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Mental causationIn Sophie Gibb, E. J. Lowe & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology, Oxford University Press. 2013.
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42Fact and Meaning: Quine and Wittgenstein on Philosophy of LanguagePhilosophical Books 31 (4): 229-231. 1992.
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153Mental causesAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1): 61-71. 1991.Our suspicion is that philosophers who tie the fate of agency to advances in cognitive science simultaneously underestimate that conception's tenacity and overestimate their ability to divine the course of empirical inquiry. For the present, however, we shall pretend that current ideas about what would be required for the scientific vindication of folk psychology are apt, and ask where this leaves the notion of agency. Our answer will be that it leaves that notion on the whole unaffected.
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71Powerful qualitiesIn Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations, Routledge. 2010.
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104Accidents, Modes, Tropes, and UniversalsAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 51 (4): 333-344. 2014.What are properties? Examples are easy. Consider a particular billiard ball. The ball is red, spherical, and has a definite mass. The ball's redness, sphericity, and mass are properties: properties of the ball. Putting it this way invites a distinction between the ball, a bearer of properties, and the ball's properties. Some philosophers deny that there are properties. To say that the ball is red or spherical, for instance, is just to say that the predicates "is red" and "is spherical" apply tru…Read more
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26Mental CausationRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 185 (1): 105-106. 1995.Common sense and philosophical tradition agree that mind makes a difference. What we do depends not only on how our bodies are put together, but also on what we think. Explaining how mind can make a difference has proved challenging, however. Some have urged that the project faces an insurmountable dilemma: either we concede that mentalistic explanations of behavior have only a pragmatic standing or we abandon our conception of the physical domain as causally autonomous. Although each option has…Read more
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HolismIn Ted Honderich (ed.), The Oxford companion to philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 397--98. 1995.
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Are We Brains in a Vat? Top Philosopher Says, "No"!In Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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16Mind and KnowledgeIn Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford handbook of epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 316. 2002.
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26Language and ThoughtIn Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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18Reply to Ross Cameron and Elizabeth Barnes, John HeilSWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 6 (2). 2007.
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64RelationsIn Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. 2009.
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63Modes and MindIn Simone Gozzano Francesco Orilia (ed.), Tropes, Universals and the Philosophy of Mind: Essays at the Boundary of Ontology and Philosophical Psychology, Ontos Verlag. pp. 13-30. 2008.