-
6Call for Papers First World Congress on Paraconsistency, Gent, Belgium 1997Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 6 (2). 1996.
-
29Tolerating deontic conflicts by adaptively restricting inheritanceLogique Et Analyse 55 (219): 477-506. 2012.In order to deal with the possibility of deontic conflicts Lou Goble developed a group of logics (DPM) that are characterized by a restriction of the inheritance principle. While they approximate the deductive power of standard deontic logic, they do so only if the user adds certain statements to the premises. By adaptively strengthening the DPM logics, this paper presents logics that overcome this shortcoming. Furthermore, they are capable of modeling the dynamic and defeasible aspect of our no…Read more
-
50An inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic for normative conflictsJournal of Philosophical Logic. forthcoming.
-
21Logic, Reasoning, and Rationality (edited book)Springer. 2014.This book contains a selection of the papers presented at the Logic, Reasoning and Rationality 2010 conference in Ghent. The conference aimed at stimulating the use of formal frameworks to explicate concrete cases of human reasoning, and conversely, to challenge scholars in formal studies by presenting them with interesting new cases of actual reasoning. According to the members of the Wiener Kreis, there was a strong connection between logic, reasoning, and rationality and that human reasoning …Read more
-
119Majority merging by adaptive countingSynthese 165 (2). 2008.The present paper introduces a belief merging procedure by majority using the standard format of Adaptive Logics. The core structure of the logic ADM c (Adaptive Doxastic Merging by Counting) consists in the formulation of the conflicts arising from the belief bases of the agents involved in the procedure. A strategy is then defined both semantically and proof-theoretically which selects the consistent contents answering to a majority principle. The results obtained are proven to be equivalent t…Read more
-
29A formal logic for abductive reasoningLogic Journal of the IGPL 14 (2): 221-236. 2006.This paper presents and illustrates a formal logic for the abduction of singular hypotheses. The logic has a semantics and a dynamic proof theory that is sound and complete with respect to the semantics. The logic presupposes that, with respect to a specific application, the set of explananda and the set of possible explanantia are disjoint . Where an explanandum can be explained by different explanantia, the logic allows only for the abduction of their disjunction
-
62Yes fellows, most human reasoning is complexSynthese 166 (1): 113-131. 2009.This paper answers the philosophical contentions defended in Horsten and Welch . It contains a description of the standard format of adaptive logics, analyses the notion of dynamic proof required by those logics, discusses the means to turn such proofs into demonstrations, and argues that, notwithstanding their formal complexity, adaptive logics are important because they explicate an abundance of reasoning forms that occur frequently, both in scientific contexts and in common sense contexts
-
51The adaptive logic of compatibilityStudia Logica 66 (3): 327-348. 2000.This paper describes the adaptive logic of compatibility and its dynamic proof theory. The results derive from insights in inconsistency-adaptive logic, but are themselves very simple and philosophically unobjectionable. In the absence of a positive test, dynamic proof theories lead, in the long run, to correct results and, in the short run, sometimes to final decisions but always to sensible estimates. The paper contains a new and natural kind of semantics for S5from which it follows that a spe…Read more
-
23Some Adaptive Logics for DiagnosisLogic and Logical Philosophy 11 (n/a): 39-65. 2003.A logic of diagnosis proceeds in terms of a set of data and one or more (prioritized) sets of expectancies. In this paper we generalize the logics of diagnosis from [27] and present some alternatives. The former operate on the premises and expectancies themselves, the latter on their consequences
-
54Shortcuts and dynamic marking in the tableau method for adaptive logicsStudia Logica 69 (2): 221-248. 2001.Adaptive logics typically pertain to reasoning procedures for which there is no positive test. In [7], we presented a tableau method for two inconsistency-adaptive logics. In the present paper, we describe these methods and present several ways to increase their efficiency. This culminates in a dynamic marking procedure that indicates which branches have to be extended first, and thus guides one towards a decision — the conclusion follows or does not follow — in a very economical way
-
30IntroductionPhilosophica 86 (4): 319-322. 2012.This introduction clarifies the ideas behind the Logic, Reasoning and Rationality congress from which the papers in this issue are selected. These ideas are situated in the history of 20th century philosophy (Vienna Circle, Kuhn, ...). We also give an overview of the papers in this issue
-
7Inconsistency in Science (edited book)Springer Verlag. 2002.For centuries, inconsistencies were seen as a hindrance to good reasoning, and their role in the sciences was ignored. In recent years, however, logicians as well as philosophers and historians have showed a growing interest in the matter. Central to this change were the advent of paraconsistent logics, the shift in attention from finished theories to construction processes, and the recognition that most scientific theories were at some point either internally inconsistent or incompatible with o…Read more
-
Tolerating Deontic Conflicts by Adaptively Restricting InheritanceLogique Et Analyse 219 477--506. 2012.
