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628Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2002.The most famous challenge to computational cognitive science and artificial intelligence is the philosopher John Searle's "Chinese Room" argument.
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167Artificial Intelligence Is Stupid and Causal Reasoning Will Not Fix ItFrontiers in Psychology 11. 2021.Artificial Neural Networks have reached “grandmaster” and even “super-human” performance across a variety of games, from those involving perfect information, such as Go, to those involving imperfect information, such as “Starcraft”. Such technological developments from artificial intelligence (AI) labs have ushered concomitant applications across the world of business, where an “AI” brand-tag is quickly becoming ubiquitous. A corollary of such widespread commercial deployment is that when AI get…Read more
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36Contemporary Sensorimotor Theory (edited book)Springer. 2013.This book analyzes the philosophical foundations of sensorimotor theory and discusses the most recent applications of sensorimotor theory to human computer interaction, child's play, virtual reality, robotics, and linguistics. Why does a circle look curved and not angular? Why doesn't red sound like a bell? Why, as I interact with the world, is there something it is like to be me? These are simple questions to pose but more difficult to answer. An analytic philosopher might respond to the first …Read more
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9Phenomenal PromiscuityConstructivist Foundations 11 (2): 284-285. 2016.Open peer commentary on the article “Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World” by Michael Beaton. Upshot: Sensorimotor direct realism is too promiscuous in its account of sensation.
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Implementation of the spiking neuron stochastic diffusion network on parallel hardwareConsciousness and Cognition 9 (2). 2000.
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44Why Computers Can’t Feel PainMinds and Machines 19 (4): 507-516. 2009.The most cursory examination of the history of artificial intelligence highlights numerous egregious claims of its researchers, especially in relation to a populist form of ‘strong’ computationalism which holds that any suitably programmed computer instantiates genuine conscious mental states purely in virtue of carrying out a specific series of computations. The argument presented herein is a simple development of that originally presented in Putnam’s (Representation & Reality, Bradford Books, …Read more
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78Zombie Mouse in a Chinese RoomPhilosophy and Technology 28 (2): 209-223. 2015.John Searle’s Chinese Room Argument purports to demonstrate that syntax is not sufficient for semantics, and, hence, because computation cannot yield understanding, the computational theory of mind, which equates the mind to an information processing system based on formal computations, fails. In this paper, we use the CRA, and the debate that emerged from it, to develop a philosophical critique of recent advances in robotics and neuroscience. We describe results from a body of work that contrib…Read more
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48A new book by Zenon Pylyshyn is always a cause for celebration among philosophers of psychology. While many hard-nosed experimental cognitive scientists are attentive to philosophers’ concerns, Pylyshyn stands alone in the extraordinary efforts he takes to understand, address, and struggle with the philosophical puzzles that the mind, and perception in particular, raises. Pylyshyn’s most recent work, Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World, does not disappoint. It is philosophica…Read more
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48Rethinking Construction: On Luciano Floridi’s ‘Against Digital Ontology’Minds and Machines 24 (1): 89-99. 2014.In the fourteenth chapter of The Philosophy of Information, Luciano Floridi puts forth a criticism of ‘digital ontology’ as a step toward the articulation of an ‘informational structural realism’. Based on the claims made in the chapter, the present paper seeks to evaluate the distinctly Kantian scope of the chapter from a rather unconventional viewpoint: while in sympathy with the author’s doubts ‘against’ digital philosophy, we follow a different route. We turn our attention to the concept of …Read more
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884Why computers can't feel painMinds and Machines 19 (4): 507-516. 2009.The most cursory examination of the history of artificial intelligence highlights numerous egregious claims of its researchers, especially in relation to a populist form of ‘strong’ computationalism which holds that any suitably programmed computer instantiates genuine conscious mental states purely in virtue of carrying out a specific series of computations. The argument presented herein is a simple development of that originally presented in Putnam’s (Representation & Reality, Bradford Books, …Read more
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417Counterfactuals cannot count: A rejoinder to David ChalmersConsciousness and Cognition 11 (4): 642-652. 2002.The initial argument presented herein is not significantly original—it is a simple reflection upon a notion of computation originally developed by Putnam and criticised by Chalmers et al. . In what follows, instead of seeking to justify Putnam’s conclusion that every open system implements every Finite State Automaton and hence that psychological states of the brain cannot be functional states of a computer, I will establish the weaker result that, over a finite time window every open system imp…Read more
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1034Quantum linguistics and Searle's Chinese room argumentIn V. C. Muller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence, Springer. pp. 17-29. 2011.Viewed in the light of the remarkable performance of ‘Watson’ - IBMs proprietary artificial intelligence computer system capable of answering questions posed in natural language - on the US general knowledge quiz show ‘Jeopardy’, we review two experiments on formal systems - one in the domain of quantum physics, the other involving a pictographic languaging game - whereby behaviour seemingly characteristic of domain understanding is generated by the mere mechanical application of simple rules. B…Read more
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738A Cognitive Computation Fallacy? Cognition, Computations and PanpsychismCognitive Computation 1 (3): 221-233. 2009.The journal of Cognitive Computation is defined in part by the notion that biologically inspired computational accounts are at the heart of cognitive processes in both natural and artificial systems. Many studies of various important aspects of cognition (memory, observational learning, decision making, reward prediction learning, attention control, etc.) have been made by modelling the various experimental results using ever-more sophisticated computer programs. In this manner progressive inroa…Read more
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683The Imitation GameKybernetes 39 (3): 398-402. 2010.This issue of the Kybernetes journal is concerned with the philosophical question- Can a Machine Think? Famously, in his 1950 paper `Computing Machinery andIntelligence' [9], the British mathematician Alan Turing suggested replacing this question - which he found \too meaningless to deserve discussion" - with a simple -behavioural - test based on an imagined `Victorianesque' pastime he entitled the`imitation game'. In this special issue of Kybernetes a selection of authors with a special inter…Read more
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1403Dancing with pixies: strong artificial intelligence and panpsychismIn John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence, Oxford University Press. pp. 360-379. 2002.The argument presented in this paper is not a direct attack or defence of the Chinese Room Argument (CRA), but relates to the premise at its heart, that syntax is not sufficient for semantics, via the closely associated propositions that semantics is not intrinsic to syntax and that syntax is not intrinsic to physics. However, in contrast to the CRA’s critique of the link between syntax and semantics, this paper will explore the associated link between syntax and physics. The main argument prese…Read more
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311Of (zombie) mice and animatsIn Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence, Springer. pp. 85-107. 2013.The Chinese Room Argument purports to show that‘ syntax is not sufficient for semantics’; an argument which led John Searle to conclude that ‘programs are not minds’ and hence that no computational device can ever exhibit true understanding. Yet, although this controversial argument has received a series of criticisms, it has withstood all attempts at decisive rebuttal so far. One of the classical responses to CRA has been based on equipping a purely computational device with a physical robot bo…Read more
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990HeX and the single anthill: playing games with Aunt HillaryIn Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence, Springer. pp. 367-389. 2016.In a reflective and richly entertaining piece from 1979, Doug Hofstadter playfully imagined a conversation between ‘Achilles’ and an anthill (the eponymous ‘Aunt Hillary’), in which he famously explored many ideas and themes related to cognition and consciousness. For Hofstadter, the anthill is able to carry on a conversation because the ants that compose it play roughly the same role that neurons play in human languaging; unfortunately, Hofstadter’s work is notably short on detail suggesting ho…Read more
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Goldsmiths College, University of LondonRegular Faculty
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Computing and Information |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Computing and Information |