John Divers

Quine’s (in)famous sceptical critique of de re modality is expounded in the pair of 1953 classic papers ‘Reference and Modality’ and ‘Three Grades of Modal Involvement’. Here, I position the salient, and non-sceptical, treatments of de re modality in the later part of the twentieth century—those due to Kripke, Lewis, and Fine—in relation to that prior sceptical critique. My theses are: (a) that that Kripke, Lewis, and Fine all undertake non-sceptical defences of de re modal predication that conform to the Smullyan language-independence strategy; and (b) none does so in a way that falsifies Quine’s prediction of the commitments involved. I emphasize the insights on which Quine’s scepticism was based and commend these as sound and enduring.

Hale (2013) constructs and defends a conception of absolute modality as metaphysically fundamental. Part of this defense is an attack on alternative positions. One such position is a kind of modal skepticism that permits our declining to accept that any proposition is absolutely necessary. Another such position is a kind of modal reductionism that attempts to secure (non-trivial) modal truths via analysis that does not terminate in modal primitives of any kind. This chapter resists Hale on both fronts, arguing that the significance of the anti-skepticism established is variously limited and that the charge of question-begging against the reductionist(s) is not proven.

Kant states that necessity and strict universality are criteria of a priori knowledge. Interpreting this dictum standardly and straightforwardly in respect of necessity, it is inconsistent with there being necessary a posteriori truths or contingent a priori truths (cf Kripke). This straightforward interpretation may convict Kant of understandable error (at worst) in the case of necessity, but it is so uncharitable in the case of strict universality that we ought to seek an alternative. I offer a charitable interpretation of the doctrine that necessity and strict universality are sufficient conditions of a priority, commenting briefly on comparable necessary conditions.

The modal antirealist, as presented here, aims to secure at least some of the benefits associated with talking in genuine modal realist terms while avoiding commitment to a plurality of Lewisian (or ersatz) worlds. The antirealist stance of agnosticism about other worlds combines acceptance of Lewis's account of what world‐talk means with refusal to assert, or believe in, the existence of other worlds. Agnosticism about other worlds does not entail a comprehensive agnosticism about modality, but where such agnosticism about modality is enforced, the aim of the agnostic programme is to show that it is not detrimental to our modal practices. The agnostic programme consists in an attempt to demonstrate the rational dispensability of that disputed class of modal beliefs which the agnostic eschews, but which are held by the realist and the folk. Here I attempt to motivate, describe, and illustrate such an agnostic antirealist programme in modal philosophy.

We propose a novel interpretation of Lewis on the analysis of modality that is constructed from primary sources, comprehensive and unprecedented. Our guiding precepts are to distinguish semantics from metaphysics, while respecting the inter-relations between them, and to discern whatever may be special, semantically or metaphysically, about the modal case. Following detailed presentation, we amplify and advocate our interpretation by providing a conforming genealogy of Lewis’s theory of modality and applying it to construct a detailed and newly illuminating version of the Lewisian theory of modality de re.

McFetridge (in Logical necessity and other essays. London: Blackwell, 1990) suggests that to treat a proposition as logically necessary-to believe a proposition logically necessary, and to manifest that belief-is a matter of preparedness to deploy that proposition as a premise in reasoning from any supposition. We consider whether a suggestion in that spirit can be generalized to cover all cases of absolute necessity, both logical and non-logical, and we conclude that it can. In Sect. 2, we explain the significance that such an account of manifestation of belief in absolute necessity has for the prospects of a non-realist theory of modality. In Sect. 3, we offer a sympathetic articulation of the detail that underlies the McFetridge conception of belief in logical necessity. In Sects. 4 and 5, we show that the conception so articulated will not generalize to encompass all cases of belief in absolute necessity and proceed to offer a remedy. Our proposal is based upon a distinction between two kinds of suppositional act: A-supposing and C-supposing (Sect. 6). In Sect. 7, we then explain and defend our central thesis: (roughly) that (manifestation of) belief in absolute necessity is a matter of preparedness to deploy as a premise in reasoning under any C-supposition. Finally, we indicate that there is some promise in the parallel thesis that manifestation of the treatment of a proposition as a priori is a matter of preparedness to deploy as a premise in reasoning under any A-supposition (Sect. 8).

At the core of the concept of supervenience are certain general maxims— notably, that there can be no A-differences without B-differences and that Bindiscernibility must bring A-discernibility. Supervenience is thus conceived as a matter of modal covariance between two sets of things in a given category, usually properties. The perennial issues surrounding supervenience concern: (a) the variety of specifically formulated theses that serve the core maxims and the patterns of entailment that obtain among these theses, and (b) the relations that obtain between supervenience theses and such salient concepts of metaphysics as reduction, dependence and determination. The regions of philosophical inquiry that gave rise to contemporary analytic philosophical interest in supervenience, and in which the notion is still most prominently applied are, famously, meta-ethics and the philosophy of mind. In the former case the history of supervenience can be traced back through Hare to Moore; in the latter case the line can be traced back from the pathfinding work of Kim through the famous resurrection of the notion of supervenience in Davidson’s work to the emergentist theorists of mind in the early part of this century.1 Publication on the topic of supervenience has exploded so that a brief treatment of recent work could provide an even remotely comprehensive survey only by degenerating into a list.2 So I shall settle for concentrating on the two groups of issues that were identified above, that is those concerning the logical character and metaphysical significance of supervenience theses, interposing some comments on the specific topic of supervenience in the philosophy of mind. I will emphasise and sympathise with that deflationary strand of recent work that invites soberand cautious re-appraisal of the role of supervenience theses in philosophical enquiry