John C. Duff

Historically low private-sector labor union density indicates looming labor union extinction. Introducing the self-infliction thesis, I demonstrate that since U.S. neoliberalism negatively correlates to private-sector union density and that U.S. neoliberal common sense pervades social conventions, it is plausible that neoliberal common sense pervades U.S. private-sector union organizational standards, exacerbating density corrosion along the way. In particular, Antonio Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony and common sense inform a frame of reference from which U.S. neoliberal common sense is expressed as a traditionally inherited and reflexively accepted social perspective of the world, assuming U.S. neoliberal inevitability and equity. The self-infliction thesis underscores the urgency of labor unions to transcend neoliberal common sense and foster collective visions for a post-neoliberal, pro-labor socioeconomic paradigm.

Scott Soames argued that Wittgenstein’s private language argument reveals ambiguity, presenting two possible conclusions, wherein either conclusion exhibits devastating implications for the private language argument. I contend that interpreting Wittgenstein’s reasoning holistically dissipates inclinations to infer ambiguity in the private language argument. In particular, I challenge Soames’ ambiguity argument by demonstrating its contrived limitations, resulting in a false dichotomy. However, allowing the dichotomy for argument’s sake adequately corresponds to Wittgenstein’s conclusion, raising further questions about the ambiguity argument’s veracity and redundancy. As such, Wittgenstein’s private language argument withstands charges of ambiguity, demonstrating reasons to doubt Soames’ ambiguity argument.

Moti Mizrahi argues that Gettier cases are unsuccessful counterexamples to the traditional analysis of knowledge (TAK) because such cases inadequately reveal epistemic failures of justified true belief (JTB); and because Gettier cases merely demonstrate semantic inadequacy, the apparent epistemic force of Gettier cases is misleading. Although Mizrahi claims to have deflated the epistemic force of Gettier cases, I will argue that the presence of semantic deficiency in Gettier cases neither requires nor indicates the denial of the epistemic force of those cases. I will provide an extracted version of Mizrahi’s argument, which I believe to be most charitable to his motivation. Then I will offer a counterexample to a pivotal premise in Mizrahi’s argument, ultimately rendering the argument unsound. Finally, upon the examination of a plausible objection, I conclude that Gettier cases are epistemically sustained.