•  55
    In “Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency”, Philip Gerrans and Jeanette Kennett argue that prominent versions of metaethical sentimentalism and moral realism ignore the importance, for moral agency and moral judgment, of the capacity to experientially project oneself into the past and possible futures – to engage in ‘mental time travel’. They contend that such views are committed to taking subjects with impaired capacities for MTT to be moral judgers, and thus confront a dilemma: either allow tha…Read more
  • Moral-Conative Relations and Metaethics
    Dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 2001.
    This work centers around the relations between moral beliefs and the motivational and affective states which characteristically accompany them, and what those relations tell us about the nature of moral beliefs themselves. Specifically, I argue for five conclusions. First, moral-conative relations are far more complex than is typically realized. Secondly, certain relations to conations are both necessary and sufficient for moral beliefs. Third, given the complexity of moral-conative relations, i…Read more
  •  88
    The challenge of communal internalism
    Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (2): 179-199. 2009.
  •  494
    Wisdom Beyond Rationality: A Reply to Ryan
    Acta Analytica 28 (2): 229-235. 2013.
    We discuss Sharon Ryan’s Deep Rationality Theory of wisdom, defended recently in her “Wisdom, Knowledge and Rationality.” We argue that (a) Ryan’s use of the term “rationality” needs further elaboration; (b) there is a problem with requiring that the wise person possess justified beliefs but not necessarily knowledge; (c) the conditions of DRT are not all necessary; (d) the conditions are not sufficient. At the end of our discussion, we suggest that there may be a problem with the very assumptio…Read more
  •  144
    Metaethicists of all stripes should read and learn from Richard Joyce's book The Evolution of Morality. This includes moral realists, despite Joyce's own nihilism. Joyce thinks that moral obligations, prohibitions, and the like are myths. But that is just a bit of a rich, broad account of moral attitudes and practices, the bulk of which can comfortably be accepted by realists. In fact, other than nihilism itself, there's only one claim of Joyce's which realists must reject. I argue that that cla…Read more
  •  421
    Will Retributivism Die and Will Neuroscience Kill It?
    Cognitive Systems Research 34 54-70. 2015.
    In a widely read essay, “For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything,” Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen argue that the advance of neuroscience will result in the widespread rejection of free will, and with it – of retributivism. They go on to propose that consequentialist reforms are in order, and they predict such reforms will take place. We agree that retributivism should be rejected, and we too are optimistic that rejected it will be. But we don’t think that such a development w…Read more
  •  108
    Metaethical Internalism: Another Neglected Distinction
    The Journal of Ethics 13 (1): 51-72. 2009.
    ‘Internalism’ is used in metaethics for a cluster of claims which bear a family resemblance. They tend to link, in some distinctive way—typically modal, mereological, or causal—different parts of the normative realm, or the normative and the psychological. The thesis of this paper is that much metaethical mischief has resulted from philosophers’ neglect of the distinction between two different features of such claims. The first is the modality of the entire claim. The second is the relation betw…Read more