John Lemos

This article provides a brief explanation of Robert Kane's indeterministic, event‐causal libertarian theory of freedom and responsibility. It is noted that a number of authors have criticized libertarian theories, such as Kane's, by presenting the problem of luck. After noting how Kane has tried to answer this problem in his recent writings, the author goes on to explain Ishtiyaque Haji's recent version of the luck argument. The author considers three possible Kanian replies to Haji's luck argument and argues that the third reply can adequately answer the luck objection. It is also noted that the third reply requires making some significant alterations to Kane's theory that would also help him resolve certain problems with his views about responsibility for character.

This essay gives a summary account of the central theses in my recent book, Free Will’s Value: Criminal Justice, Pride, and Love (Routledge, 2023). The book defends a particular version of libertarian free will, what I call “the indeterministic weightings view.” This view is similar to Robert Kane’s libertarian view. It is argued that (a) it is a coherent view that fits with scientific naturalism and (b) while we lack sufficient evidentiary grounds to believe we have such free will, there are nonetheless sufficient axiological reasons to believe, or at least live and act as if, we have such free will.

In his event-causal libertarian theory of free will, Robert Kane maintains that in the moments leading up to an undetermined free choice the agent engages in competing efforts of will and he regards this as crucial in establishing agent control over and responsibility for such undetermined free choices. In contrast, Mark Balaguer puts forward an event-causal theory of undetermined free choice in which such competing efforts of will are not a required element. In a recent published exchange between these two, Kane has made the argument that without including the dual efforts as an essential component of undetermined free choice Balaguer’s view falls prey to a certain version of the luck argument. Balaguer has argued that (1) his position is immune to such a luck argument and (2) if it is not immune to it, then Kane’s view suffers from the same problem. In this paper the author explains the nature of their different views as well as the nature of this recent debate in which they’ve engaged. He shows that despite Balaguer’s attempt at rebutting Kane’s arguments he fails to offer adequate defense of points (1) and (2).

Naturalistic naturalized epistemology combines ontological naturalism with naturalized epistemology. Ontological naturalism is the view that nothing exists other than spatio-temporal beings embedded within a space-time framework. Naturalized epistemology is a view about the nature of knowledge characterized by its commitment to externalism and the idea that knowledge consists in beliefs reliably generated by cognitive mechanisms operating in a suitable environment. Alvin Plantinga has provided a much discussed evolutionary biological argument against naturalistic naturalized epistemology. In this article I defend naturalistic naturalized epistemology by refuting Plantinga's replies to two important criticisms of his argument.

This article begins with an account of some of the different views on the nature of free will which have been expressed by historically important Muslim thinkers. The views of both Muslim philosophers and theologians are addressed. It is demonstrated that some held compatibilist views while others held libertarian views. In the second half of the paper, Robert Kane gives a summary account of the latest version of his libertarian view of free will, putting it in relation to the Muslim views considered in the first half of the paper.

In a recent book, The Problem of the Soul, Owen Flanagan discusses the Cartesian, or agent causation, view of free will. According to this view, when a person acts of his own free will his action is not caused by antecedent events but is caused by the agent himself, and in acting the agent acts as an uncaused cause. Flanagan argues at length that this view is false. In this article, I defend the agent causation view against Flanagan’s criticisms and I go on to critically address his own ‘neo-compatibilist’ alternative to the agent causation view. In doing so, I hope to exhibit some common misconceptions about the nature of the agent causation view and to show that this is a view that deserves more serious consideration.

This article begins with an account of some of the different views on the nature of free will which have been expressed by historically important Muslim thinkers. The views of both Muslim philosophers and theologians are addressed. It is demonstrated that some held compatibilist views while others held libertarian views. In the second half of the paper, Robert Kane gives a summary account of the latest version of his libertarian view of free will, putting it in relation to the Muslim views considered in the first half of the paper.

