Jonathan O Chimakonam

African philosophy of higher education is an evolving field of discourse. As a distinctively African contribution to critical pedagogy and global philosophical discourse in higher education, there is a paucity of literature for researchers to reference as a starting point to further their discourse. Much of what has been written about education so far involves the cultivation of autonomous action, moral instruction, iteration in higher pedagogy, and responsible action towards the public good or the harmonisation and promotion of collective interests. To address this paucity of research, we propose a need to rethink the African philosophy of higher education, including critical pedagogy from an alternative framework. We begin by presenting an overview of what constitutes an African philosophy of higher education in existing literature. From there, employing the method of conversational analysis, we critique the colonial foundation of higher education in Africa in its current organisation. We then deploy the same method to present a trivalent logico-ontological model of higher education as an alternative framework that can transform learners into creative, critical, and independent thinkers. We conclude by considering the potential impact of such a trivalent logico-ontological model of education on the future of African philosophy of higher education and its role in shaping critical pedagogy in and beyond Africa.

This book introduces fundamental questions and problems driving debates in contemporary African philosophy of religion, which has emerged recently as one of the most vibrant new fields of African philosophy. The chapters in this book respond to African God-talk and approach questions like the nature of God, the problem of evil, death and immortality, transhumanism, moral enhancement, atheism, meaningful existence, and the decolonisation of African religious concepts. This book reflects the diversity of voices and perspectives in the literature with its critical focus on such themes as the extent of the powers of the limited God, schools of thought in contemporary African philosophy of religion, the monotheistic credentials of African Traditional Religion (ATR), and the panpsychist presuppositions of African philosophy and ATR. The book addresses the possibility of immortality, the good life, decolonising the concept of Esu, Igbo notions of the person and the problem of evil, and transhumanist ideals and the limited harmony-God. Finally, the book highlights the significance of theosophical debate between the African perfect God perspective championed by philosophers like John S. Mbiti, Kwame Gyekye, and Ebunoluwa O. Oduwole, and the African limited God view defended by philosophers like Kwasi Wiredu, Okot p’Bitek, John A.I. Bewaji, Ada Agada, and Aribiah David Attoe. The book is of interest to academics, researchers, and postgraduate students active in the fields of African philosophy, African religious studies, African studies, comparative philosophy, global philosophy of religion, theology, and intercultural and comparative religious studies.

Paulin Hountondji will go down in the annals of African philosophy as one of its most vigorous and consistent critics, describing it in the final analysis as a ‘myth’. He grants the idea of philosophy in Africa, but not that of African philosophy. For him, the name African philosophy particularises the intellectual exercise it qualifies and denies its universal validity. Hountondji’s core argument is that the name ‘African philosophy’ refers to a culture-bound and exclusive system, which is antithetical to what philosophy as a universal enterprise represents. Hountondji’s misgiving is that the name ‘African philosophy’ conveys a derogatory meaning that robs the discourse of its universal validity. As a result, Hountondji approves the name ‘philosophy in Africa’ as a characterisation ‘of the practice’ of universal philosophy in Africa. However, his argument for rejecting ‘African philosophy’ as a myth is not convincing. A given discourse does not get shaken down merely by its name. I will counter Hountondji’s main arguments and provide logical and methodological clarifications on the nature of a philosophical tradition to establish the legitimacy of ‘African philosophy’ as a deserving name for the tradition.

In this chapter, I conceptualise relational-field metaphysics as an umbrella term for metaphysical theories that (a) prioritise relationship between realities and contexts of such relationships in their study of reality; (b) are African culture-inspired and developed from a common relational thread in various African worldviews; (c) centralise the concepts of relationship, context and complementation in their frameworks; (d) ground their assumptions in a truth-glut type of three-valued logic. I argue that it is a better and more fluid way of accessing being than substance-based metaphysics. I articulate and explain the intellectual and cultural backgrounds of relational thinking and other central notions that support relational-field metaphysics. I also identify and explain the three main principles that underlie relational-field metaphysics and its logical underpinning.

This chapter deepens the formulation of the theory of cogno-normative epistemology as an exercise in decoloniality. Questions regarding the power and influence of knowledge not only in human life but in the universe as a whole, the moral implications of knowledge and the ontology of knowledge are investigated. The chapter also investigates the two components of epistemology, namely knowledge and ignorance, and discusses their varied categories. In doing this, nmekọ or relationship and logical trivalence as key features of the African philosophical tradition are deployed to tease out the value and mechanism of the African perspective to discourses on epistemology.

African philosophy continues to see the emergence of new concepts, new formulations and new ideas in the twenty-first century. Consolationism is one of such formulations. As propounded by Ada Agada, its chief objectives are exploring the meaningfulness of human existence in a universe that does not readily yield its secrets, in particular, secrets about origin and destiny. The preoccupation with the meaning of human existence gives the concept of purpose a central position in Agada’s consolationist system. This chapter will explore key metaphysical propositions of consolationism and uncover some of its epistemological underpinnings. It will demonstrate the decolonial leaning of consolationism by grounding its assumptions on conversational thinking and Ezumezu logic.

