• The badness of dying early
    In Espen Gamlund & Carl Tollef Solberg (eds.), Saving People from the Harm of Death, Oxford University Press. 2019.
  •  296
    Backwards induction in the centipede game
    Analysis 59 (4): 237-242. 1999.
    The standard backward-induction reasoning in a game like the centipede assumes that the players maintain a common belief in rationality throughout the game. But that is a dubious assumption. Suppose the first player X didn't terminate the game in the first round; what would the second player Y think then? Since the backwards-induction argument says X should terminate the game, and it is supposed to be a sound argument, Y might be entitled to doubt X's rationality. Alternatively, Y might doubt th…Read more
  •  3
    Rationality
    In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Wiley‐blackwell. 2010.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Rationality as a Property and Rationality as a Source of Requirements Rationality and Normativity Requirements of Rationality Reasoning References Further reading.
  •  2
    The Principle of Personal Good
    In Weighing Goods, Wiley. 2017.
    This chapter explains that the principle of personal good is a principle of separability in the dimension of people. Together with the coherence of good, it provides a basis for applying the separability theorem across the two dimensions of people and states of nature. This chapter starts by qualifying the principle of personal good in some ways, and explains the defence of the principle. One possible line of defence is metaphysical. It is to argue that suprapersonal entities such as nations are…Read more
  •  6
    Coherence Against the Pareto Principle
    In Weighing Goods, Wiley. 2017.
    The coherence of general good turns out to conflict with the widely accepted Pareto principle. This chapter explains the conflict and resolves it in favour of coherence. It also presents an example of a head‐on collision between coherence and the Pareto principle. The example relies on an auxiliary assumption, but one that is very plausible. The principle of personal good is immune to the difficulty raised by the probability agreement theorem. The theorem presents welfare economics with a dilemm…Read more
  •  2
    The Coherence of Good
    In Weighing Goods, Wiley. 2017.
    This chapter discusses one of the main subjects: the structure of good. It aims to establish one point about all of the general relation and the individual relations: they all conform to the axioms of expected utility theory. The theory proves that, if a relation satisfies the axioms, it can be represented by an expectational utility function. The details of the representation and its significance are spelt out. The chapter also aims to show that individual and general betterness relations satis…Read more
  •  7
    Expected Utility and Rationality
    In Weighing Goods, Wiley. 2017.
    This chapter concerns with rational preferences in the face of uncertainty. The goodness of uncertain prospects is best understood in terms of rational preferences. The chapter discusses some necessary spadework. Its particular purpose is to defend some parts of expected utility theory as an account of rational preferences. It explains the general idea of expected utility theory, and particularly how it is founded on axioms. The principal axiom is also explained. It is often called the 'sure‐thi…Read more
  •  4
    The Separability Theorems
    In Weighing Goods, Wiley. 2017.
    This chapter sets out the theorems, and presents some examples that show in a rough way how the theorems work. It explains separability precisely, and states the theorems. The chapter starts the work of interpreting the theorems, and also explains the significance of their conclusions from a formal, mathematical point of view. It then discusses a significant assumption that is used in the proofs of the theorems. The published proofs of both the separability theorems depend on an assumption that …Read more
  •  3
    Similarity Arguments
    In Weighing Goods, Wiley. 2017.
    The chapter describes Derek Parfit's argument that aims to cast light on distributive justice by comparing it with the distribution of good across time. It also describes John Harsanyi's argument by comparing it with the distribution of good across states of nature. More particularly, both arguments are intended to offer some support to the utilitarian principle of distribution. The utilitarian principle is about the distribution of good across the dimension of people. Parfit's defence compares …Read more
  •  1
    Introduction II: Weighing Goods
    In Weighing Goods, Wiley. 2017.
    The weighing up of goods is one aspect of the structure of good. This chapter describes the general problem of weighing goods, and illustrates it with examples. The states of nature are locations of good. Separability says that the value of what happens in one location is independent of what happens in other locations. When the locations are states of nature, the leading theory about how good should be aggregated across them is expected utility theory, and separability is the key assumption of t…Read more
  •  1
    Introduction I: The Structure of Good
    In Weighing Goods, Wiley. 2017.
    One part of ethics is concerned with good. This chapter talks generally about the idea of the structure of good. According to some ethical theories, the concern for good amounts to the whole of ethics, not just a part. Most nonteleological theories give some role to good. Since side‐constraint theory is an important example of nonteleological ethics, the popular belief that it is necessarily agent relative helps to sustain the popular association between nonteleological ethics and agent‐relative…Read more
  • Bibliography
    In Weighing Goods, Wiley. 2017.
  • Front Matter
    In Weighing Goods, Wiley. 2017.
    The prelims comprise: Half‐Title Page Title Page Copyright Page Contents Preface.
  •  18
    Utilitarian Metaphysics?
    In Weighing Goods, Wiley. 2017.
    This chapter sets out an intertemporal addition theorem, the exact analog, across the dimension of time, of the interpersonal addition theorem. A premise of the new theorem is the 'principle of temporal good', the exact analog of the principle of personal good. It turns out that the principle of temporal good would, if true, give crucial support to the utilitarian principle. The chapter explains that the principle of temporal good is dubious, and describes how this principle might nevertheless b…Read more
  •  2
    Index
    In Weighing Goods, Wiley. 2017.
