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141No Hope for ConciliationismSynthese 203 (148): 1-30. 2024.Conciliationism is the family of views that rationality requires agents to reduce confidence or suspend belief in p when acknowledged epistemic peers (i.e. agents who are (approximately) equally well-informed and intellectually capable) disagree about p. While Conciliationism is prima facie plausible, some have argued that Conciliationism is not an adequate theory of peer disagreement because it is self-undermining. Responses to this challenge can be put into two mutually exclusive and exhaustiv…Read more
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198Reliable Knowledge: A Reply to TurriDialectica 74 (3): 495-509. 2020.Recently John Turri (2015b) has argued, contra the orthodoxy amongst epistemologists, that reliability is not a necessary condition for knowledge. From this result, Turri (2015a, 2017, 2016a, 2019) defends a new account of knowledge - called abilism - that allows for unreliable knowledge. I argue that Turri's arguments fail to establish that unreliable knowledge is possible and argue that Turri's account of knowledge is false because reliability must be a necessary condition for knowledge.
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456The insignificance of philosophical skepticismSynthese 200 (485): 1-22. 2022.The Cartesian arguments for external world skepticism are usually considered to be significant for at least two reasons: they seem to present genuine paradoxes and that providing an adequate response to these arguments would reveal something epistemically important about knowledge, justification, and/or our epistemic position to the world. Using only premises and reasoning the skeptic accepts, I will show that the most common Cartesian argument for external world skepticism leads to a previously…Read more
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51Defending Philosophical KnowledgeDissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 2021.This dissertation concerns whether philosophy as a discipline can, and does, produce philosophical knowledge. Specifically, this dissertation concerns several prominent arguments for philosophical skepticism. Some support philosophical skepticism by arguing that the philosophical practice of appealing to intuitions to justify philosophical beliefs is illegitimate because either intuitions are not a legitimate kind of evidence or intuitions are an unreliable source of justification. Others argue …Read more
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296Moral disagreement scepticism leveledRatio 34 (3): 203-216. 2021.While many have argued that moral disagreement poses a challenge to moral knowledge, the precise nature of this challenge is controversial. Indeed, in the moral epistemology literature, there are many different versions of ‘the’ argument from moral disagreement to moral scepticism. This paper contributes to this vast literature on moral disagreement by arguing for two theses: 1. All (or nearly all) moral disagreement arguments share an underlying structure; and, 2. All moral disagreement argumen…Read more
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Wake Forest UniversityVisiting assistant professor
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
PhD, 2021
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
General Philosophy of Science |
Ethics, Misc |