John Greco

The volume brings together for the first time original essays by leading philosophers working on powers in relation to metaphysics, philosophy of natural and social science, philosophy of mind and action, epistemology, ethics and social and political philosophy. In each area, the concern is to show how a commitment to real causal powers affects discussion at the level in question. In metaphysics, for example, realism about powers is now recognized as providing an alternative to orthodox accounts of causation, modality, properties and laws. Dispositional realist philosophers of science, meanwhile, argue that a powers ontology allows for a proper account of the nature of scientific explanation. In the philosophy of mind there is the suggestion that agency is best understood in terms of the distinctive powers of human beings. Those who take virtue theoretic approaches in epistemology and ethics have long been interested in the powers that allow for knowledge and/or moral excellence. In social and political philosophy, finally, powers theorists are interested in the powers of sociological phenomena such as collectivities, institutions, roles and/or social relations, but also in the conditions of possibility for the cultivation of the powers of individuals. The book will be of interest to philosophers working in any of these areas, as well as to historians of philosophy, political theorists and critical realists.

Several philosophers have argued for a safety condition on knowledge, and have proposed various relationships between a safety condition and a virtue condition. Thus Duncan Pritchard (early) argued that knowledge requires safety but not virtue, whereas Pritchard (late) argues that knowledge requires both safety and virtue. Ernest Sosa (early) argued that knowledge requires both safety and virtue, whereas Sosa (late) seems to argue that knowledge requires virtue but not safety. Part One of this chapter looks at some different options for understanding the safety condition on knowledge, and argues that the safety condition (properly understood) is entailed by the virtue condition (properly understood). Part Two proposes a specific version of that position. Part Three argues that the position proposed in Part Two explains why there is no knowledge in Sosa’s Kaleidoscope Jokester case, and without having to invoke a distinction between animal and reflective knowledge.

The purpose of this volume is to provide a relatively complete guide to the current state of epistemology. To this end, each essay addresses some important issue in the theory of knowledge. Each provides some historical background or other contextual information so as to orient the reader to the problem at hand and to its current state of development. After this, each author provides an extended defense of his or her own position on the relevant topic. In this way the essays go well beyond simple introductions. They are attempts to (a) locate the current state of an important question in epistemology, and (b) move discussion forward from that point.

In his excellent book, Adam Leite argues that we can give a “fully satisfactory refutation” of Cartesian skepticism without epistemological theory. Here Leite claims to be defending the tradition of Moore, Austin, and Wittgenstein against the dominant methodology of contemporary epistemology. This essay clarifies Leite’s thesis and the anti-theoretical methodology that he recommends, and then argues for the necessity of epistemological theorizing in a philosophically satisfactory refutation of skepticism. In effect, there are two central issues before us. First, what does “epistemological theorizing” or “development of an epistemological theory” amount to? Second, what would constitute a philosophically satisfactory refutation of the kind of skepticism that Leite’s analysis targets?

The purpose of this volume is to provide a relatively complete guide to the current state of epistemology. To this end, each essay addresses some important issue in the theory of knowledge. Each provides some historical background or other contextual information so as to orient the reader to the problem at hand and to its current state of development. After this, each author provides an extended defense of his or her own position on the relevant topic. In this way the essays go well beyond simple introductions. They are attempts to (a) locate the current state of an important question in epistemology, and (b) move discussion forward from that point.

In this paper I offer a solution to scepticism about the world which neither embraces idealism, nor ends in a stalemate, nor begs the question against the sceptic. In the first part of the paper I explicate the sceptical argument and try to show why it has real force. In the next part of the paper I propose a version of the relevant possibilities approach to scepticism. The central claim of the proposed solution is that a sceptical possibility undermines knowledge only if the possibility is true in some close possible world. But since there is no reason to believe that I am deceived by an evil demon or that I am a brain in a vat in some close possible world, there is no reason to accept an essential premise of the sceptical argument, i.e. that the sceptical scenarios are relevant possibilities. Finally, I argue that the solution proposed does not embrace idealism, end in a stalemate, or beg the question.

