John C. Cahalan

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE PROBLEM OF THING AND OBJECT IN MARITAIN JOHN c. CAHALAN Methuen, Massachusetts I N THE essay, "Critical Realism," Jacques Maritain said, "The problem of thing and object is the crux of the problem of realism." 1 Since then, the distinction between thing and object has received little attention, except for some helpful discussions by Yves Simon. Either Maritain and Simon were very mistaken, or we have been missing something very important. This study will attempt to explain the importance of the thing/object distinction by showing how it applies to a wide range of questions about human knowledge, from the nature of metaphysics to the problem of conceptual relativity in the philosophy of science and hermeneutics. Skeptics and idealists grant that our awareness has objects. Skeptics question whether we can make extramentally existing things objects of awareness as they are. Idealists deny that things have an existence other than being objects of awareness.2 Maritain considered the presuppositions of calling something an " object " of awareness: what are we doing when we call something an object of awareness and what conditions are necessary for knowing that something is such an object. He found that the conditions necessary for knowing that something is an object of awareness provide the basis for refutations of skepticism and 1 Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Scribners, 1959) 107 (translation corrected). Hereafter, I refer to this work as DK, followed by a page number. 2 Maritain uses " idealism " for both ways of denying that we directly attain extramental existents, that is, for any position holding that we must begin from awareness of our mental states. 21 22 JOHN C. CAHALAN idealism. But his analysis also gives us a tool, the distinction between things as things and things as objects, capable of illuminating many other epistemological problems. I will begin by explaining the thing/object distinction and how it enables us to refute idealism. Then, I will apply the distinction to problems concerning the knowledge of being in metaphysics. Next, I will show how the distinction reveals, for the first time, the nature of that " conformity" between the mind and things which we call truth. Finally, I will apply the distinction to the problems of skepticism and conceptual relativity. I How do the conditions required for knowing that something is an object enable us to defend realism? We can ask epistemological questions because we are reflexively aware of our own awareness. The reality we call "awareness" is a way of relating to terms that we call its "objects." "Object" is a relational term here; to call something an "object" of awareness is to describe it as a term of a knowledge relation (where " knowledge " means cognition in general, not just knowledge of truth). " We must distinguish," Maritain says, "between the thing as thingas existing or able to exist for itself-and the thing as objectwhen it is set before the faculty of knowing and made present to it" (DK, 91). "The object is the correlative of a knowing subject... which precisely takes the name 'object' from the fact that it is presented to the mind" (DK, 93; my emphasis). When we describe something as known, conceived, imagined, heard, referred to, expressed, meant, thought about, remembered, etc., we are describing it as an object, in Maritain's sense. The subjectobject polarity is a fundamental fact that reflexive self-awareness reveals to us: A state of awareness has an object that is distinct from itself at least to the extent that the term of any relation is distinct from the relation, and just as we can describe awareness as a relation to something, we can describe that something as a term of a relation of awareness, an object. But we cannot describe objects solely as objects; for whatever we are first aware of, we must be aware of other than as an ob- THING AND OBJECT IN MARITAIN 23 ject. To be an object is to be a term of a knowledge relation; consequently, to be aware that X is an object is to have a knowledge relation whose term is the existence of a knowledge relation to X. But what are...