    The main difficulty for the principle of personal good arises from egalitarianism. Egalitarianism is the view that equality between people is good. Equality is a relation between people. So it seems as though it will have to be a nonpersonal or interpersonal or suprapersonal good. This chapter outlines a utilitarian argument for equality. This argument is the point of departure for other egalitarian theories. It also describes two broad divisions of egalitarian thinking: the communal and the ind…Read more
  •  2
    The Interpersonal Addition Theorem
    In Weighing Goods, Wiley. 2017.
    This chapter explains the interpersonal addition theorem. The theorem leads to two remarkable points. Firstly, it links the aggregation of good across the dimension of people with its aggregation across the dimension of states of nature. The result is that, in favourable circumstances, it links the value of equality in the distribution of good with the value of avoiding risk to good. The chapter also explains this link. The second point is even more remarkable. The theorem shows that general uti…Read more
  •  12
    Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy
    Mind 110 (439): 781-783. 2001.
  • Reply to Rabinowicz
    In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics, Wiley Periodicals. 2009.
  •  5
    Loosening the Betterness Ordering of Lives: A Response to Rabinowicz
    In Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister Bykvist, Tim Campbell & Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics, Oxford University Press. 2022.
  •  34
    This volume is a selection of Broome's recent papers on normativity, rationality, and reasoning. It covers a variety of topics such as the meanings of 'ought', 'reason', and 'reasons'; the fundamental structure of normativity and the metaphysical priority of ought over reasons; the ownership - or agent-relativity - of oughts and reasons; the distinction between rationality and normativity; the notion of rational motivation; what characterizes the human activity of reasoning, and what is the role…Read more
  •  16
    Responses to Commentaries on ‘Rationality Versus Normativity’
    Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4): 393-401. 2020.
    I am very grateful to the ten authors who have written commentaries on my paper. I am overwhelmed by the number of interesting and useful arguments they have made. I cannot come near to responding...
  •  63
    Rationality versus Normativity
    Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4): 293-311. 2020.
    ABSTRACT Philosophers often do not make as sharp a distinction as they should between rationality and normativity. Partly this is because the word ‘reason’ can be used to refer to either, and this leads to a confusion over meanings. This paper starts by clarifying the meanings of ‘normativity’ and ‘rationality’. It argues that it is a conceptual truth that rationality supervenes on the mind. Then it considers substantive arguments that purport to show there is no real distinction between rationa…Read more
  •  12
    Commentators on John Broome's Tanner Lecture. The Tanner Lectures are a collection of educational and scientific discussions relating to human values. Conducted by leaders in their fields, the lectures are presented at prestigious educational facilities around the world.
  •  1075
    What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion?
    with Stephane Zuber, Nikhil Venkatesh, Torbjörn Tännsjö, Christian Tarsney, H. Orri Stefánsson, Katie Steele, Dean Spears, Jeff Sebo, Marcus Pivato, Toby Ord, Yew-Kwang Ng, Michal Masny, William MacAskill, Nicholas Lawson, Kevin Kuruc, Michelle Hutchinson, Johan E. Gustafsson, Hilary Greaves, Lisa Forsberg, Marc Fleurbaey, Diane Coffey, Susumu Cato, Clinton Castro, Tim Campbell, Mark Budolfson, Alexander Berger, Nick Beckstead, and Geir B. Asheim
    Utilitas 33 (4): 379-383. 2021.
    The Repugnant Conclusion served an important purpose in catalyzing and inspiring the pioneering stage of population ethics research. We believe, however, that the Repugnant Conclusion now receives too much focus. Avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion should no longer be the central goal driving population ethics research, despite its importance to the fundamental accomplishments of the existing literature.
  •  95
    Good, Fairness and QALYs
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 23 (1): 57-73. 1988.
    Counting QALYs (quality adjusted life years) has been proposed as a way of deciding how resources should be distributed in the health service: put resources where they will produce the most QALYs. This proposal has encountered strong opposition. There has been a disagreement between some economists favouring QALYs and some philosophers opposing them. But the argument has, I think, mostly been at cross-purposes. Those in favour of QALYs point out what they can do, and those against point out what…Read more
  •  25
    Does Rationality Give Us Reasons? 1
    Philosophical Issues 15 (1): 321-337. 2005.
  •  309
    Against Denialism
    The Monist 102 (1): 110-129. 2019.
    Several philosophers deny that an individual person’s emissions of greenhouse gas do any harm; I call these “individual denialists.” I argue that each individual’s emissions may do harm, and that they certainly do expected harm. I respond to the denialists’ arguments.
  •  60
    Efficiency and future generations
    Economics and Philosophy 34 (2): 221-241. 2018.
    Abstract:Standard lessons from economics tell us that an externality creates inefficiency, and that this inefficiency can be removed by internalizing the externality. This papers considers how successfully these lessons can be extended to intergenerational externalities such as emissions of greenhouse gas. For intergenerational externalities, the standard lessons involve comparisons between states whose populations of people differ, either in their identities or their numbers. Common notions of …Read more