The focus of this book is on a decolonial approach to philosophy, specifically as it concerns African philosophy as a discipline. In writing this work, we have avoided the temptation of comparing and contrasting the philosophical ideas, insights and thoughts gleaned from the African philosophical place with those from other philosophical places. We have concerned ourselves with discussing African metaphysics and epistemology through the framework of the conversational method grounded in Ezumezu logic and teased out of the principle of nmekọ. In the two parts of the book, which deal with metaphysics and epistemology, we did not focus on the polemic of whether African metaphysics and epistemology exist or not. Where we tried to address that in any of the chapters, we did not dwell on them. We passively highlighted some of the salient points to keep records straight. We were primarily concerned with discussing the nature of African metaphysics and epistemology as captured in the treatises of some African philosophers in addition to throwing in our own proposals. Each part contains chapters that discussed ideas in the literature and a chapter that made a theoretic proposal as a way of extending the frontiers of knowledge in African metaphysics and epistemology. Specifically, the work proposed nmekọka as a robust metaphysical theory and a theory of knowledge called cogno-normative epistemology.

In this chapter, we present ụwa ontology, a theory of being articulated by Pantaleon Iroegbu, as a decolonial project. This ontological theory is articulated to address the lapses inherent in some ontological theories in Western and African philosophies. The word ụwa is taken from the Igbo language and conceptualized to mean ‘an englobing phenomenon.’ For Iroegbu, ụwa is the only existing reality, which consists of other beings. The idea is that being is because it belongs to ụwa. This is to say that without ụwa there can be no being. We show that for Iroegbu, being that is enfolded in ụwa is multidimensional, multifaceted and relational, and that it can be explained through the decolonial methodology of conversational thinking grounded in Ezumezu logic.

What are the basic principles of the African system of thought? This question calls for clarification on what binds some of the salient features that can be found in many African worldviews. Here, I show how the logical principle of trivalence, which characterizes a mode of reasoning that rests on a truth-glut, three-valued logic, and the principle of nmekọ or relationship, which highlights not only the significance of binary complementarity of seemingly opposed variables but the importance of the notion of context, represent the two basic principles of the African system of thought. I will show how the African system and any methodology mechanized from it, such as conversational thinking, can be construed as decolonial in order to provide a logico-methodological landing for this book.

Our focus in this chapter is to curate some epistemological ideas in African philosophy in light of decolonial methodology and logic. The task is necessary because very few works in African philosophy, and in particular African epistemology, have paid attention to curating what has been done, and the concepts or ideas that have been articulated by different thinkers. Here, we are not concerned with doing a metaphilosophical discourse on African epistemology’s existence. This is because we take it for granted that African epistemology is being done in African philosophy, by African philosophers. Some of the epistemological concepts or ideas discussed in this chapter include Senghor’s negritude, Anyanwu’s epistemological relativity, Wiredu’s notion of truth, Ijiomah’s humanizing epistemology, Chimakonam’s cogno-normative epistemology, Hountondji’s endogenous knowledge, Ozumba-Chimakonam’s integrative epistemology and Tavernaro-Haidarian’s deliberative epistemology. The essence of this chapter is to demonstrate that African epistemology has come of age and that there is the need to take stock and document it properly.

This chapter adopts decolonial method and logic in surveying the discussions on personhood, focusing on the Afro-communitarian metaphysical and ethical theories of Mbiti and Menkiti, now popularly known as the radical version, that of Gyekye known as moderate communitarianism and that of Matolino known as limited communitarianism. The chapter discusses the two main categories or conceptions: the metaphysical and the normative. The chapter shows that while most discussions in African philosophy center on the normative conception of personhood, the metaphysical conception cannot be left out. The chapter argues that both conceptions are connected such that discussing one should spillover into the other, assuming it has not been unduly trivialized. The chapter claims that the metaphysical has been trivialized and contends that any comprehensive discussion of personhood in African philosophy cannot leave out the metaphysical because to understand personhood requires understanding the nature of entities that bear the characteristics or features of the normative personhood.

This chapter taps into ideas present in extant literature to construct an African metaphysical theory called nmekọka metaphysics. The chapter shows that the metaphysics of nmekọka is a collectivist metaphysics, which highlights the attributes of ‘dynamism’ and ‘relationship’ as features that shape realities. The chapter identifies some metaphysical concepts and ontological positions developed so far in African philosophy, and observes, to the best of our knowledge, that a full-fledged theory in African metaphysics fitted with a discernible background logic and a method(s) that drive(s) its discourse has yet to be formulated. The chapter argues that a theory of African metaphysical thinking that gives an account of reality as a whole is long overdue. The chapter unbundles nmekọka as a decolonized theory of metaphysics.

