John Shook

A synoptic approach to conceptualizing fallacy, less ambitious than forging a theory of argument or argumentation, could lend some systematicity to the study of fallacies unbeholden to any particular theory. Much progress has been made from many standpoints on fallacy, already sharing an admonition that fallacies typically offer feigned reasoning to fool thinking. Four primary approaches to fallacy theorizing are distinguished for comparison and then an amalgamation into a synoptic approach delineating four key factors, where a fallacy operates as a case of reasoning deception that is proposed as plausible. Partly structural yet functional and mildly agential, this operationalism on fallacy shows how rhetorical and disputational maneuvers are related to inferential fallacies without assimilating them together.

An evolutionary naturalism hospitable for life and its sentience should have been a philosophical priority since Darwin, but dualistic temptations have swayed vitalisms, emergentisms, and panpsychisms. Tracing sentience’s evolution from biological beginnings was the modest naturalistic proposal from pragmatist John Dewey. Curiously, his endorsement in his 1925 Experience and Nature of affective sentience across the animal world has gone almost entirely unnoticed by philosophy, psychology, and animal research. However, those disciplines may be converging on minimum expectations for sentient learning and behavior that Dewey had already proposed and defended. For Dewey, identifying and explaining cognitive conduct cannot be about outer behavioral adjustments or inner physiological operations taken separately – their organized coordination within environing conditions is the minimum situation for scientific investigations. An organism is perpetually engaging its environs (what it can sense) through enactions (what it can do) from energizations (what it can power) activated from its sensings-doings, in order to sustain itself as an organized entity. Hard dilemmas about demoting feeling to impotence or banishing experience from nature dissolve when vitality’s own qualities are empirically respected. Dewey’s organic naturalism endorses zoopsychism, finding that behavioral, life, and physical sciences together discover how the existential and experiential lives of animals are accountable in naturalistic terms.

Long-standing debates over historiographical approaches to the Axial Age have distracted the history of philosophy from its own disciplined inquiry into the breadth and depth of ancient thought beyond the Greeks. The philosopher Karl Jaspers offered a vista for seeing commonalities among ancient innovations and discerning continuities along history to modern times. That dual agenda divided Axial historiography with the question of whether axiality reflects creativities of ancient systems or have modern reflections created images of axiality. A singular chronology for humanity encourages a mode of philosophical history open to providential designs, epochal turns, spiritual evolutions, psychological leaps, or cognitive revolutions. History of philosophy and religion, with the advice of theology and social history herein solicited, can reformulate a stricter and sounder historiography more congenial to a broad scope for ancient philosophy. In particular, arrivals of axiality would appear in distinct stages at different times across separate regions as a matter of responding creatively to changing socio-historical conditions. Twelve candidates for Axial phases across Eurasia during the early Iron Age are accordingly proposed, which include oft-mentioned philosophies and religions as well as overlooked systems that were no less Axial.

The reception of John Dewey’s A Common Faith has been quite marginal in philosophy of religion since its appearance in 1934. The more memorable aspect to Dewey’s reconstruction of religion, his reformulation for God, tends to confound natural theology, transgress scientific naturalism, and offend humanism’s secularity. Neither supernatural nor just natural, not personal but far from impersonal, and thoroughly experiential yet never observable, his philosophical divinity seems to elude categorization. Initially he pictures a God of personal ideals driving the process of self-realization. Then Dewey sketches how a society’s collective devotion to realizing its shared ideals amounts to its shared religious experience oriented through that idealized God. Not halting with religious pluralism, he demands natural piety from everyone in the pursuit of realizing shared ideals for all humanity. That universal project of realizing idealizations inheres a motivational unity into an ideally-real deity which Dewey calls God. That humanity-wide endeavor conveys the deified spirit of unlimited democracy, not because humanity or democracy should be God, but because genuine democracy without borders reveres one deity without peers. Dewey’s religious philosophy and its God, while distinctive among philosophical deities for personalistic, participatory, and progressive character can be classed with ethical monotheism.

There may be no such a thing as a generic enhancement to cognitive performance. Cultural inheritance, group socialization, personal values, and physiological factors are necessarily involved when defining and addressing enhancement. What can be enhanced at an individual’s performance level may not easily extrapolate across an entire culture or to all of humanity. This concern for enhancement’s contexts rises to the level of normative questioning as well. Conservative guidelines from the medical ethics tradition are ill-designed for guiding the biopolitics of enhancement beyond healthiness. Neuroethical deliberations must rise above local conventionality or a single ethical system to survey the rich cultural diversity to human self-understandings and our dynamic cognitive capacities. Plurality doesn’t abandon us to relativity; the default cannot be laissez faire individuality. Sound policy decisions for pluralistic societies won’t rashly approve whatever appears to be scientifically ascertained enhancements without public deliberations about human welfare and social justice.

Current joint warfighters are no longer merely trained – in many ways, they are increasingly bioengineered. Within the contemporary warfighting paradigms, the body becomes a domain of technological inscription, where interventions collapse the boundary between therapy and enhancement, transforming organic bodies into operational platforms fortified for tactical efficiency and strategic imperatives. This transformation is not neutral; it is intentional, and thus, the warfighter becomes a node in a cybernetic network whereby the enhanced warfighter is not just more capable, but more compliant, less interruptible, and increasingly interwoven with the ethics of technology. In this light, we propose a framework for military neuroethics that is attuned to the ontological realities and relational consequences of bioenhancement. It acknowledges the ideology of optimization and remains attentive to the contingencies of human involvement in the exigencies of warfighting. Cognizant of a future of conflict that is increasingly automated, it asserts that the human, while biotechnologically altered, is not obsolete; and with this recognition, this article addresses both the need for tactical advantage and the strategic imperatives for the human remaining in command and control.

The roles of abductive inference in dynamic heuristics allows scientific methodologies to test novel explanations for the world’s ways. Deliberate reasoning often follows abductive patterns, as well as patterns dominated by deduction and induction, but complex mixtures of these three modes of inference are crucial for scientific explanation. All possible mixed inferences are formulated and categorized using a novel typology and nomenclature. Twenty five possible combinations among abduction, induction, and deduction are assembled and analyzed in order of complexity. There are five primary categories for sorting these inferential procedures: fallacies, non-scientific procedures, quasi-scientific procedures, scientific procedures, and scientific heuristics.