John Haglund

In Swedish military policy, the concept of kompetens (competence) describes the skills and capability of military personnel. Furthermore, “competence-in-use,” a multidimensional conceptual tool, has been used for decades in Swedish military instruction and training without having ever been empirically proven. In this pilot study, designed as an exploratory case study, we will try to connect theory to practice by examining the actual situations in which military competence is used. This article has two aims: First, to examine the relevance of the concept of competence-in-use in Swedish military practice abroad, and second, to combine and evaluate two methods in an exploratory case study. To capture firsthand experiences of real combat situations, we selected a sample of 28 firsthand narratives from Swedish service members. Our mapping identifies the blurred transition between combat and noncombat situations. By way of conclusion, we suggest that our analysis tool is further tested, for example, in comparative studies between nations.

The World as Bestand and Representation: The Anthropocene, Technology and Art through Heidegger’s Philosophy The Anthropocene marks the earth’s entrance into a new geological time. The transition is assumed to be caused by the implementation of man-made technologies resulting in massive changes for environment and ecosystems. Even if the concept of Anthropocene originates from the natural sciences, its influence within both art and the humanities has been considerable. Since the human influence in Anthropocene is specifically a technological influence, understanding Anthropocene entails clarifying what technology is. We propose that a conceptual elucidation is found in Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. According to Heidegger, technology involves that the world is framed as a «standing-reserve» (Bestand) for human interests. In such an «enframing» (Gestell), the position of the human is simultaneously yet paradoxically elevated and dethroned. The indications of this contradictory relation can be found in contemporary discussion of the Anthropocene in the arts. To further inquire into the role of art in Anthropocene, we turn to Heidegger’s analysis of how the work of art sets off truth in the work as a conflict between earth and world. This allows us to differentiate between three different positions for «Anthropocene» art: an affirming, a critical, and one that attempts to go beyond this dichotomy.

We advocate an analysis of meaning that departs from the pragmatic slogan that “meaning is use”. However, in order to avoid common missteps, this claim is in dire need of qualification. We argue that linguistic meaning does not originate from language use as such; therefore we cannot base a theory of meaning only on use. It is important not to neglect the fact that language is ultimately reliant on non-linguistic factors. This might seem to oppose the aforementioned slogan, but it will be made clear how this opposition is chimerical. We propose that meaning traces back to the relation between subjectivity and intersubjectivity, which is at the heart of the matter by inducing strong interdependency between intention and interpretation. But to base a full-fledged analysis of meaning in communicative dyads alone is also insufficient. What needs to be further acknowledged is that meaning sharing becomes regulated by the interactions of a community. This we call consensus and it is at play in framing all communicative acts. Hence arises a triadic structure – we call this the meaningsharing network. The main motivation behind this model is to capture that meaning is not “in the head”, nor is it autonomous of the individual members that constitute it.

The old duality that eventually came to produce the mind/body-problem indicates the problem of transcendental subjectivity. The enduring significance of this problem shows itself in a provocation of any paradigm that has become too objectivistic, too naturalistic – even too idealistic in a certain sense – and too forgetful of its own departure from a perspective always presumed. Analytic philosophy bears a tendency towards such a ‘view from nowhere’ which denies a fundamental subjective connection. The rebuttal of this position entails accepting the interrelation between first- and third-person-perspective; we call this the ‘view from somewhere’. Tracing the tension between the subjective and the objective we find this “view” embraced in the phenomenological tradition. At the same time we find the mind/body-problem seemingly dissolved through, among other key concepts, the introduction of the ‘lived body’. We will see, however, that this is no thorough solution; a fundamental mind/world polarity escapes the phenomenological framework and ends up mounting a critical threat to its own stability. A demonstration is attempted of how both the process of objectification and the process of subjectification falls into regressive patterns. This is due to the interplay of the gaze and the source, the ‘from’ and the ‘towards’: Ajin. Later this argumentation calls for a discussion of the pre-reflective sphere of consciousness. Finally we show the alignment between conclusions driven forth in our own dialectic and the ones found in the philosophy of Nāgārjuna. The transcendental interconstitution of subjectivity and objectivity, perspective and world, has a name in emptiness.