In my dissertation I defend a view that I call "pluralistic character-morality." Pluralistic character-morality is the view that: the character of persons plays an essential and irreducible role in determining the overall moral worth of persons; and morally good character, whatever it is, is constituted by a plurality of ontologically independent virtues. The dissertation consists of four chapters, the first two of which serve as a defense of above and the second two of which serve as defense of above. ;The first thesis of pluralistic character-morality is divisible into two distinct theses; these are the irreducibility thesis and the essentiality thesis. In Chapter One, I defend the irreducibility thesis, which is the view that the character of persons is not reducible to talk about the acts or mere dispositions to act of persons. In Chapter Two, I defend the essentiality thesis, which states that the character of persons plays an essential role in determining their overall moral worth. ;The second thesis of pluralistic character-morality is also divisible into two distinct theses; these are the ontological independence thesis and the plurality thesis. The ontological independence thesis states that it is possible to possess one virtue, such as justice, courage, benevolence, etc., without possessing all of them. In Chapter Four, I defend pluralism by showing that none of the most plausible monistic views about morally good character are true

Some contemporary philosophers maintain we lack the kind of free will that makes us morally responsible for our actions. Some of these philosophers, such as Derk Pereboom, Gregg Caruso, and Bruce Waller, also argue that such a view supports the case for significant reform of the penal system. Pereboom and Caruso explicitly endorse a quarantine model for dealing with dangerous criminals, arguing that while not responsible for their crimes such criminals should be detained in non-harsh conditions and offered the opportunity for rehabilitation. Waller does not explicitly endorse the quarantine model, but his view is similar in significant respects. I argue that such views can too easily lead to the endorsement of legal policies which would result in more frequent punishment of innocent persons for crimes they have not committed. Thus, we should have deep moral reservations about such views.

Years ago Robert Nozick provided the experience machine argument, which states that since many people would forgo a life of artificially stimulated tremendous pleasure provided by an "experience machine," it must be that sometimes people are motivated by things other than the pursuit of their own pleasure. This is to say that he rejected psychological hedonism. In a recent book Elliot Sober and David Wilson defend the view that Nozick's argument does not provide adequate refutation of psychological hedonism. This article defends Nozick's argument against their objections

Dwayne Moore (2021) argues that libertarians about free will who are reductive physicalists cannot make proper sense of free will. In doing so, he presents what he calls “the physical indeterminism luck objection” to libertarian free will. He goes on to consider three different contemporary naturalistic approaches to libertarian free will (LFW) – those of Christopher Franklin, Mark Balaguer, and Robert Kane – and argues that if understood as reductive physicalist views they all fall prey to this objection. While it’s not entirely clear that Kane is a reductive physicalist, it is clear that he would reject any kind of eliminative materialism or eliminative physicalism (Kane 1996, 147). Regardless, in this essay I argue that even if Kane’s view is a kind of reductive physicalist view, it is immune to the arguments made in Moore’s essay.

: In this article it is assumed that human goodness is to be judged with respect to how well one does at practical reasoning. It is acknowledged that there is a difference between moral practical reasoning and prudential practical reasoning and what these would recommend sometimes conflict. A distinction is then made between absolute PPR and relative PPR and it is argued that doing well at absolute PPR is always consistent with MPR. It is also argued that since it is more reasonable to assess prudential practical rationality in terms of the absolute standard than the relative standard, there is no conflict between the demands of MPR and PPR

Robert Kane's event-causal libertarian theory of free will has been subjected to a variety of criticisms. In response to the luck objection, he has provided an ambiguous answer which results in additional criticisms that are avoidable. I explain Kane's theory, the luck objection and Kane's reply to the problem of luck. I note that in some places he suggests that the dual wantings of agents engaged in self-forming actions (SFAs) provides the key to answering the luck objection, whereas in other places he suggests that the dual willings or tryings of agents is the key. Various philosophers criticize Kane's view by focusing on his concept of the dual willings/tryings involved in SFAs. I argue that despite Kane's efforts to answer these criticisms, they still hold; but I also go on to argue that Kane can avoid these criticisms and also answer the luck objection by just focusing on the important role of the dual wantings in SFAs

This article articulates and defends an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will. It begins by defining the conception of free will at issue and then goes on to present versions of the luck objection which is often made against theories of LFW. It is argued that the sort of indeterministic weightings model of LFW which has been defended in the recent literature by Storrs McCall and E.J. Lowe and John Lemos has the resources to answer such luck objections while possessing virtues which some other libertarian views lack. According to the indeterministic weightings model of LFW, in making undetermined free-willed choices between two courses of action, A or B, the reasons for choosing each option don’t come with pre-established evaluative weights. During the process of deliberation, the agent assigns weight in an undetermined way to the reasons for each option and this typically leads to the choice of the option that has been assigned a greater value. In the paper, it is not only argued that this theory can resolve worries about luck but also that the view has virtues which certain other libertarian views lack, as such the view is contrasted with the modest libertarian models of LFW from Daniel Dennett and Alfred Mele as well as Robert Kane’s view.

