Jonas Johansson

The purpose of this study is to identify if gender differences exist with respect to conviction of university students for academic dishonesty. To investigate this phenomenon, data from the Swedish National Agency for Higher Education (SNAHE) and from disciplinary boards of several Swedish universities were evaluated from a gender perspective. To identify whether the penalty severity for academic dishonesty is gender biased, the ratio of suspensions/warnings for male and female students was calculated. It was identified that female students are less prevalent in disciplinary matters and that there was no systematic gender bias in penalty severities (warnings or suspensions). In addition, female students deny academic dishonest behaviors more than male students, indicating a possibly higher false conviction rate.

Those who endorse the view that death is in some cases bad for the deceased—a view that, as I shall explain, has considerable bearing on many bioethical issues—need to address the following, Epicurean question: When is death bad for the one who dies? The two most popular answers are "before death" (priorism) and "after death" (subsequentism). Part of the support for these two views consists in the idea that a third answer, "at no time" (atemporalism), makes death unsatisfyingly different from other evils. I argue that this objection is mistaken, and that priorism and subsequentism face problems that atemporalism avoids. Moreover, I argue that if it is nonetheless insisted that we must find a time at which my death is bad for me, we can appeal to periods that begin before my death and end after my death. I end with some implications for posthumous harm