John V. Garner

This paper addresses the apparent tension between Albert Camus’s abolitionist critique of capital punishment and Simone Weil’s seemingly ambiguous remarks on the topic. I argue that Weil’s account of attention, consent, and free depersonalization definitively demands the suspension of the death penalty. By distinguishing natural power—expressed in domination, contempt, and bureaucratic penal systems—from supernatural justice—expressed through attention and the preservation of free consent—I argue that Weil treats abolition not as a precondition for justice but as a necessary consequence of the genuine attention that grounds it.

Can we learn from imagination? This article surveys a thread from an ongoing debate in philosophy of mind and brings it into dialogue with Proclus's notion of mathematical imagination. Imagination for Proclus mediates between intellect and perception and reveals a unique level of reality borne by “intelligible matter.” By contrast, the contemporary debate, focused on concepts such as instructive versus transcendent imagining and propositional versus doxastic justification, is primarily epistemic in nature and seems not to require the fifth-century Platonist's commitment to a distinctive level of imaginal reality. Even so, I argue that Proclus could converse fruitfully with the contemporary debate on questions about whether there is evidence accessible only to imagination and irreducible to other sources and about whether imagination is situationally responsive and able to inform belief.

The 1982–1983 seminars of Cornelius Castoriadis (1922–1997) at the School for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences (EHESS) in Paris are here translated as The Greek Imaginary: From Homer to Heraclitus, Seminars 1982–1983. They were originally published in French in 2004, with expert editing and supplemental notes provided by Enrique Escobar, Myrto Gondicas, and Pascal Vernay. For basic introductory information on these seminars, their context, and their content, see their excellent Editors’ Introduction which follows.

At least three prevalent themes in the Castoriadis-MAUSS debate have important contemporary resonances. First, the debate contributes to discussions about the ‘post-truth era’ through its exploration of the practical consequences of relativism. Second, it speaks to the need to reflect on our institutional-level commitments (e.g. to public spaces, to education, and so on) and on whether and how they enable genuine political engagement and dialogue. Third, it explores important examples of past political engagement, especially the example of Greek democracy, in a way that contextualizes our own era. Emphasis should be placed, in each case, on how the interlocutors model both a respectful form of dialogue and a non-authoritarian approach to intellectual questions.

Dmitri Nikulin's _The Concept of History_ raises important questions about the ways historical beings like humans can be said to face non-being (for example, the non-being of death; or of past events or persons; or of future novelties). Here, I discuss three main topics relevant to the book's framework. First, I ask whether the content of and motivation for historical writing must be of exclusively mortal origin. Beyond Nikulin's theory of ahistorical invariant structures, I consider the possibility of ahistorical sources of content or motivation. Second, I engage with the book's concept of beneficial forgetting and express caution regarding the terminology of "mechanisms" or "arts" of forgetting. Third, I engage with the book's conception of productive imagination and suggest that a radical conception of historical novelty may be integrated into Nikulin's theory. Following Nikulin's lead, I emphasize throughout the essay the way that thinking about history demands attentiveness to the ahistorical.

This article places Henry Corbin’s concept of creative imagination in conversation with the French phenomenological tradition. Section I explores Corbin’s phenomenological method and his view of the imaginal world, drawn from his interpretations of Suhrawardī and Ibn ‘Arabī. Section II then places this concept in conversation with the early Jean-Paul Sartre’s “annihilative” imagination and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s critique of it. This section argues that Corbin needs a strong distinction like Sartre’s between imagination and perception but also that he could be seen as agreeing partly with Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Sartre. What Corbin ultimately maintains, as the article’s conclusion argues, is that our access to the distinctive imaginal world enables a characteristic duality to arise in all perceptual life, a duality that is required if we are to be able to relate to perception either critically or charitably.

