Jonas Oßwald

Tillie Olsen (1978) drew attention to an evident, yet underappreciated fact of writing, which is that it takes time: ‘Where the claims of creation cannot be primary, the results are atrophy; unfinished work; minor effort and accomplishment; silences’ (p. 13). Drawing from our experiences as a precariously employed PhD student and a postdoc in philosophy with parenting responsibilities, we want to address this type of silencing in a manner that stylistically corresponds to the exhaustion, lack of time, and lack of leisure experienced by many caregivers in academia. For this, we want to record one of the few occasions in our daily routine where there is sufficient time and mental capacity to reflect on our own situation: the conversation at the kitchen table in the evening when the chores are done. Our contribution consists in a redacted transcription of this conversation for which we propose the term ‘autotheoretical dialogue’ (see Fournier 2021; Young 1997). Our dialogue covers topics such as: care in relation to class and gender (Lightman & Link 2021); teaching in higher education as a form of care work in contrast to the more prestigious work of research (Cardozo 2017); the precarious working conditions in academia and their relation to parenting (Spina et al. 2022); the ignorance and hostility towards parenthood in academia; the effects of this marginalisation like fatigue, self-doubt, and depression, but also the ambivalence that arises from the conflict of the joy of caring; and the institutional and cultural difficulties of reconciling academic work with parenthood.

Academic philosophy has undergone a homogenization since the Second World War that can be understood as a discursive colonization through analytic philosophy. This colonization directly results in the othering of non-analytic discourses as continental philosophy as well as the normalization of the discipline according to the analytic model. While analytic philosophy serves as the model for this continuing normalization, it is also itself the product of a normalization that occurred in the US during McCarthyism, resulting in the adaptation of mainstream analytic philosophy to the ideological needs of the Cold War. As the historical result of this process, mainstream analytic philosophy can be genealogically defined as our current majoritarian philosophy. The principal normalization techniques of contemporary academic philosophy, such as prepublication peer review and quantified research evaluation, can be analyzed as a strategically coherent intensification of disciplinary techniques of power. These techniques primarily aim at reducing intellectual labour costs, controlling intellectual work, increasing quantifiable research performance, and breaking the relative autonomy of academic staff.

Recent commentaries on the relation between Deleuze and Foucault often operate with an implicit idea of compatibility or consistency that postulates systematic harmony as the decisive criterion for the affinity between them. Accordingly, the predominant question is whether Deleuze and Foucault are “true” friends philosophically and politically. Although the assessments differ, they share a likewise implicit notion of the friend as familiar that excludes any form of ambivalence in amicable relations and consequently cannot fully account for the dynamics and variability of the relation between Deleuze and Foucault. This article tries to address this problem by suspending the notion of the friend-as-familiar, effectively posing the question of what concept of friendship we would have if the ambivalent relation between Deleuze and Foucault would be the model. For this, the reconstruction begins with the early encounters and follows their relationship until the supposed split in the context of the desire-pleasure-debate. What becomes apparent is the dialogical structure of the philosophical friendship between Deleuze and Foucault that entails convergences as well as divergences, which will eventually be related to their own and fundamentally different concepts of friendship. Deleuze and Foucault, as will be argued, are neither “vrais amis” nor “faux amis” but simply amis that practised a form of philosophical friendship, lasting for more than 15 years.

As Deleuze says in his essay "Nomadic Thought", it is Nietzsche's movement of uncoding which announces a "new politics". Nietzsche marks the beginning of a counter-culture in the effort "to get something through which is not encodable". In this way, Nietzsche establishes a different kind of philosophical discourse, a "counter-philosophy", inasmuch as its utterances are directed against philosophy conceived as the bureaucracy of pure reason. This chapter attempts to establish an untimely echo of Deleuze's essay, which aims at an actualised understanding of this rather enigmatically announced "new politics". It first illustrates how a recent strain of political thought, postfoundationalism, repeats the recoding of society. It then shows that these efforts of recoding are obsessive expressions of a figure which resembles the Nietzschean priest. Finally, it concludes with an outline of Nietzsche's "new politics".