John Robert Williams

One of the most beloved passages in the Zhuang-Zi text is a dialogue between Hui Zi and Zhuang Zi at the end of the “Qiu-shui” chapter. While this is one of many vignettes involving Hui Zi and Zhuang Zi in the text, this particular vignette has recently drawn attention in Chinese and comparative philosophy circles. The most basic question concerning these studies is whether or not the passage represents a substantial philosophical dispute, or instead idle chitchat between two friends. This vignette has not only received much attention as of late, but commentators from at least Guo Xiang onward have taken the conversation as substantial rather than merely charming. Of the traditional readings that take the passage as substantial, there are two main strategies for taking Zhuang Zi as “winning” a substantial dispute: One that argues Zhuang Zi is undermining Hui Zi’s position without offering a positive position, and another that argues that Zhuang Zi is undermining Hui Zi’s position by offering a positive position. Guo Xiang’s “official commentary” is paradigmatic of the first “negative” strategy, while Wang Fuzhi’s reading is paradigmatic of the second “positive” strategy. The goal in the present article is to present these two strategies for reading the passage by translating and analyzing Guo’s and Wang’s annotations, thereby showing how the passage might be and has been taken as more than frivolous chitchat.

This is the main handout for my “Zhuangzi Month” public talk, Sept 26/27, 2025, hosted by the Division of Humanities at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Fāng Yǐzhì’s (方以智, 1611–1671) Yàodì Páo Zhuāng 藥地炮莊 (ca. 1663; “Monk Yàodì Concocts a Zhuāngzǐ”) is an exceptionally complex text. The present talk introduces one of the most distinctive essays contained within Yàodì Páo Zhuāng, an early work of “fan fiction” entitled Huìzǐ yǔ Zhuāngzǐ shū 惠子與莊子書 (“A Letter from Huìzǐ to Zhuāngzǐ”), in which Huìzǐ writes to Zhuāngzǐ from beyond the grave to complain about how he is depicted in the Zhuāngzǐ, among other concerns. This work of “fan fiction”, modeled on Zhāng Zìliè’s (張自烈; 1597–1673) Yǔ gǔrén shū 與古人書 “Letters to the Ancients”, is known as one of the Lúshān èr shū 廬山二書 “Two Writings from Lúshān” finished in 1652. The other of these “two writings”, which shall be discussed en passant, is the complex Xiàng Zǐqī yǔ Guō Zǐxuán shū 向子期與郭子玄書 (“A Letter from Xiàng Zǐqī [Xiàng Xiù (向秀; ca. 227–272)] to Guō Zǐxuán [i.e., Guō Xiàng (郭象; ca. 252–312)]”). This talk will argue that Fāng Yǐzhì’s use of this “fan fiction” format is not merely a literary novelty, but a sophisticated philosophical method for re-engaging and resolving long-standing interpretive problems in Zhuāngzǐ studies.

This is a supplemental handout for my “Zhuangzi Month” public talk, Sept 26/27, 2025, hosted by the Division of Humanities at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Scholarship is a process of continual refinement. In my 2022 Monumenta Serica article, “An Annotated Translation of Fang Yizhi’s Commentary on Zhuangzi’s ‘Butterfly Dream’ Story,” I offered a first English rendering of Fang Yizhi’s dense and allusive remarks on this well-known passage. The present is a reattempt at that early effort. That earlier effort was too literal and imprecise.

This series pairs brief “allegorical tales” (寓言) from the enigmatic ancient Chinese classic Zhuangzi (莊子; ca. 4th through 3rd century BCE) with original watercolor paintings. Through this union of word and image, we hope to create a dialogue in which each illuminates the other, offering a fresh path into these ancient stories. (NB: Sharing selected draft 'Parts' from my book manuscript, ZHUANGZI, A HAPPY FAILURE. This is a work in progress, and I welcome any comments or feedback from colleagues.)

This series pairs brief “allegorical tales” (寓言) from the enigmatic ancient Chinese classic Zhuangzi (莊子; ca. 4th through 3rd century BCE) with original watercolor paintings. Through this union of word and image, we hope to create a dialogue in which each illuminates the other, offering a fresh path into these ancient stories. (NB: Sharing selected draft 'Parts' from my book manuscript, ZHUANGZI, A HAPPY FAILURE. This is a work in progress, and I welcome any comments or feedback from colleagues.)

This series pairs brief “allegorical tales” (寓言) from the enigmatic ancient Chinese classic Zhuangzi (莊子; ca. 4th through 3rd century BCE) with original watercolor paintings. Through this union of word and image, we hope to create a dialogue in which each illuminates the other, offering a fresh path into these ancient stories. (NB: Sharing selected draft 'Parts' from my book manuscript, ZHUANGZI, A HAPPY FAILURE. This is a work in progress, and I welcome any comments or feedback from colleagues.)

This book provides a glimpse into 17th-century Zhuāngzǐ (莊子; ca. 4th through 3rd century BCE) studies by introducing the works of Hānshān Déqīng (憨山德清; 1546–1623), Wáng Fūzhī (王夫之; 1619–1692), and Lín Yúnmíng (林雲銘; 1628–1697), which give a sense of diverse approaches to Zhuāngzǐ during this period. The three commentators represent three distinct orientations as reflected by their respective roles, with Hānshān Déqīng being a Buddhist monk, Wáng Fūzhī a philosopher, and Lín Yúnmíng a literary critic. Their understanding of "carefree wandering" (逍遙遊) is spelled out, followed by a complete translation of the Péng–bird 鵬 passage through their eyes. The author concludes how this amounts to a conception of human flourishing. This is the first monograph on Zhuāngzǐ studies of any of these three thinkers in English. General readers or specialists of ancient Chinese philosophy can gain insight into how Zhuāngzǐ was read in culturally relevant contexts.

