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6Causation in psychiatryIn Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology, Johns Hopkins University Press. 2008.
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22Sense, Reference and Selective AttentionAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 55-98. 1997.
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Information processing, phenomenal consciousness, and Molyneux's questionIn José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, reference, and experience: themes from the philosophy of Gareth Evans, Clarendon Press. 2005.
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58Sense, Reference and Selective AttentionAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (71): 55-98. 1997.Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1997), 55-74, with a reply by Michael Martin
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1Visual Attention and the Epistemic Role of AttentionIn Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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127The simple view of colourIn Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color, Mit Press. pp. 177-90. 1997.Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..
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131Molyneux's question and cognitive impenetrabilityIn Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Penetrabiity of Perception: Attention, Strategies and Bottom-Up Constraints, Nova Science. 2005.
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Perceptual attentionIn Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford University Press Uk. 2015.
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583A variational approach to niche constructionJournals of the Royal Society Interface 15 1-14. 2018.In evolutionary biology, niche construction is sometimes described as a genuine evolutionary process whereby organisms, through their activities and regulatory mechanisms, modify their environment such as to steer their own evolutionary trajectory, and that of other species. There is ongoing debate, however, on the extent to which niche construction ought to be considered a bona fide evolutionary force, on a par with natural selection. Recent formulations of the variational free-energy principle…Read more
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88The First Person, Embodiment, and the Certainty that One ExistsThe Monist 87 (4): 475-488. 2004.Descartes made vivid that my certainty as to which psychological states are mine seems to outrun by far my certainty about which body is mine, or even that I have a body. This can make it seem compelling that in our ordinary use of the first person, we are referring to purely psychological subjects, which just so happen to be specially related to particular bodies. This would explain why your certainty about your ownership of a particular psychological life can outrun your certainty about your o…Read more
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207My project in this paper is to extend the interventionist analysis of causation to give an account of causation in psychology. Many aspects of empirical investigation into psychological causation fit straightforwardly into the interventionist framework. I address three problems. First, the problem of explaining what it is for a causal relation to be properly psychological rather than merely biological. Second, the problem of rational causation: how it is that reasons can be causes. Finally, I lo…Read more
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239An interventionist approach to causation in psychologyIn Alison Gopnik & Laura Schulz (eds.), Causal learning: psychology, philosophy, and computation, Oxford University Press. pp. 58--66. 2007.
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297Berkeley's puzzleIn Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press. 2002.But say you,surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees,for instance,in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no dif?culty in it:but what is all this,I beseech you,more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of anyone that may perceive them? But do you not yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpos…Read more
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5Consciousness and referenceIn Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.in Brian McLaughlin and Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (Oxford, Oxford University Press, in press)
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Manipulating colourIn Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press. 2006.It seems a compelling idea that experience of colour plays some role in our having concepts of the various colours, but in trying to explain the role experience plays the first thing we have to describe is what sort of colour experience matters here. I will argue that the kind of experience that matters is conscious attention to the colours of objects as an aspect of them on which direct intervention is selectively possible. As I will explain this idea, it is a matter of being able to use experi…Read more
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8New Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett (edited book)Atlanta: Rodopi. 1998.Ever since the publication of 'Truth' in 1959 Sir Michael Dummett has been acknowledged as one of the most profoundly creative and influential of contemporary philosophers. His contributions to the philosophy of thought and language, logic, the philosophy of mathematics, and metaphysics have set the terms of some of most fruitful discussions in philosophy. His work on Frege stands unparalleled, both as landmark in the history of philosophy and as a deep reflection on the defining commitments of …Read more
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Manipulating colour : pounding an almondIn Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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299Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusionPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3): 89-100. 2001.
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158Cogito Ergo Sum: Christopher Peacocke and John Campbell: II—Lichtenberg and the CogitoProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3pt3): 361-378. 2012.Our use of ‘I’, or something like it, is implicated in our self-regarding emotions, in the concern to survive, and so seems basic to ordinary human life. But why does that pattern of use require a referring term? Don't Lichtenberg's formulations show how we could have our ordinary pattern of use here without the first person? I argue that what explains our compulsion to regard the first person as a referring term is our ordinary causal thinking, which requires us to find a persisting object as t…Read more
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19Institutionnal Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political EcnomyTheory and Society 27 (3): 377-409. 1998.
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461The Ownership of ThoughtsPhilosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1): 35-39. 2002.In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.1 (2002) 35-39 [Access article in PDF] The Ownership of Thoughts John Campbell Keywords: schizophrenia, thought insertion, immunity to error through misidentification. SYDNEY SHOEMAKER FORMULATED a basic point about first-person, present-tense ascriptions of psychological states when he declared that they are, in general, immune to error through misidentification (Shoemaker 1984). Assuming Shoem…Read more
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14What Is It to Know What ‘I’ Refers To?The Monist 87 (2): 206-218. 2004.We can make a distinction between the conceptual role of the first person and the reference of the first person. By ‘conceptual role’ I mean the use that is made of the term: the kinds of procedures that we use in verifying judgements using the term and the kinds of actions we perform on the basis of judgements involving the term. In “Self-Notions,” Perry talks about conceptual role using the phrase, ‘epistemic/pragmatic relations’. He says there are “normally self-informative” ways of getting i…Read more
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212What is it to know what 'I' refers to?The Monist 87 (2): 206-218. 2004.We can make a distinction between the conceptual role of the first person and the reference of the first person. By ‘conceptual role’ I mean the use that is made of the term: the kinds of procedures that we use in verifying judgements using the term and the kinds of actions we perform on the basis of judgements involving the term. In “Self-Notions,” Perry talks about conceptual role using the phrase, ‘epistemic/pragmatic relations’. He says there are “normally self-informative” ways of getting i…Read more
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130What is the role of location in the sense of a visual demonstrative? Reply to MatthenPhilosophical Studies 127 (2): 239-254. 2006.
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311Schizophrenia, the space of reasons, and thinking as a motor processThe Monist 82 (4): 609-625. 1999.Ordinarily, if you say something like “I see a comet,” you might make a mistake about whether it is a comet that you see, but you could not be right about whether it is a comet but wrong about who is seeing it. There cannot be an “error of identification” in this case. In making a judgement like, “I see a comet,” there are not two steps, finding out who is seeing the thing and finding out what it is that is being seen, so that you could go wrong at either step. The only place to go wrong is in y…Read more
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79Sense and consciousnessIn Abraham Zvie Bar-On (ed.), Grazer Philosophische Studien, Distributed in the U.s.a. By Humanities Press. pp. 195-211. 1986.On a classical conception, knowing the sense of a proposition is knowing its truth-condition, rather than simply knowing how to verify the proposition, or how to find its implications (whether deductive implications or implications for action). But knowing the truth-condition of a proposition is not unrelated to your use of particular methods for verifying the proposition, or finding its implications. Rather, your knowledge of the truth-condition of the proposition has to justify the use of part…Read more
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237Molyneux's questionPhilosophical Issues 7 301-318. 1996.in Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception (Philosophical Issues vol. 7) (Atascadero: Ridgeview 1996), 301-318, with replies by Brian Loar and Kirk Ludwig
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University of California, Los AngelesRegular Faculty
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Biology |