Jonathan Marks

This article examines Shiao, Bode, Beyer, and Selvig’s (2012) arguments in their article “The Genomic Challenge to the Social Construction of Race” and finds that their claims are based on fundamentally flawed interpretations of current genetic research. We discuss current genomic and genetic knowledge about human biological variation to demonstrate why and how Shiao et al.’s recommendations for future sociological studies and social policy, based on their inadequate understanding of genomic methods and evidence, are similarly flawed and will lead sociology astray.

The overwhelming similarity of human and ape genes is one of the best-known facts of modern genetic science. But what does this similarity mean? Does it, as many have suggested, have profound implications for understanding human nature? Well-known molecular anthropologist Jonathan Marks uses the human-versus-ape controversy as a jumping-off point for a radical reassessment of a range of provocative issues—from the role of science in society to racism, animal rights, and cloning. Full of interesting facts, fascinating personalities, and vivid examples that capture times and places, this work explains and demystifies human genetic science—showing ultimately how it has always been subject to social and political influences and teaching us how to think critically about its modern findings. Marks presents the field of molecular anthropology—a synthesis of the holistic approach of anthropology with the reductive approach of molecular genetics--as a way of improving our understanding of the science of human evolution. As he explores the intellectual terrain of this field, he lays out its broad areas of interest with issues ranging from the differences between apes and humans to the biological and behavioral variations expressed in humans as a species. Marks confronts head-on the problems of racial classification in science. He describes current theories about race and uses work in primatology, comparative anatomy, and molecular anthropology to debunk them. He also sheds new light on the controversial Great Ape Project, the Human Genome Diversity Project, and much more. This iconoclastic, witty, and extremely readable book illuminates the deep background of human variation and asks us to reconsider the role of science in modern society.

Reflections on principle and prudence in the thoughts and actions of great thinkers and statesmen. Discussions of the place of moral principle in political practice are haunted by the abstract and misleading distinction between realism and its various principled or “idealist” alternatives. This volume argues that such discussions must be recast in terms of the relationship between principle and prudence: as Nathan Tarcov maintains, that relationship is “not dichotomous but complementary.” In a substantive introduction, the editors investigate Leo Strauss’s attack on contemporary political thought for its failure to account for both principle and prudence in politics. Leading commentators then reflect on principle and prudence in the writings of great thinkers such as Homer, Machiavelli, and Hegel, and in the thoughts and actions of great statesmen such as Pericles, Jefferson, and Lincoln. In a concluding section, contributors reassess Strauss’s own approach to principle and prudence in the history of political philosophy. “Principle and Prudence in Western Political Thought contains a series of first-rate essays on a—if not the—central problem of political thought: how should and can abstract and general principles inform contingent, particularistic political life.” — Catherine H. Zuckert, coauthor of Leo Strauss and the Problem of Political Philosophy.

We are addressing this letter to the editors of Philosophical Psychology after reading an article they decided to publish in the recent vol. 33, issue 1. The article is by Nathan Cofnas and is entitled “Research on group differences in intelligence: A defense of free inquiry” (2020). The purpose of our letter is not to invite Cofnas’s contribution into a broader dialogue, but to respectfully voice our concerns about the decision to publish the manuscript, which, in our opinion, fails to meet a range of academic quality standards usually expected of academic publications.

Our knowledge of the evolution of human thought is limited not only by the nature of the evidence, but also by the values we bring to the authoritative scientific study of our ancestors. The tendency to see human thought as linear progress in rational capacities has been popular since the Enlightenment, and in the wake of Darwinism has been extended to other species as well. Human communication can be used to transmit useful information, but is rooted in symbolic processes that are nonrational—that is, they involve choosing among functionally equivalent alternatives, any of which is as good an option as any other. The evolution of human thought cannot be realistically isolated from the evolution of human society or human communication, neither of which is rooted in obvious rationality.

Serological data have been used to address anthropological problems since the turn of the century. These were predominantly problems of two kinds in anthropological systematics: the relations of human populations to one another (racial serology), and the relations of primate species to one another (systematic serology). Though they were the locus of considerable debate about the relative merits of 'genetic' versus 'traditional' data, the serological work had little lasting impact in the field. I attribute this to the fact that the research was carried out largely externally to anthropology, and often interpreted in facile manners. To a large extent the history of this research has been ignored or rewritten following the development of 'molecular anthropology' in the 1960s. To some extent, however, contemporary genetic research in anthropology replays aspects of the serological era

In this paper I discuss reductive trends in evolutionary anthropology. The first involved the reduction of human ancestry to genetic relationships (in the 1960s) and the second involved a parallel reduction of classification to phylogenetic retrieval (in the 1980s). Neither of these affords greater accuracy than their alternatives; that is to say, their novelty is epistemic, not empirical. As a result, there has been a revolution in classification in evolutionary anthropology, which arguably clouds the biological relationships of the relevant species, rather than clarifying them. Just below the species level, another taxonomic issue is raised by the reinscription of race as a natural category of the human species. This, too, is driven by the convergent interests of cultural forces including conservative political ideologies, the creation of pharmaceutical niche markets, free-market genomics, and old-fashioned scientific racism

Evolution leaves two patterns in nature simultaneously: continuity (i.e., descent) and discontinuity (i.e., modification). In narrating the evolution of our species, we tend to privilege continuity at the expense of discontinuity, for reasons having in part to do with our historical engagement with creationist interlocutors, and to the cultural status ascribed to genetics. In this paper, I will explore the emergence of the imaginary – the universe of metaphors, possible futures, symbolic meanings, remote ancestors, spirits, magic, and most importantly, stories – as a crucial element in human evolution. The emergence of wisdom might be considered as the ability to navigate successfully in a largely fictive domain of relatedness, obligation, and morality.