Jonathan King

Ongoing efforts to build intelligent machines has required reexamining ourunderstandings of intelligence. A significant conclusion, shared by anumber of noteworthy thinkers, is that real intelligence depends very muchon story telling and story understanding. Several examples illustrate howthis conclusion flies in the face of dominant (reductionist) understandingsof intelligence. Several reasons are then presented for the greater use ofstories in business ethics classes, reasons that progress from enhancing"conceptual'' intelligence, to emotional intelligences, and culminating inmoral intelligences.

While I am in broad agreement with the main thrust of Fine’s and Milonakis’s argument, I pose sixteen questions for them. The first ten questions relate to the history of economic thought ; substantive issues of economic theory ; methodological and philosophical matters ; and the other social sciences. I conclude by asking six questions about the ‘old’ and ‘new’ economics imperialism, the prospects for mainstream economics, and the precise nature of the political-economy alternative that Fine and Milonakis propose. Is it simply Marxian political economy in disguise?

Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century makes hardly any reference to the ethics of inequality. Surprisingly, this is an omission shared by most of his critics. In this paper I investigate the literature on which he and his reviewers might have drawn and speculate on the reasons why they did not. I outline the four ‘views of society’ and the related issues in moral philosophy that were presented by Michael Schneider in his book on the distribution of wealth. I then summarise the criticisms of Piketty made by those few reviewers who did show some interest in ethical questions and examine the slightly earlier and quite different case against reducing inequality made by one of these critics, N. Gregory Mankiw. I consider the economic, political and social costs of inequality identified in a book-length study of Piketty’s work by Steven Pressman, and conclude by reflecting on the reasons for the widespread neglect of moral philosophy by mainstream economists.

By 1918 Bertrand Russell had well-formed and distinctive opinions on many aspects of economic philosophy, theory and policy. In the second half of his life (1919–70) he wrote at great length on a very wide range of economic issues, including modern technology and the prospects for abolishing scarcity; population growth, eugenics and birth control; the economic development of China; the case for democratic socialism; the case against Soviet communism; the causes of economic crises; and the economic background to war and peace. Russell’s economic writings appeared as chapters of books on subjects as diverse as the philosophy of science, the history of nineteenth-century Europe, the principles of education and the case for world government. Economic themes can be detected even in his most frivolous newspaper articles. He was a great literary stylist, and his popular writings on economics were widely read and possibly quite influential, especially between the wars.

Bertrand Russell was perhaps the last great philosopher to take an active interest in economics. After a brief, youthful engagement with the economics of socialism in 1889, Russell wrote on economic questions in three separate periods up to 1918, and in each case there was a clear political motivation. The first, in 1895–96, arose from his investigation of Marxism as a creed and of German social democracy as its principal contemporary political expression. The second, in 1903–04, was provoked by his intervention on the free trade side of the tariff controversy. Finally, in 1915–18, Russell's commitment to Guild Socialism and to war resistance led him to some profound, if rather speculative, reflections on the economics of libertarian socialism. In this paper I discuss each of these three phases in Russell's economic thought and conclude that he never went far enough in his opposition to neo-classical theory in general, or to its utilitarian foundations in particular.

Bertrand Russell was perhaps the last great philosopher to take an active interest in economics. After a brief, youthful engagement with the economics of socialism in 1889, Russell wrote on economic questions in three separate periods up to 1918, and in each case there was a clear political motivation. The first, in 1895–96, arose from his investigation of Marxism as a creed and of German social democracy as its principal contemporary political expression. The second, in 1903–04, was provoked by his intervention on the free trade side of the tariff controversy. Finally, in 1915–18, Russell's commitment to Guild Socialism and to war resistance led him to some profound, if rather speculative, reflections on the economics of libertarian socialism. In this paper I discuss each of these three phases in Russell's economic thought and conclude that he never went far enough in his opposition to neo-classical theory in general, or to its utilitarian foundations in particular.

Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 BC-43 BC) was a Roman statesman, lawyer, political theorist, philosopher, and Roman constitutionalist. He is widely considered one of Rome's greatest orators and prose stylists. He is generally perceived to be one of the most versatile minds of ancient Rome. He introduced the Romans to the chief schools of Greek philosophy and created a Latin philosophical vocabulary, distinguishing himself as a linguist, translator, and philosopher. An impressive orator and successful lawyer, he probably thought his political career his most important achievement. Today, he is appreciated primarily for his humanism and philosophical and political writings. Although a great master of Latin rhetoric and composition, Cicero was not Roman in the traditional sense, and was quite self-conscious of this for his entire life. He was declared a "righteous pagan" by the early Catholic Church, and therefore many of his works were deemed worthy of preservation. Saint Augustine and others quoted liberally from his works On the Republic and On the Laws, and it is due to this that we are able to recreate much of the work from the surviving fragments.

Integrated annual methane fluxes measured from 1994 to 1996 at sites representing specific tundra vegetation and land cover types were weighted areally using a vegetation map [Auerbach et al., 1997] for the Kuparuk River basin and subareas. Wetland and open water CH 4 emissions dominate the Kuparuk River basin emission estimate. Areal weighting of site fluxes resulted in a regional CH 4 emission estimate of 2.09 x 10 10 g CH 4 yr -1 for the Kuparuk River basin. The global CH 4 emission obtained by extending areally weighted annual fluxes from this study to global tundra area is 5.83 Tg CH 4 yr -1. This is about 15% of the Fung et al. [1991] atmospheric tracer model estimate and indicates that the vegetation distribution of the Kuparuk River Basin is not typical of the entire Arctic. Reconciling results from atmospheric tracer model estimates and areally weighted field flux measurements will require accurate high-resolution circumpolar estimates of wetland and open water areas and fluxes. Copyright 1998 by the American Geophysical Union.