John Murphy

Most workers report that they are alienated from their jobs and find their workplaces to be stifling and uninviting. Given this condition, the introduction of computer technology, including AI, will only make matters worse, unless a more humane organizational culture is created. The key point in this article is the need to produce a responsible technology, so that employees are not further overworked and manipulated. To achieve this end, phenomenology is invoked, particularly the life world, to provide technology with a human foundation. In practice, this shift in philosophy means that when AI is introduced into an organization, workers have a central role in the design, implementation, and evaluation of this technology. Computer technology can thus promote human flourishing instead of control and alienation in workplaces.

In an era defined by the global surge in the adoption of AI-enabled technologies within public administration, the promises of efficiency and progress are being overshadowed by instances of deepening social inequality, particularly among vulnerable populations. To address this issue, we argue that democratizing AI is a pivotal step toward fostering trust, equity, and fairness within our societies. This article navigates the existing debates surrounding AI democratization but also endeavors to revive and adapt the historical social justice framework, maximum feasible participation, for contemporary participatory applications in deploying AI-enabled technologies in public administration. In our exploration of the multifaceted dimensions of AI’s impact on public administration, we provide a roadmap that can lead beyond rhetoric to practical solutions in the integration of AI in public administration.

This article provides a course of correction in the discourse surrounding human-centric AI by elucidating the philosophical underpinning that serves to create a view that AI is divorced from human-centric values. Next, we espouse the need to explicitly designate stakeholder- or community-centric values which are needed to resolve the issue of alignment. To achieve this, we present two frameworks, Ubuntu and maximum feasible participation. Finally, we demonstrate how employing the aforementioned frameworks in AI can benefit society by flattening the current top-down social hierarchies as AI is currently being utilized. Implications are discussed.

Most workers report that they are alienated from their jobs and find their workplaces to be stifling and uninviting. Given this condition, the introduction of computer technology, including AI, will only make matters worse, unless a more humane organizational culture is created. The key point in this article is the need to produce a responsible technology, so that employees are not further overworked and manipulated. To achieve this end, phenomenology is invoked, particularly the life world, to provide technology with a human foundation. In practice, this shift in philosophy means that when AI is introduced into an organization, workers have a central role in the design, implementation, and evaluation of this technology. Computer technology can thus promote human flourishing instead of control and alienation in workplaces.

Critical Theory is usually associated with an intellectual tradition which emerged from the work of a group of social philosophers who coalesced around the Institute for Social Research, established in Frankfurt in 1923. This tradition is now considered to have two major branches: the first related to the work of Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Leo Lowenthal, and Walter Benjamin, while the second pertains to the expansion of this original work which has been proffered by Jürgen Habermas, Claus Offe, Niklas Luhmann, Karl-Otto Apel, and others. It should be immediately noted that Critical Theory does not form a unity, for it does mean different things to both its early and current adherents. Without overstating the case, however, the common theme which unites these theorists is a dislike for the types of determinism which saw socialism arising automatically from either appropriate social conditions or at the behest of elite party members. In each case the belief was inadvertently advanced that people do not make their own history. In line with the work of Lukács and Korsch, these critical theorists wanted to develop a more vital Marxist theory, one which understands human praxis to be at the center of social development and, thus, human liberation.

English and Australian judges have, over the past few decades, severely questioned the juridical distinctiveness and utility of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. The popular assertion in this country has been that the rule is really only a sub-species of the law of private nuisance. By contrast, the Australian judiciary has abandoned the rule altogether, preferring to expand the law of negligence to capture the rule's former territory. This article seeks to defend the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. In particular it asserts that, by reference to their historical origins, the rule in Rylands v Fletcher and the law of private nuisance can be seen to be quite different creatures. It also argues that there is strong case for the rule's continued vitality, and that it would be a grave mistake to abandon it in favour of a yet more expansive law of negligence