John Lachs

(1934 - 2023)

This chapter sketches an account of flourishing that resists the allure of overgeneralization and universal pronouncements. It does justice to the staggering variety of human lives and satisfactions. Because there is no one human endeavor or satisfaction that constitutes the essence of human life, any successful account of flourishing must be radically pluralistic and relational. Aristotle and Mill provided the most plausible accounts of well-being, but even their views are overly narrow. An effective philosophy of flourishing must be committed to letting people pursue their fulfillments in their own ways. In this undertaking, a broad-minded philosophy can be an effective antidote to smug self-certainty, effective resistance against exclusive occupation with the past, and a site of large fulfillments and expanded meanings.

The _Encyclopedia of American Philosophy_ provides coverage of the major figures, concepts, historical periods and traditions in American philosophical thought. Containing over 600 entries written by scholars who are experts in the field, this _Encyclopedia_ is the first of its kind. It is a scholarly reference work that is accessible to the ordinary reader by explaining complex ideas in simple terms and providing ample cross-references to facilitate further study. The _Encyclopedia of American Philosophy_ contains a thorough analytical index and will serve as a standard, comprehensive reference work for universities and colleges. Topics covered include: Great philosophers: Emerson, Dewey, James, Royce, Peirce, Santayana Subjects: Pragmatism, Progress, the Future, Knowledge, Democracy, Growth, Truth Influences on American Philosophy: Hegel, Aristotle, Plato, British Enlightenment, Reformation Self-Assessments: Joe Margolis, Donald Davidson, Susan Haack, Peter Hare, John McDermott, Stanley Cavell Ethics: Value, Pleasure, Happiness, Duty, Judgment, Growth Political Philosophy: Declaration of Independence, Democracy, Freedom, Liberalism, Community, Identity

If I have been correct in my surmise that Weiss is no reductionist in the ordinary sense, then it is evident that he can offer no definition of mind in any ordinary or straightforward manner. The only way in which he could offer a definition would be, on the basis of the ontological reducibility of mind, by reference to Actuality of which it is asserted to be a function. But Weiss has not provided such a definition, nor is it easy to see how this omission could be rectified. For the proposition that mind is an expression of the self, the most obvious candidate for a definition, does not identify mind uniquely: there are expressions of the self which are not mental. Thus what is needed is a differentia, a characteristic distinguishing mind from all the other expressions of the self.