In his Euclid commentary, Proclus states that mathematical objects have a status in between Platonic forms and sensible things. Proclus uses geometrical examples liberally to illustrate his theory but says little about arithmetic. However, by examining Proclus’s scattered statements on number and the traditional sources that influenced him (esp. the Philebus), I argue that he maintains an analogy between geometry and arithmetic such that the arithmetical thinker projects a “field of units” to serve as the bearers of number forms. I argue that this conception of a “multitude,” wherein each unit differs in no way from the others, implies that Platonists need not recognize unqualifiedly what would become the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. I argue that Cratylus 432c in particular provides support for a reading of Plato as consistently thinking beyond the principle of identity. I conclude by drawing out an important epistemological and ethical lesson from this reading.

In the 'Hippias Major' Socrates uses a counter-example to oppose Hippias‘s view that parts and wholes always have a "continuous" nature. Socrates argues, for example, that even-numbered groups might be made of parts with the opposite character, i.e. odd. As Gadamer has shown, Socrates often uses such examples as a model for understanding language and definitions: numbers and definitions both draw disparate elements into a sum-whole differing from the parts. In this paper I follow Gadamer‘s suggestion that we should focus on the parallel between numbers and definitions in Platonic thought. However, I offer a different interpretation of the lesson implicit in Socrates‘s opposition to Hippias. I argue that, according to Socrates, parts and sum-wholes may share in essential attributes; yet this unity or continuity is neither necessary, as Hippias suggests, nor is it impossible, as Gadamer implies. In closing, I suggest that this seemingly minor difference in logical interpretation has important implications for how we should understand the structure of human communities in a Platonic context.

In his commentary on Euclid, Proclus develops what he takes to be an important Platonic critique of the epistemology of abstraction. As I argue, his argument closely reflects terminology and concepts from Plato’s Philebus. Both emphasize the priority—in reality and in our awareness—of the precise over the imprecise. Specifically, Proclus’s famous notion of the psychical “projection” of intermediate mathematical entities, while having no technically exact precedent in Plato, finds a conceptual neighbor in the Philebus’s suggestion that philosophical arithmeticians “posit” pure units for counting. Likewise, for both our self-engagement in mathematical thinking serves to clarify the independence of the precise sciences—both in their content and in their practice—from perception. Thus, as I argue, Plato and Proclus, with their different terms and nuances, develop a shared conception scientific inquiry in which an activity of “creative discovery” plays a central role.

Cornelius Castoriadis was an important intellectual figure in France for many decades, beginning in the late-1940s. Trained in philosophy, Castoriadis also worked as a practicing economist and psychologist while authoring over twenty major works and numerous articles spanning many traditional philosophical subjects, including politics, economics, psychology, anthropology, and ontology. His oeuvre can be understood broadly as a reflection on the concept of creativity and its implications in various fields. Perhaps most importantly he warned of the dangerous political and ethical consequences of a contemporary world that has lost sight of autonomy, i.e. of the need to set limits or laws for oneself.

This paper seeks to highlight the importance of spatial cognition in Bergson’s Données immédiates by engaging with Robert Watt’s reconstruction of Bergson’s argument that every idea of number involves the idea of space. We focus on the second stage of Watt’s reconstruction, where Bergson argues that only space can provide the distinction required for our counting of otherwise identical items. Watt bases his reconstruction on a premise regarding the possibility that identical objects, in the absence of spatial distinction, might remain identical across different “temporal locations”. Our paper raises the prospect that Bergson is committed to a stronger thesis, namely one implying that identical objects would necessarily remain indistinguishable without the intervention of space. The paper thus concludes by emphasizing the indispensability of space for knowledge according to Bergson.

This study examines Plato's dialogue on the good life and argues, most centrally, that the pleasures of learning exemplify the possibility of good becoming or change. It sheds light on the dialogue's ideas about the order of values and shows that the 'Philebus', while agreeing broadly with themes in more widely studied works by Plato such as the 'Gorgias', 'Phaedo', and 'Republic' (e.g. "the good transcends being"), develops a unique way of salvaging the full spectrum of human life, including our ever-changing nature.