The present discussion aims to help corroborate recent claims that the link between nourishing life 養生 and the Butcher Ding 庖丁 vignette from chapter 3 of the Zhuangzi 莊子 (c. fourth to third century bce) might be taken seriously, while at the same time falsifying recent claims that it is nonetheless uncommon for the connection to be taken seriously. This is achieved by supplying several pieces of textual evidence from leading figures from throughout the history of Zhuangzi studies who all explicitly make the connection and take it seriously. Beyond corroborating one claim and falsifying the other, the present discussion provides renderings of much hitherto untranslated work so as to prevent future scholars from underestimating just how common it is to take the link between the Butcher Ding story and nourishing life seriously.

A glimpse is provided into the Zhuangzi (Master Zhuang) commentary of Fang Yizhi (1611–1671), Yaodi pao Zhuang (Monk Yaodi Distills the Essence of the Zhuangzi), by providing the first translation of all the remarks on the famous butterfly story from the end of the “Qiwulun” (Discourse on Equalizing Things) chapter. The bricolage (pinzhuang) structure of Fang’s text, with layer upon layer of intertextuality (huwenxing), is preserved throughout, thereby giving insights into the structure as well as the content of the text.

The present article aims to subject two recent works, which attempt to argue for an interpretation of Confucian epistemology as akin to standpoint epistemology, to critical scrutiny. These works are by Karyn Lai and Kevin DeLapp, respectively. This is achieved by looking at a classic study by Christoph Harbsmeier, Science and Civilization in China Volume VII Part 1, and then showing that logical practices in early China, including those displayed in the Mengzi 孟子 and Lunyu 論語, run contrary to commitments that both Lai and DeLapp attribute to Confucian epistemology. On the basis of this observation, I conclude that Confucianism is not as similar to or as useful for standpoint theories as Lai and DeLapp maintain. While a detailed analysis of Lai’s and DeLapp’s views is not attempted, the hope is that the positive value of Harbsmeier’s volume for understanding early Confucian epistemology is displayed.

The present article presents Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619-1692 C.E.)’s reading of the eighteenth chapter of the Zhuang-Zi 莊子 (ZZ) by looking at his entry from Zhuang-Zi-Tong 莊子通 and other key glosses from Zhuang-Zi-Jie 莊子解. The philosophical upshot, I aim to show, is that Wang takes ZZ as presenting the consummation of “the greatest joyousness” (zhi-le 至樂) as requiring getting rid of joyousness as one’s desideratum. Using Derek Parfit’s work as a point of reference, I aim to show that this is not paradoxical or even inconsistent or even (directly or indirectly) self-defeating but is instead an interesting instance of a self-effacing theory.

If one cannot establish givens, such as Platonic ideas, or determiners, such as Kantian categories, as a point of departure for philosophical inquiry, then how is philosophical inquiry to proceed in a non-question-begging manner? This, of course, is the familiar problem of grounding philosophical discourse. In this essay, I hope to offer a Zhuangzian solution—that is, a solution derived from analysis of the Zhuangzi 莊子 text—to this perennial philosophical problem. As a result, I hope to give the reader a critical glimpse into a Zhuangzian philosophy without foundations, thereby providing a potential solution to the preceding problem while displaying the continued relevance of the Zhuangzi text.

To advance our understanding of both the Book of Zhuāngzǐ 莊子 (c. fourth to third century BCE) and Qián Mù 錢穆 (1895–1990)’s Zhuāngzǐ studies 莊學, I aim to squarely face one of the more obscure passages in the former with recourse to an explanation from the latter. The passage in question is that from the second chapter beginning with the claim ‘there is a beginning’ (有始也者) and culminating with the claim that ‘there has not yet begun to be a “there has not yet begun to be nothing”’ (有未始有夫未始有無也者). I hope to show that Qián offers a compelling and novel interpretation of this difficult passage worthy of our consideration.

This book is the first interlinear bilingual edition of the core Inner Chapters of the book Zhuangzi, which must be counted among the most famous texts in Chinese intellectual and literary history. A special feature of this edition is that it follows the specific rhythm and rhyme of the text in the translation, making it possible to experience the particular style of this most exciting of the ancient Chinese philosophers. An extensive introduction explains the history and the literary nature of the text, and in particular it tells the story of how this text was appreciated and commented upon in China and translated into foreign languages through the ages. Extensive footnotes are provided to enable Western readers to read the text through the eyes of the enthusiastic Chinese commentators who have annotated the text over the centuries: traditional Chinese literary as well as philosophical commentaries are presented in detail in the original classical Chinese and in translation. For the general reader this book will offer a rare opportunity to approach one of the most outrageously unconventional texts of world literature with the philosophical and philological perspectives of the greatest of its literate Chinese connoisseurs. For the student of Chinese this book will serve as a bilingual cornucopia of spirited classical Chinese discourse on a fiercely contested and always controversially discussed crucial text in the Daoist tradition of ancient China.