Jonathan J. Sanford

The dissertation is an inquiry into the foundations of ethics. Drawing on Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue, I argue that there is considerable confusion in current ethical inquiry. The sociological quagmire discussed by MacIntyre is, I argue, symptomatic of a deeper problem, which is the dearth of attention that has been payed to supplying the metaphysical underpinnings of ethics. The only way to remedy this underlying problem is to work to develop a metaphysic of ethics. ;There are, I argue, three primary notions on which a successful ethical theory must be built: virtue, value, and person. In conducting an analysis of virtue, value, and person I draw from the strengths of two traditions: Aristotelian and early phenomenological. As I will seek to demonstrate, it is in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, and Scheler's Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values, that the most fruitful investigations into virtue, value, and person are to be found. Relevant parts of these two texts are examined carefully. The overall strategy of the dissertation includes an extended argument concerning the need to combine several elements from these two traditions, as well as an outline of the ways in which they are to be combined. It is from these two traditions, moreover, that the methodological tools for investigating virtue, value, and person are gleaned. ;In calling for and developing a metaphysical foundation for ethics this project takes some of the steps necessary for resolving the debate between virtue-based and rule-based approaches to ethics. The combination of certain parts, a combination which entails the rejection of other parts, from both Aristotle's and Scheler's work lends itself to a metaphysical foundation for ethics that can be made to serve many of the aims of both virtue-based and rule-based approaches in a way that does not force one to choose between them. The project does not propose to resolve fully the conflict between virtue-based and rule-based approaches to ethics, but rather to provide a preliminary investigation which makes this resolution feasible

In light of truths expressed by Thomas Aquinas and in lawyers’ oaths, lawyers sworn to uphold the civil law must work toward the goal of teaching and gradually encouraging citizens to have the inner virtues that would make civil law itself irrelevant. This follows from claims central to the civic and the Catholic intellectual traditions: the civil law is a teacher, its effect ought to be the promotion of virtue, and virtuous living is constitutive of the common good. Natural law undergirds and gives substance to the civil law, which nonetheless should only demand under fear of punishment what is followable for the majority of men, given the needs of good public order and the habits and customs of their country.

Fleeing Cuba in 1961, Jorge J. E. Gracia arrived in the USA at the age of nineteen without family and unable to speak English. Ten years later he was assistant professor of philosophy at the State University of New York at Buffalo. Over the next 50 years Gracia published dozens of books and hundreds of articles, making major contributions to numerous areas of philosophy: Latin American philosophy, race and ethnicity, Medieval philosophy, philosophical historiography, metaphysics and ontology, and theory of interpretation. This book is a critical response to Gracia’s work and a tribute to his legacy. It includes a comprehensive bibliography of Gracia’s philosophical works.

This book is intended for “students and readers not formally trained in philosophy who feel the need for a reliable conceptual structure for their own thinking in the midst of the confusing array of moral views expressed today”. It is systematic in structure and almost no mention is made of the historical sources for natural law ethics until the appendix, where Gómez-Lobo credits Grisez and especially Finnis for shaping much of the book’s content. Gómez-Lobo proceeds under the assumption that “certain norms are common to mankind, and that they are not crafted by man”, and, drawing from Plato’s Crito, he invites his readers to explore his claims as interlocutors on equal footing who share a commitment to rational persuasion.

Scheler’s theory of the person is at the center of his philosophy and one of the most celebrated of his achievements. It is somewhat surprising, then, that a straightforward and sufficient account of the person is missing from his works, an omission felt most keenly in that work which is in large measure dedicated to forging a new personalism: The Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values. In his explicit accounts of what a person is, Scheler stresses its spirituality and claims that it lives and has its being wholly in the execution of its acts. But in forging his personalism, Scheler makes a number of claims which require an account of the person that reaches deeper than its executed acts. In this essay, I focus on the accounts of the person given in the Formalism and use Scheler toimprove Scheler’s theory of the person.