-
20Which style of reasoning to choose in the face of conflicting information?Journal of Logic and Computation 26 (1). 2013.
-
18Abduction through semantic tableaux versus abduction through goal-directed proofsTheoria 22 (3): 295-304. 2009.In this paper, we present the outline for a goal-directed proof procedure for abductive reasoning and compare this procedure with Aliseda’s approach.
-
19Yes fellows, most human reasoning is complexSynthese 166 (1): 113-131. 2009.This paper answers the philosophical contentions defended in Horsten and Welch (2007, Synthese, 158, 41–60). It contains a description of the standard format of adaptive logics, analyses the notion of dynamic proof required by those logics, discusses the means to turn such proofs into demonstrations, and argues that, notwithstanding their formal complexity, adaptive logics are important because they explicate an abundance of reasoning forms that occur frequently, both in scientific contexts and …Read more
-
21Abduction through Semantic Tableaux versus Abduction through Goal-Directed ProofsTheoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (3): 295-304. 2007.In this paper, we present a goal-directed proof procedure for abductive reasoning. This procedure will be compared with Aliseda’s approach based on semantic tableaux. We begin with some comments on Aliseda’s algorithms for computing conjunctive abductions and show that they do not entirely live up to their aims. Next we give a concise account of goal-directed proofs and we show that abductive explanations are a natural spin-off of these proofs. Finally, we show that the goal-directed procedure s…Read more
-
136Abduction through semantic tableaux versus abduction through goal-directed proofsTheoria 22 (3): 295-304. 2007.In this paper, we present a goal-directed proof procedure for abductive reasoning. This procedure will be compared with Aliseda’s approach based on semantic tableaux. We begin with some comments on Aliseda’s algorithms for computing conjunctive abductions and show that they do not entirely live up to their aims. Next we give a concise account of goal-directed proofs and we show that abductive explanations are a natural spin-off of these proofs. Finally, we show that the goal-directed procedure s…Read more
-
95An Inconsistency-Adaptive Deontic Logic for Normative ConflictsJournal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2): 285-315. 2013.We present the inconsistency-adaptive deontic logic DP r , a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts such as O A ∧ O ∼A, O A ∧ P ∼A or even O A ∧ ∼O A. On the other hand, DP r still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). DP r interprets a given premise set ‘as normally as possible’ with respect to SDL. Whereas some SDL-rules are ve…Read more
-
61On the Acceptance of Problem Solutions Derived from Inconsistent ConstraintsLogic and Logical Philosophy 8 (n/a): 33-46. 2000.In this paper, I discuss the main difficulties one encounters whensolving problems with inconsistent constraints. I argue that in order to meetthese difficulties we need an inconsistency-adaptive logic that enables one toderive as many consequences as possible, but that at the sametime allows one to determine which consequences can be accepted. I showthat the inconsistency-adaptive logic ANA satisfies these requirements
-
21Adaptive Logics and the Integration of Induction and DeductionVienna Circle Institute Yearbook 11 93-120. 2004.The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I want to argue that the distinction between induction and deduction is less clear-cut than traditionally assumed, and that, moreover, most reasoning processes in the sciences involve an integration of inductive and deductive steps. Next, I want to show how so-called adaptive logics may lead to a better understanding of this integrated use of induction and deduction
-
50The Positivists’ Approach to Scientific DiscoveryPhilosophica 64 (2). 1999.In the early eighties, philosophers of science came to the conviction that discovery and creativity form an integral part of scientific rationality. Ever since, the?positivists? have been criticised for their neglect of these topics. It is the aim of this paper to show that the positivists' approach to scientific discovery is not only much richer than is commonly recognized, but that they even defended an important thesis which some of the `friends of discovery' seem to have forgotten. Contrary …Read more
-
17Inconsistencies and the dynamics of scienceLogic and Logical Philosophy 11 (n/a): 129-148. 2003.It is generally agreed upon today that scientific reasoning, like everyday reasoning, proceeds in a dynamic way: inferences derived at some stage in the reasoning process may at a later stage be rejected. This dynamics may be extrinsic or intrinsic. I shall call it extrinsic when previously derived conclusions are rejected on non-logical grounds, and intrinsic when their rejection is based on a purely logical analysis
-
32Claudius' discovery of the first two laws of thermodynamics. A paradigm of reasoning from inconsistenciesPhilosophica 63 (1): 89-117. 1999.