John Evans

One of the many arguments against the genetic enhancement of children is that the children enhanced in this way would have restricted freedom by being controlled by the design of their parents. These normative arguments are based on empirical assumptions about the experience of such children, but these assumptions have never been tested. In this paper, I first discuss the mechanisms by which such a loss of freedom would occur. I then produce a test of these assumptions using a survey experiment from a U.S. nationally representative survey with 3,401 adult respondents. The results suggest that the empirical assumptions in the literature are correct and that an enhanced child will experience less freedom than would an unenhanced child.

Bioethicists’ attraction to principlism is rooted in a Western view of how matters that affect the public ought to be deliberated and decided: their resolution ought to be so structured and constrained that it can be understood and verified even by those at a remove from the circumstances of the problem. That view of deliberation, itself fostered by the Western view of government, has encouraged principlism to spread from its source in human subjects research into other areas of bioethics discourse.

Many participants in bioethical debate believe the long-standing myth about the religiously oriented members of the public—that they disagree with scientific fact claims about the natural world. While there are a few conflicts over such claims for a few religious traditions, largely concerning human origins, these fact claims are not relevant for bioethics. Instead, social science research has shown widespread moral conflict between scientists and the actively religious in the United States. The prevalence of moral conflict and the absence of fact conflict is illustrated by the Covid pandemic, where religious objections to vaccines were moral, not factual, in nature. It is important to accurately represent conflicts so that the public sees bioethical input to policy debates as legitimate.

I greatly appreciate the opportunity provided by the editor of Zygon to further develop the ideas in my book Morals Not Knowledge: Recasting the Contemporary U.S. Conflict between Religion and Science in conversation with four critical commentaries. It is an honor to have one's work focused upon so intently, and I greatly appreciate the time and effort of the critics. The book was quite intentionally written as a provocation, an attempt at agenda setting, and as a call for changing the thinking of the entire religion and science academic community. In my previous writings I have kept close to the data, allowing myself at best mid‐level conclusions, but this book is a foray into the abstraction and inevitable lack of precision required for high‐level generalization. I hope that it continues to be generative of debate.

At the beginning of this century Max Weber concluded that institutions in Western societies were being transformed from substantively rational to formally rational. Many scholars following Weber have expanded his insights into other spheres, with some noting that even our collective values were becoming subject to formal rationality. How this process actually occurs has remained unexamined. In this dissertation I examine the transformation from 1959-1995 in the form of rationality employed in the ethical debate about whether or not we should engage in the practice of human genetic engineering. ;I do not explain this change as the result of large abstract processes but rather as the result of professional competition between particular scientists, physicians, theologians, philosophers and persons in the emerging profession of bioethics for jurisdiction over the work of promulgating the ethics of human genetic engineering. These professions are embedded in a system that structures the opportunities and constraints facing these professions. ;Through the quantitative analysis of citations and keywords from one sample of texts, qualitative analysis of another sample of texts, and a case study of the creation of an ethical text by The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, I conclude that the terms of the debate about human genetic engineering has indeed changed from substantively rational to formally rational. The debate was rationalized as the bioethicists succeeded in obtaining resources from the state to use in the reproduction of their formally rational ethical system. Moreover, through a jurisdictional alliance between scientists and bioethicists, the interests of the scientific profession have been forwarded in the debate. In addition to providing insight about this transformation in the form of rationality, this dissertation also provides insight into the evolution of the profession now called "bioethics," as well as the evolution of "bioethical" debates more generally

In this essay I suggest that the bioethics profession’s jurisdiction over healthcare ethics consultation is in need of reinforcement. I argue that as the profession becomes more successful, competitors will challenge the profession to justify its ethical claims and ask whose ethics the profession represents. This challenge will come more quickly as the profession tries to influence the ethics of healthcare organizations. I propose a method of bolstering jurisdiction that will make the profession less vulnerable to challenge in the future.

For most theologians, theology should ultimately be used by the laity and/or the public. However, the religion and science debate has not focused on the divide between theologians and the laity. In this case study I examine the debate among theologians about human enhancement. I focus on the extent to which the structure of the debate in a “mediating organization” between the theologians and the public coincides with the structure of the debate among the theologians. I conduct a survey of participants in the organization, and find that the basic divides among the theologians are largely replicated. These results, when combined with studies of the theologians themselves and the laity, provide a more holistic understanding of the future debate about human enhancement.

In this article I explore the underlying political philosophy of public bioethics by comparing it to technocratic authority, particularly the technocratic authority claimed by economists in Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s. I find that public bioethics - at least in the dominant forms - is implicitly designed for and tries to use technocratic authority. I examine how this type of bioethics emerged and has continued. I finish by arguing that, as claims to technocratic authority go, bioethics is in an incredibly weak position, which partly explains why it has never gained the degree of public legitimacy that other technocracies have gained. I conclude by arguing for a "technocracy-lite" orientation for public bioethics.

Bioethicists’ attraction to principlism is rooted in a Western view of how matters that affect the public ought to be deliberated and decided: their resolution ought to be so structured and constrained that it can be understood and verified even by those at a remove from the circumstances of the problem. That view of deliberation, itself fostered by the Western view of government, has encouraged principlism to spread from its source in human subjects research into other areas of bioethics discourse.