Max Scheler argues that there is much to learn about reality through faculties that lie beyond the boundary of reason. In his Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, Scheler explores values (Werte), awareness of which depends primarily on affective receptivity rather than rational perceptionof the world. This essay explores the possibility of affective insight in light of Scheler’s analysis of values. Scheler’s notion of values as moral facts is first examined, next consideration is given to how we learn of values, and then Scheler’s account of how the preference we feel for a given value yields insight into its relative rank is considered. In conclusion, I discuss some reasons for being wary of Scheler’s account, as well as other reasons for being open to it.

Bostock’s Aristotle’s Ethics is a commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Although there are other ethical writings within the Aristotelian corpus, referring to the Nicomachean Ethics as Aristotle’s Ethics seems warranted: the Nicomachean Ethics has long been regarded as Aristotle’s most mature ethical work, and it is certainly his most thorough one. Bostock’s commentary is of interest as an interpretation and as a critical appraisal of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. In what follows I discuss Bostock’s general assessment of the Nicomachean Ethics , and then some specific merits and demerits of Bostock’s commentary. I conclude with some thoughts on which audiences might find Bostock’s book helpful, and which might not

The notion that evil is not simply a privation but a privation of a due good has roots in Aristotle’s Metaphysics and implications for other areas of his thought. In making this case, I begin with a description of the standard view of Aristotle’s place in the development of the privation theory of evil and contend that the standard view does not do justice to Aristotle’s theory of evil. I then provide an interpretation of a portion of Metaphysics Theta that utilizes recent scholarship on this book of the Metaphysics in an effort to demonstrate that Aristotle thinks of evil in such a manner as to be compatible with what the later tradition describes in terms of evil as the deprivation of a due good. I then consider several of the ways in which Aristotle’s metaphysical theory of evil has impact on other areas of his thought.

There are four features to Aristotle’s account of courage that appear peculiar when compared to our own intuitions about this virtue: (1) his account of courage seems not, on its surface, to fit a eudaimonist model, (2) courage is restricted to a surprisingly small number of actions, (3) this restriction, among other things, excludes women and non-combatant men from ever exercising this virtue, and (4) courage is counted as virtuous because of its nobility and beauty. In this paper I explore Aristotle’s account of courage while being attentive to these features, and conclude with a brief consideration of how one might, without ignoring the peculiarities of his own treatment, apply Aristotle’s account of courage to a wider range of actions and actors than he would allow by employing analogoussenses of the terms “life” and “death.”

In this paper I focus on a few of the passages in the Nicomachean Ethics that challenge the standard hylomorphic interpretation of Aristotle’s anthropology. I proceed by reflecting on the manner in which Aristotle’s two ways of characterizing the human person follow from his accounts of the two most important intellectual virtues, phronesis and sophia. I attempt to argue for the following three points: first, that Aristotle’s presentation of a divided mind is the result of his consistency rather than inconsistency; second, that there is not a clear way found in his Nicomachean Ethics to overcome this dual anthropology without doing violence to his account of intellectual virtue; and third, that there are several reasons why this dual anthropology should not be regarded as an aporetic failure.

_Untangle the complex web of philosophical dilemmas of Spidey and his world—in time for the release of _The Amazing Spider-Man_ movie_ Since Stan Lee and Marvel introduced Spider-Man in _Amazing Fantasy_ #15 in 1962, everyone’s favorite webslinger has had a long career in comics, graphic novels, cartoons, movies, and even on Broadway. In this book some of history’s most powerful philosophers help us explore the enduring questions and issues surrounding this beloved superhero: Is Peter Parker to blame for the death of his uncle? Does great power really bring great responsibility? Can Spidey champion justice and be with Mary Jane at the same time? Finding your way through this web of inquiry, you’ll discover answers to these and many other thought-provoking questions. Gives you a fresh perspective and insights on Peter Parker and Spider-Man’s story lines and ideas Examines important philosophical issues and questions, such as: What is it to live a good life? Do our particular talents come with obligations? What role should friendship play in life? Is there any meaning to life? Views Spider-Man through the lens of some of history’s most influential thinkers, from Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Immanuel Kant to Nietszche, William James, Ayn Rand, and Alasdair MacIntyre