John Hoverman

The search for a foundation for morality is one of the oldest problems of Philosophy. Yet recent philosophic work has questioned the role Philosophy may have in solving this problem. Developments in Sociobiology and Evolutionary Biology have offered different avenues to approach this problem. The hypothesis of this dissertation is that there are now enough data available through these other disciplines to answer the traditional philosophic questions of morality, particularly "what is it to be moral?" and "is there a structure that indicates what l ought to do?" The argument proceeds by examining evolutionary genetics and the causes of variability. It is postulated that our moral feelings are emotional states that come about by our biologic structure that gives us a way to interpret events. The predominant aspects of these structures are characterized by the feelings of sympathy and dominance. When moved sufficiently by these feelings we exert "power" in order to change the state of affairs. In a very complex way these interactions are the source of our moralities. The insights of Aristotle in this regard are presented. From an analysis of these interactions, a definition of "justice" is proposed. The basis of two contemporary moral problems, abortion and the right to die, are discussed using the proposed structure. Finally, the discussion returns to the original philosophic questions. A proposal is made to demonstrate why the things that we "ought" to do are bound up by our nature and our language only reflects the practical necessity of performing certain kinds of activities. The argument is concluded with a discussion of John Henry Faulk as a paradigm of a moral character