Jonas Holst

The German philosopher Martin Heidegger’s seminal essay “Building, Dwelling, Thinking”, published in 1954, is one of the texts which has had most influence on architectural thinking in the second half of 20th and early 21st century. What much of modern and postmodern architectural thinking extracts from Heidegger’s text and revolves around is the understanding of building and dwelling as more or less abstract forms of being without taking into account the people inhabiting space. In these traditions little has been said about what the Danish architect Jørn Utzon adds to the term “being” and announces as the most important aspect of architecture: Well-being understood as human well-being. The present paper means to re-interpret Heidegger’s text critically in order to rethink dwelling and building within an architectural context, presenting Jørn Utzon’s work and thinking as a lifelong search for the architecture of well-being.

The purpose of the paper is to investigate into the philosophical concept of human embodiment in relation to physical education. As human beings we do not only have a body that we can control, but we ”are” our body and live embodied in the world, as the German thinker, Helmuth Plessner, puts it in one of his many contributions to the philosophical anthropology of the 20th century. Elaborating on this concept of human embodiment the paper explores a form of physical re-education that takes as its starting point this aspect of being in the body which has been and is still being underestimated even in the physical educational system. Re-educating the body in this aspect includes becoming more aware of the states, postures and expressions of the body so as to be able to remain connected to the body and to get to know oneself better as being in the body.

The purpose of the paper is to investigate into the ethical significance of friendship, beginning with its origins in ancient Greek philosophy. The first part is dedicated to an interpretation of Plato’s understanding of friendship as a way towards the good. The second part focuses on how Aristotle takes up the thread after Plato and elaborates on the potential of friendship to enhance the good between virtuous people. In the final parts, the paper uncovers Friedrich Nietzsche’s posthumous thoughts on “an ethics of friendship”, which he traces back to ancient Greek philosophy, and it offers a concluding critical commentary on three modern thinkers, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hannah Arendt and Alasdair MacIntyre, who reflect, each in their own way, on the human good in an on-going dialogue with the ancient Greek philosophy of friendship.

The purpose of the paper is to study the interrelatedness of rationality, virtue, and practical wisdom in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics by offering a critical interpretation of the bipartition of the soul presented in Chap. 13 of the first book. Aristotle relies on the partition of the soul into a rational and a non-rational part when he distinguishes between ethical and intellectual virtues. The paper will question the adequacy of these divisions and show that Aristotle himself casts doubt on them while leaving open the possibility of understanding the soul in an alternative way which will prove to fit better with his own exposition of deliberate choice and the integration of virtuous action and practical wisdom.

Based on a reading of K. E. Løgstrup’s The Ethical Demand and Emmanuel Levinas’ Totality and Infinity, the paper aims to show that it is respectively through trust and love, hospitality and friendship that the two thinkers envisage humans as being capable of realising unfulfillable and impossible ethical demands. It will be argued that they develop their ethical thinking along similar lines, yet, even when they come closest to each other conceptually, a difference in their phenomenological analysis of the I and the other remains, which it is paramount to keep in mind in order to assess what they may contribute to each other’s thinking.

Based on a philosophical interpretation of the Ancient concepts, philia and agape, the present contribution offers a comparative study of the ancient Greek ethics of friendship and the Christian theology of love. While the former tradition understands philia as a finite relationship between human selves within a sociopolitical context, agape is regarded by the latter tradition as the bond of love which God grants all humans who believe in Jesus Christ as the Messiah. Despite the fundamental differences between the two conceptions of love, they converge at one point, namely in the caring concern for the stranger, who humans are called upon to receive in hospitality.

I anledning af 50-året for udgivelsen af et af de mest betydningsfulde værker i det 20. århundredes filosofi, Emmanuel Lévinas' Totalitet og uendelighed, behandler artiklen et grundtema i værket, nemlig forholdet mellem etik og undervisning. Det sker under inddragelse af den pædagogiske model, som Lévinas anser for at stå i et modsætningsforhold til sin egen etiske forståelse af undervisning, den sokratiske maieutik. Den udførlige behandling af de to «positioner» skal imidlertid vise, at de har mere til fælles, end det kommer frem i den første modstilling, hvilket giver mulighed for at formulere en mellemposition, der fastholder det etiske ved begge, og som er mere praktisk anvendelig i undervisning end nogen af dem taget hver for sig.Nøgleord: etik, undervisning, Lévinas, åbenbaring, Sokrates, maieutik, dialogEnglish summary: The Ethical Dimension of Teaching – Based on a Main Theme in the Work of Emmanuel LévinasOn the occasion of the 50th anniversary of one of the most important works in 20th century philosophy, Emmanuel Lévinas' Totality and Infinity, the article presents a main theme of this work, the relationship between ethics and teaching. The discussion draws on another pedagogical understanding, which Lévinas considers to be opposed to his own ethical understanding of teaching, Socratic maieutics. A thoroughgoing interpretation of the two «positions» shows, however, that they have more in common than what the opposition seems to elucidate at first. The sublation of the two will make it possible to sketch out a third ethical point of view, more applicable to teaching in practice than either of the two taken on its own.

ABSTRACT The paper delves into the origins of the ancient Greek concept of melancholy. The purpose of the first part is to trace a precursor of melancholy back to Homer’s description of certain emotions which are congenial with rage (cholos), and which are associated with the colour black (melainos). Based on a systematic interpretation of these traces of melancholy in the earliest premedical history, the second part of the paper will shed new light on the broader and more dynamic way in which part of the Hippocratic tradition conceptualized melancholy as being, not a fixed state bound to an already existing substance in the human body, but as originating from a series of transformations associated with constitutional and climatological factors.

The purpose of the present contribution is to develop an understanding of experience that accounts for its need to be continuously uncovered and recovered in order to consolidate itself. Through critical dialogue with modern phenomenological and hermeneutical traditions I posit that this consolidation process proves porous and discontinuous as experience contains caesuras and limits, which break open and even fracture what is already known by individual consciousness so as to make room for something new to appear over the horizon. Thinking about how to engage with the phenomena given in experience draws us into a dynamic movement at the limits of singular subjectivity and the world which transcends it to all sides. After following and exploring this movement, it remains a question, which will be discussed in the end, whether all experience can be retrieved.

Based on critical readings of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, the paper offers a phenomenological study of the ontology of well-being that transcends the opposition between subjective and objective being. By interpreting the Heideggerian notion of Befindlichkeit as the fundamental way in which humans find themselves in the world, being affected by and faced with their own existence, the paper opens a way to understanding well-being that locates the possibility of elevating one’s own being not inside or outside the I but in the affective bond to others called friendship. Aristotle’s reflections on philia play a crucial role in developing this understanding of well-being, according to which humans find themselves well by sharing joy with each other and making a vital contribution to the realization of their own possibilities.

During October 1953, Hannah Arendt made a short list, divided into two columns, which represents what she sought to move away from, singularity, and what she was moving towards, plurality. The purpose of the present contribution is to interpret her concept of the duality of the two-in-one as a middle term which opens up an ambiguous field that can either facilitate the movement towards plurality and human worldliness or turn the human soul towards itself, withdrawing it from the world. Exemplified by such phenomena as thinking and friendship, the duality of the two-in-one will prove to be precisely as double and dual as its name indicates. Despite Arendt’s scepticism about the capacity of thinking and friendship to bring about a common, plural world, it will be argued, in a critical discussion of her views, that she needs and treasures both phenomena enough to give them a significant role to play in the movement towards plurality.