The category of conversation is both broader and narrower than the category of testimony. It is broader because conversations involve more than testimony. It is narrower because not all testimony takes place within conversation. Nevertheless, the epistemologies of conversation and testimony overlap in interesting ways. On the account to be defended here, both conversation and testimony essentially involve joint agency and joint achievement, including epistemic joint agency and achievement. Moreover, it will be argued, appreciation of this point resolves an important dispute in the epistemology of testimony: whether addressees have a special epistemic standing over eavesdroppers and other overhearers of testimony. The claim defended here is that they do, and precisely in virtue of their participation in joint agency.

This paper responds to my critics in the Synthese topical collection, The Epistemology of John Greco. Part One offers some clarifications and elaborations of earlier work, bringing into focus some themes that I now see better with some hindsight. Most importantly, I draw a distinction between anti-reductionism and anti-individualism in the epistemology of testimony, and I argue that anti-individualism is the deeper and more important issue, here and for social epistemology more generally. Relatedly, I argue that an anti-individualist virtue epistemology must ground knowledge in the competent joint agency of speakers and hearers, rather than in the hearer’s participation in competent joint agency. Part Two responds to my critics more directly, including by drawing on the themes set out in Part One.

_Powers and Capacities in Philosophy_ is designed to stake out an emerging, discipline-spanning neo-Aristotelian framework grounded in realism about causal powers. The volume brings together for the first time original essays by leading philosophers working on powers in relation to metaphysics, philosophy of natural and social science, philosophy of mind and action, epistemology, ethics and social and political philosophy. In each area, the concern is to show how a commitment to real causal powers affects discussion at the level in question. In metaphysics, for example, realism about powers is now recognized as providing an alternative to orthodox accounts of causation, modality, properties and laws. Dispositional realist philosophers of science, meanwhile, argue that a powers ontology allows for a proper account of the nature of scientific explanation. In the philosophy of mind there is the suggestion that agency is best understood in terms of the distinctive powers of human beings. Those who take virtue theoretic approaches in epistemology and ethics have long been interested in the powers that allow for knowledge and/or moral excellence. In social and political philosophy, finally, powers theorists are interested in the powers of sociological phenomena such as collectivities, institutions, roles and/or social relations, but also in the conditions of possibility for the cultivation of the powers of individuals. The book will be of interest to philosophers working in any of these areas, as well as to historians of philosophy, political theorists and critical realists.

It is argued that a shared agency account of large-scale knowledge transmission provides a viable way forward for understanding a variety of phenomena, including the transmission of knowledge via diverse technologies such as Wikipedia, Google Search, and Siri. In fact, the lessons learned arguably apply more generally than this. If the arguments of the paper are sound, much of what is said here will apply to large-scale knowledge generation as well, including knowledge generation via large-scale technologies. Finally, the paper considers generative AI technologies such as ChatGPT, Gemini, and Med-PaLM, and asks whether these can be understood as either transmitting knowledge or generating it. Several models are considered for each of these possibilities.

The volume brings together for the first time original essays by leading philosophers working on powers in relation to metaphysics, philosophy of natural and social science, philosophy of mind and action, epistemology, ethics and social and political philosophy. In each area, the concern is to show how a commitment to real causal powers affects discussion at the level in question. In metaphysics, for example, realism about powers is now recognized as providing an alternative to orthodox accounts of causation, modality, properties and laws. Dispositional realist philosophers of science, meanwhile, argue that a powers ontology allows for a proper account of the nature of scientific explanation. In the philosophy of mind there is the suggestion that agency is best understood in terms of the distinctive powers of human beings. Those who take virtue theoretic approaches in epistemology and ethics have long been interested in the powers that allow for knowledge and/or moral excellence. In social and political philosophy, finally, powers theorists are interested in the powers of sociological phenomena such as collectivities, institutions, roles and/or social relations, but also in the conditions of possibility for the cultivation of the powers of individuals. The book will be of interest to philosophers working in any of these areas, as well as to historians of philosophy, political theorists and critical realists.