-
A temporal same-object advantage in the tunnel effect: Facilitated change detection for persisting objectsJournal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 32. 2006.
-
23A model that adopts human fixations explains individual differences in multiple object trackingCognition 205 (C): 104418. 2020.
-
2Spatiotemporal priority as a fundamental principle of object persistenceIn Bruce M. Hood & Laurie Santos (eds.), The origins of object knowledge, Oxford University Press. 2009.
-
8Spatiotemporal priority as a fundamental principle of object persistenceIn Bruce M. Hood & Laurie Santos (eds.), The origins of object knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 135--164. 2009.
-
285Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) spontaneously compute addition operations over large numbersCognition 97 (3): 315-325. 2005.
-
506A reply to commentators -- Jake Beck, Nico Orlandi and Aaron Franklin, and Ian Phillips -- on our paper "Does perceptual consciousness overflow cognitive access?".
-
993Does Perceptual Consciousness Overflow Cognitive Access? The Challenge from Probabilistic, Hierarchical ProcessesMind and Language 32 (3): 358-391. 2017.Does perceptual consciousness require cognitive access? Ned Block argues that it does not. Central to his case are visual memory experiments that employ post-stimulus cueing—in particular, Sperling's classic partial report studies, change-detection work by Lamme and colleagues, and a recent paper by Bronfman and colleagues that exploits our perception of ‘gist’ properties. We argue contra Block that these experiments do not support his claim. Our reinterpretations differ from previous critics' i…Read more
-
995Problems for the Purported Cognitive Penetration of Perceptual Color Experience and Macpherson’s Proposed MechanismBaltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication. 2014.Fiona Macpherson (2012) argues that various experimental results provide strong evidence in favor of the cognitive penetration of perceptual color experience. Moreover, she proposes a mechanism for how such cognitive penetration occurs. We argue, first, that the results on which Macpherson relies do not provide strong grounds for her claim of cognitive penetrability; and, second, that, if the results do reflect cognitive penetrability, then time-course considerations raise worries for her propos…Read more
-
Johns Hopkins UniversityRegular Faculty
Baltimore, Maryland, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |