Jon Hall

Given its importance for understanding intentional agency, it is surprising, and somewhat concerning, that there is no general and satisfactory theory of the feeling of effort. To be satisfactory the theory must answer the question posed by Bermúdez in his recent paper: ‘What is the feeling of effort about?’ (2023). To be general, it must capture, in a unified framework, all subspecies of effort. In this paper I develop a unified representational theory of the feeling of effort, starting with the idea that the feeling of effort is the feeling of trying-against-resistance. I show that for all three sub-species of effort - effort of will, cognitive effort and muscular effort - the proximate force that is both necessary and sufficient for a trying to feel effortful is of a single, conative, kind. Thus, feelings of effort reveal the existence of both pro- and con- motives, and of conflict between the two. An effortful action is an action because it is motivated, but it is effortful because it is conatively controversial.

In this thesis I aim to advance philosophical understanding of human agency, and resolve some knotty philosophical puzzles, by engaging in a novel fine-grained analysis of conative and cognitive phenomenology. Taking the phenomenology of the decision-making process seriously is sensible for three reasons: First, instances of phenomenology are data to be explained. Any theory which ignores their existence is incomplete. Second, experience-based seemings pay a central part in belief formation. Any unresolved conflict between experience and theory will either lead to rejection of the theory or to a dialectic impasse. Third, phenomenologically informed theories, are better placed to answer some of the unresolved philosophical questions including does agential phenomenology support beliefs in libertarianism (no), is intentional synchronic self-control possible (yes), and can making a decision ever be an action (yes)? The central claim that I defend throughout the thesis is the motivational strength idea, that when an agent makes a choice, she always chooses to do what she is most motivated to do. Whilst others have rejected or added complexity to the idea, I will remain true to its simplicity. Doing so will force me to be flexible elsewhere, and question other assumptions, which will pay dividends. From this foundation, and focusing almost entirely on motives and levels of confidence in the context of a sophisticated metacognitive agent, I am able to present an experience compatible, and evolutionarily plausible theory of agency. Although the broad picture is uncontroversial, some of the findings may be surprising: An intention is just an uninhibited motive. The phenomenological intensity of a motive is a representation of its functional strength if and only if it is inhibited. The feeling of effort is, for all subspecies of effort, a non-conceptual representation of the conative costs of a pursued course of action. It represents-as-costly a trying. An instrumentally rational (undivided) agent with metacognitive abilities can intentionally shift her own current motivational balance. Making a difficult decision is an action. It feels effortful because it involves resisting the motivation to deliberate further. Whilst functional analysis celebrates the victory of the strongest motive (indicating only that it was stronger than its competition), phenomenological analysis reveals the strength of its weaker, inhibited cousin. This inversion encourages a new perspective on the phenomenology of agency. Rather than of desires being realised and intentions being implemented, it is the experience of uncertainty, inhibited motives and unfulfilled plans. The model that emerges is hierarchical but extremely simple, explaining flexible agency through the interaction of inhibitable motives in accordance with the motivational strength idea. There is no reliance on distinct intending attitudes, motivational partitions, reservoirs of willpower, Cartesian homunculi, or error theory. There is just an agent, deliberating about and then doing (or at least trying to do) what she most wants to do.

A paradigmatic experience of agency is the felt effort associated with the act of making a difficult choice. The challenge of accounting for this experience within a compatibilist framework has been called ‘the agency problem of compatibilism’ (Vierkant, 2022, The Tinkering Mind: Agency, Cognition and the Extended Mind, Oxford University Press, 116). In this paper, I will propose an evolutionarily plausible, actional account of deciding which explains the phenomenology. In summary: The act of making a difficult choice is triggered by a metacognitive decision to intentionally stop deliberating, despite ongoing uncertainty. This decision is the output of a metacognitive cost–benefit computation, which weighs the value of uncertainty reduction against the costs of ongoing deliberation. Strikingly, contemporary theories of effort suggest that this cost–benefit computation is also the source of the feeling of mental effort, which tracks the costs of that decision. If this account is correct, the agency problem of compatibilism has been solved. The act of making a difficult choice and the associated paradigmatic experience of agency, felt effort, both follow from the metacognitive evaluation. Implications are explored.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Social Evasion and Aristocratic Manners in Cicero’s De OratoreJon HallThe importance of Cicero’s De oratore as a source for Roman aristocratic manners has long been recognized. In particular, the participants in the dialogue have often been regarded as providing a model of the sophisticated ideal of humanitas and its associated qualities. 1 The aim of the present paper is likewise to examine Cicero’s portrayal of Roman manners, but from a rather different point of view. The traditional emphasis on humanitas has one important shortcoming: it encourages us to view the characters as idealized, and consequently rather remote from the social realities of Cicero’s day. In what follows, I would like to suggest that De oratore, despite the element of idealization that is undeniably present, also depicts many of the practical problems of everyday aristocratic interaction with which Cicero himself was well acquainted. And, moreover, that in his depiction of these problems, Cicero successfully captures the real flavor of Roman manners. Such an approach to the work helps to shed light both on the intricacies of Roman behavior and on Cicero’s artistic achievement in the dialogue.The method adopted in the following discussion is a simple but hopefully enlightening one. We shall begin with Cicero’s portrayal of social manners in several scenes from De oratore itself, and then move on to consider how these fictional episodes compare with certain real-life situations that come to light in his correspondence. The similarities that arise will demonstrate that his literary portrayal in the dialogue is much more than an idealized fiction.The Theme of Evasion in De OratoreThe main focus of our discussion is the theme of evasion that runs throughout the first two books of De oratore. On repeated occasions L. Crassus is depicted as trying to sidestep the suggestion that he take part in a disputatio on the subject of oratory. The more his guests at Tusculum [End Page 95] urge him to speak, the more determinedly, it seems, he tries to evade the obligation. Indeed, there are some nine conversational exchanges where such attempts at evasion arise. On several occasions in Book 1 Scaevola, Sulpicius and Cotta have to cajole him to make some contribution (1.96–107, 1.133–34, 1.160–65, 1.205–7), while in Book 2 Antonius and Catulus repeatedly attempt the same task (2.13–27, 2.121–28, 2.233–34, 2.350–51, 2.361–67). 2This theme reveals much about Roman attitudes to the evasion and imposition of social obligations. The central place in Roman life of such obligations (or officia) has of course been much discussed, but surprisingly little has been said about how they were invoked or avoided. 3 The issue at stake in De oratore is hardly one of high ethical importance. Nevertheless, it involves complex social expectations. The great advantage of De oratore over non-dramatic treatises such as De officiis is that its depiction of Roman aristocrats in conversation offers direct evidence for the strategies that such men developed in order to ease the tensions that inevitably arise in social interaction.Before we explore this aspect of the theme, however, it is important to note that Cicero has several reasons for portraying Crassus as reluctant to take part in the discussion. One aim, as the most recent commentators astutely note, is to counteract the conventional Roman suspicion of philosophical debate. 4 Since such discourses were regarded as typically Greek, Crassus’ reluctance is intended to distinguish him from the more loquacious, tongue-wagging Greekling. There is a certain sleight of hand in all this, of course. Cicero ultimately intends for Crassus to embark in Book 3 upon an extensive and sophisticated analysis of oratorical style, including an emphatic plea for a synthesis of oratory and philosophy. But the character’s initial resistance goes some way to disarming the cultural prejudices of the Roman reader. In what seems to have been the Latin language’s first literary dialogue, Cicero wants to [End Page 96] suggest that Roman aristocrats do not engage in earnest theoretical discussion in the same way as the Greeks. 5Crassus’ evasion also functions as...