Jon Hall

Given its importance for understanding intentional agency, it is surprising, and somewhat concerning, that there is no general and satisfactory theory of the feeling of effort. To be satisfactory the theory must answer the question posed by Bermúdez in his recent paper: ‘What is the feeling of effort about?’ (2023). To be general, it must capture, in a unified framework, all subspecies of effort. In this paper I develop a unified representational theory of the feeling of effort, starting with the idea that the feeling of effort is the feeling of trying-against-resistance. I show that for all three sub-species of effort - effort of will, cognitive effort and muscular effort - the proximate force that is both necessary and sufficient for a trying to feel effortful is of a single, conative, kind. Thus, feelings of effort reveal the existence of both pro- and con- motives, and of conflict between the two. An effortful action is an action because it is motivated, but it is effortful because it is conatively controversial.

In this thesis I aim to advance philosophical understanding of human agency, and resolve some knotty philosophical puzzles, by engaging in a novel fine-grained analysis of conative and cognitive phenomenology. Taking the phenomenology of the decision-making process seriously is sensible for three reasons: First, instances of phenomenology are data to be explained. Any theory which ignores their existence is incomplete. Second, experience-based seemings pay a central part in belief formation. Any unresolved conflict between experience and theory will either lead to rejection of the theory or to a dialectic impasse. Third, phenomenologically informed theories, are better placed to answer some of the unresolved philosophical questions including does agential phenomenology support beliefs in libertarianism (no), is intentional synchronic self-control possible (yes), and can making a decision ever be an action (yes)? The central claim that I defend throughout the thesis is the motivational strength idea, that when an agent makes a choice, she always chooses to do what she is most motivated to do. Whilst others have rejected or added complexity to the idea, I will remain true to its simplicity. Doing so will force me to be flexible elsewhere, and question other assumptions, which will pay dividends. From this foundation, and focusing almost entirely on motives and levels of confidence in the context of a sophisticated metacognitive agent, I am able to present an experience compatible, and evolutionarily plausible theory of agency. Although the broad picture is uncontroversial, some of the findings may be surprising: An intention is just an uninhibited motive. The phenomenological intensity of a motive is a representation of its functional strength if and only if it is inhibited. The feeling of effort is, for all subspecies of effort, a non-conceptual representation of the conative costs of a pursued course of action. It represents-as-costly a trying. An instrumentally rational (undivided) agent with metacognitive abilities can intentionally shift her own current motivational balance. Making a difficult decision is an action. It feels effortful because it involves resisting the motivation to deliberate further. Whilst functional analysis celebrates the victory of the strongest motive (indicating only that it was stronger than its competition), phenomenological analysis reveals the strength of its weaker, inhibited cousin. This inversion encourages a new perspective on the phenomenology of agency. Rather than of desires being realised and intentions being implemented, it is the experience of uncertainty, inhibited motives and unfulfilled plans. The model that emerges is hierarchical but extremely simple, explaining flexible agency through the interaction of inhibitable motives in accordance with the motivational strength idea. There is no reliance on distinct intending attitudes, motivational partitions, reservoirs of willpower, Cartesian homunculi, or error theory. There is just an agent, deliberating about and then doing (or at least trying to do) what she most wants to do.

A paradigmatic experience of agency is the felt effort associated with the act of making a difficult choice. The challenge of accounting for this experience within a compatibilist framework has been called ‘the agency problem of compatibilism’ (Vierkant, 2022, The Tinkering Mind: Agency, Cognition and the Extended Mind, Oxford University Press, 116). In this paper, I will propose an evolutionarily plausible, actional account of deciding which explains the phenomenology. In summary: The act of making a difficult choice is triggered by a metacognitive decision to intentionally stop deliberating, despite ongoing uncertainty. This decision is the output of a metacognitive cost–benefit computation, which weighs the value of uncertainty reduction against the costs of ongoing deliberation. Strikingly, contemporary theories of effort suggest that this cost–benefit computation is also the source of the feeling of mental effort, which tracks the costs of that decision. If this account is correct, the agency problem of compatibilism has been solved. The act of making a difficult choice and the associated paradigmatic experience of agency, felt effort, both follow from the metacognitive evaluation. Implications are explored.