Robert Kane has for many years claimed that in our underivatively free actions, what he calls “self-forming acts”, we actually try to do both of the two acts we are contemplating doing and then we ultimately end up doing only one of them. This idea of dual willings/efforts was put forward in an attempt to solve luck problems, but Randolph Clarke and Alfred Mele argue that for this to work agents must, then, freely engage in the dual efforts leading up to their SFAs. In response, Kane has said they do so freely by meeting compatibilist criteria of freedom. In Free Will and Luck , Mele argues that this move is deeply problematic. In this essay, I defend Kane's position. In doing so, I clarify important differences between the SFAs of adults and those of young children, making more clear the connections between SFAs, character, and responsibility

In Michael Ruse's recent publications, such as Taking Darwin Seriously (1998) and Evolutionary Naturalism (1995), he has advocated a certain sort of evolutionary epistemology and has argued that it implies a rejection of metaphysical realism (MR) in favor of a position that he calls “internal realism” (IR). Additionally, he has maintained that, insofar as his evolutionary epistemology implies a rejection of MR in favor of IR, it escapes the kind of argument against naturalism that Alvin Plantinga makes in his Warrant and Proper Function (1993). In this article I explain the relevant views and arguments of Ruse and Plantinga, and I critically engage with Ruse's views, arguing that (1) his case for rejecting MR has no essential connection to evolutionary considerations; (2) his case for rejecting MR depends upon internalist assumptions about the nature of knowledge that are in need of some kind of defense; and (3) given his implicit internalism and his commitment to IR, his argument for rejecting MR can be used against his IR.

Human beings are the products of many thousands of years of biological evolution, and this process occurs in accordance with the principles of natural selection originally articulated and defended by Charles Darwin and developed and defended further in the modern synthesis of the 20th century. In this paper, I consider how it may be thought that this fact threatens the rationality of belief in the Christian God. These threats are countenanced with respect to issues of design, randomness, suffering, and the objectivity of ethics. I argue that while some versions of Christian belief, such as those grounded in a literalist reading of the Genesis creation story or those committed to the image of God thesis, may be threatened by a Darwinian worldview, there are nonetheless plausible versions of Christian belief that are immune to Darwinian challenges.

In the second half of their recent, critically acclaimed book Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior , Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson discuss psychological hedonism. This is the view that avoiding our own pain and increasing our own pleasure are the only ultimate motives people have. They argue that none of the traditional philosophical arguments against this view are good, and they go on to present theirownevolutionary biological argument against it. Interestingly, the first half of their book, which is a defense of group selectionism, has received almost all of the attention of those people who have published reactions to the book. No one has published a detailed reaction to the argument of the latter half of the book. In this article, the author explains and critically discusses their evolutionary biological argument against psychological hedonism, concluding that in its current form it is not strong enough to support its conclusion. However, the author goes on to argue that despite recent criticisms of Robert Nozick’s experience-machine argument, it is still a good argument against psychological hedonism. In support of the latter point, the author responds to the objections of Sober and Wilson and to the more recent criticisms offered by Matthew Silverstein. Key Words: hedonism • psychological egoism • evolution • Robert Nozick • Elliott Sober.

This article provides a defense of a variety of MacIntyrean arguments against emotivism. In After Virtue MacIntyre explains that emotivism might be understood either as a theory about the meaning or about the function of moral language. He also argues that emotivism is false either way. I argue that MacIntyre is right about this by explaining and then answering the recent defenses of emotivism that have appeared in the literature. I conclude by reminding the reader that according to MacIntyre his attacks on emotivism also serve as attacks on other subjectivist ethical theories, such as prescriptivism and existentialism. Thus, if he is right about this, then his critique of emotivism has more far ranging implications than one might initially suppose.

In such works as A Short History of Ethics, Against the Self-lmages of the Age, and After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that the intelligibility of the moral life hinges upon viewing the moral life as essential to the happy life, or eudaimonia. In my article I examine the reasons he gives for saying this, arguing that this thesis is not sufficiently defended by MacIntyre. I also draw connections between this thesis about the intelligibility of the moral life and other aspects of MacIntyre’s thought, such as his communitarianism. In concluding I note that several of MacIntyre’s more significant claims about morality might well be true even if his thesis about the intelligibility of the moral life is false.