoggar lines in dimension 8 make an appearance in a conjecture on sum negativity.

Consciousness and quantum mechanics are among the most puzzling phenomena studied in the sciences. Some scholars suggest they are related, though others think this claim commits a “minimization of mystery” fallacy. The aim of this programmatic paper is to draw attention to a less widely discussed parallel between consciousness and quantum mechanics: both challenge the classical objectivist worldview of science. Under certain assumptions, they are each in tension with a package of metaphysical theses – “non-relationalism”, “non-fragmentation”, and “one world” – that jointly make up that worldview. This points to three distinct non-objectivist responses: the “relationalist”, “fragmentalist”, and “many-subjective-worlds” ones. We will map out their pros and cons.

According to QBism, quantum states, unitary evolutions, and measurement operators are all understood as personal judgments of the agent using the formalism. Meanwhile, quantum measurement outcomes are understood as the personal experiences of the same agent. Wigner’s conundrum of the friend, in which two agents ostensibly have different accounts of whether or not there is a measurement outcome, thus poses no paradox for QBism. Indeed the resolution of Wigner’s original thought experiment was central to the development of QBist thinking. The focus of this paper concerns two very instructive modifications to Wigner’s puzzle: One, a recent no-go theorem by Frauchiger and Renner, and the other a thought experiment by Baumann and Brukner. We show that the paradoxical features emphasized in these works disappear once both friend and Wigner are understood as agents on an equal footing with regard to their individual uses of quantum theory. Wigner’s action on his friend then becomes, from the friend’s perspective, an action the friend takes on Wigner. Our analysis rests on a kind of quantum Copernican principle: When two agents take actions on each other, each agent has a dual role as a physical system for the other agent. No user of quantum theory is more privileged than any other. In contrast to the sentiment of Wigner’s original paper, neither agent should be considered as in “suspended animation.” In this light, QBism brings an entirely new perspective to understanding Wigner’s friend thought experiments.

We present a seven-pronged no-go result for quantum mechanics: a “heptalemma”. It shows that seven initially plausible theses about physical reality are jointly inconsistent with the predictions of quantum mechanics, while any six are jointly consistent. We must then decide which theses to retain and which to give up. Since different interpretations of quantum mechanics entail different responses to the heptalemma, we get a novel taxonomy of such interpretations. Beyond the application to quantum mechanics, the heptalemma offers a general diagnostic criterion for determining whether a given scientific domain should count as classical or not, and if not, how it departs from classicality.