John Klasios

The cognitive scientist Donald Hoffman argues that we don't perceive reality: spacetime, objects, colors, sounds, tastes, and so forth, are all merely an interface that we evolved to track evolutionary fitness rather than to perceive truths about external reality. In this paper, I expound on his argument, then I extend it, primarily, by looking at key ideas in physics that are quite germane to it. Among the topics in physics that I discuss are black holes, the holographic principle, string theory, duality, quantum gravity, and special relativity. I discuss these ideas from physics with an eye to their relevance for Hoffman's view.

This paper develops an integrated theoretical explanation of aggression among men, showing that much of that aggression is anchored in naturally-selected psychological adaptations—and, in the case of honor, importantly tied to cultural transmission—designed to solve the recurrent evolutionary problems of status and honor. Both of these problems are—or at least were—very crucial to the reproductive success of men. Maintaining and cultivating honor, engaging in theft, mating competition, war, and gangs are the main phenomena thereby explained in evolutionary terms. Drawing on theoretical and conceptual resources from the evolutionary sciences at large, and in particular evolutionary psychology, the explanation developed here also and importantly pulls together the psychological, developmental, cultural, and ecological dimensions of the phenomena at issue. Doing so allows the model to sketch the ways in which the psychological adaptations underlying aggression are sensitive to both external and individual contingencies and thereby open-ended and flexible. The evolutionary model developed here draws an additional strength from its ability to grapple with individual differences and evolutionarily-novel environments. Finally, the integrated explanation is also synthesized with the evolutionary genetics and heritability of aggression.

Many have argued that the very notion of human nature is untenable given the facts of evolution and should accordingly be discarded. This paper, by contrast, argues that the notion can be retained in a coherent and modern way. The present account expounds on the view of human nature as a collection of species-typical psychological adaptations, and outlines how it can be understood in formally modeled computational terms. The view defended is also heavily developmental and connects directly with contemporary evolutionary developmental biology. Furthermore, the notion of human nature developed here allows us to abstract away from the obfuscating variability that manifests not only between individuals across ontogeny, but also cross-culturally and throughout time.

In this paper, I critique arguments made by philosopher David Buller against central evolutionary-psychological explanations of human mating. Specifically, I aim to rebut his criticisms of Evolutionary Psychology regarding (1) women's long-term mating preferences for high-status men; (2) the evolutionary rationale behind men's provisioning of women; (3) men's mating preferences for young women; (4) women's adaptation for extra-pair sex; (5) the sex-differentiated evolutionary theory of human jealousy; and (6) the notion of mate value. In sum, I aim to demonstrate that Buller's arguments contra Evolutionary Psychologists are left wanting.

In this paper, I critique arguments made by philosopher David Buller against central evolutionary-psychological explanations of human mating. Specifically, I aim to rebut his criticisms of Evolutionary Psychology regarding women's long-term mating preferences for high-status men; the evolutionary rationale behind men's provisioning of women; men's mating preferences for young women; women's adaptation for extra-pair sex; the sex-differentiated evolutionary theory of human jealousy; and the notion of mate value. In sum, I aim to demonstrate that Buller's arguments contra Evolutionary Psychologists are left wanting.

The evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey Miller has argued that various features of human psychology have been sculpted, at least in part, by the evolutionary process of sexual selection via mate choice. This paper specifically examines the central claim of Miller’s account, namely that certain cognitive traits have evolved to function as good genes fitness indicators. First, I expound on and clarify key foundational concepts comprising the focal hypothesis, especially condition-dependence, mutation target size, and mutation-selection balance. Second, I proceed to highlight some subtle distinctions with respect to the concepts of exaptation and adaptation, as well as Fisherian runaway selection and good genes sexual selection, all of which in turn bear importantly on the overall framework of cognitive traits as fitness indicators. Third and finally, I close out the paper by examining various conceptual and methodological criteria which are integral to identifying sexually selected adaptations, then briefly examine some empirical work that has aimed to test the hypothesis that traits such as humor and creativity function as sexually attractive fitness indicators.