Our goal in this chapter is to give an insightful presentation and examination of Innocent Asouzu’s conception of being showing its decolonial leaning. Some philosophers, like Plato and Aristotle, had articulated notions of being that are bifurcating and polarizing. Asouzu suggests that any conception of being that is lopsided is mistaken. To remedy this misconception, Asouzu explains that there is a need to reconceptualize being. The idea of being that he articulates is one that overcomes the bifurcation and polarization of being. He proposes a system he calls ibuanyidanda ontology. This ontological system is complementary and non-bifurcatory in keeping with decolonial logic. In it, being is that on account of which anything that exists serves as a missing link of reality. We shall employ the conversational method for our discussion in this chapter and demonstrate the compatibility of Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda ontology with the trivalent logic system of Ezumezu.

This chapter carries out a decolonial study in epistemology. Our argument is that African epistemology exists as a branch of African philosophy and that it varies from other epistemologies in terms of method and background logic. This contention is necessitated by the fact that there continues to be some doubt on the possibility of other branches of African philosophy even after the affirmation of the existence of African philosophy. The argument is that knowledge and human knowing faculties are the same everywhere; hence, there is no need for a distinct epistemological system and theory called African epistemology. The preceding has been countered by some African philosophers who argue that, inasmuch as African philosophy exists as a separate tradition from other philosophies, African epistemology as one of its branches must also exist. We go beyond this sentiment to argue that what we call African epistemology is epistemology from an African perspective. It is a contribution from the African philosophical tradition to the theory of knowledge, and its principles and ideas are universalizable. We survey a handful of contributions in the literature and show the methodological and logical nuances that make epistemology in African philosophy different from epistemology in other philosophical traditions.

While it is a fact that the universalist school of African philosophy charged up the discourse in their time, while it cannot be disputed that their approach was argumentative, questions have re-emerged as to the relevance of the school in contemporary African philosophy. There are now two requirements to which actors in African philosophy agree on these days, to wit: (a) the need to find new conversations within and beyond African philosophy and (b) the need to ensure that the new conversations are substantive and speak to the conditions of life in the African place. Obviously, the agitations of philosophical universalism are on the metaphilosophical level, chief among which are the conditions that African philosophy has to meet before it will become philosophy. Evidently, the campaign of the universalist school still comes short of meeting the two requirements above. My aims in this work include: (1) To critique the universalist school as the choice mode of inquiry in African philosophy, (2) To unveil conversational thinking both as a mode of thought and a theory of African philosophy, and (3) to redefine the concern of African philosophy in the contemporary time using the themes of conversational thinking.

In this chapter we begin some empirical legwork into the question in respect of the sort of intellectual progress that has been made by African philosophers or African philosophy following the metaphilosophical debate in the decades past about its existence, nature, and substance. We consider this investigation to be important for African philosophy not just for stocktaking purposes or the least because of the rising unease, discussions, and protests around a lack of transformation in universities in Africa and the need to Africanize or decolonize the philosophy curriculum in universities in Africa. These are important considerations for embarking on a stocktaking exercise of African philosophy. However, in addition to these considerations, we think that a proper assessment will help invigorate African philosophy and direct African philosophers towards ways of plotting its trajectory for the future. From the data presented, we drew, amongst others, a couple of preliminary conclusions including that philosophy programs in many of the universities in sub-Saharan Africa are westernized, and that there are minimal courses offered in African philosophy in those universities.

I argue that the concern of African logic should really be about constructing systems and criticising the systems. I show that recent discussions have however threatened to veer it off-course. Instead of engaging in robust rigorous conversations, some logicians and philosophers have taken to apologias while others have taken to polemicism both of which have narrowed their visions to a debate about the correctness and incorrectness of the idea of an African logic rather than practical demonstrations. I contend that this diversion has created some problematics in African logic which include: the categorisation of logic into classical or standard and non-classical or non-standard, the problematic of the idea of African logic, the relative-universal problematic and the problematic of regional logics. I show that if the talk about African logic is going to make any meaning, it must be within the scheme of constructing an alternative logic system and not a culture-bound apologias as ethnologicians champion or fruitless animadversions as the polemicists demonstrate.

With the structure of Ezumezu laid out in preceding chapters, I want to now demonstrate how Ezumezu logic actually grounds theories in African philosophy and studies. I argue that some theories in African philosophy can be grounded in an Africa-developed system of logic to demonstrate their originality and Africanness and deflate the accusation in some quarters that African philosophers copy their Western counterparts or that African philosophy is not original. I explain what it might look like to ground a theory in African logic. I briefly highlight this with examples of some currents like conversational philosophy, ubuntu, complementary reflection, consolation philosophy and Afro-communitarianism. I pay special attention to Afro-communitarianism which shares a lot in common with the first three by considering the perennial problem of ‘priority’ that exists in the relationship between the individual and the community. I use the twin issues of individual autonomy and rights to demonstrate how Afro-communitarianism can be grounded in (an) African logic.

In this chapter, I hold a conversation with some egg-heads in African philosophy who directly or indirectly offered explanation(s) that attempted to answer the question about the criterion or the Africanness of philosophy. The criterion question asks two simple but challenging questions in African philosophy and they are: what makes a discourse, philosophy? And what makes a philosophy, African? I posit a logic-based criterion for African philosophy and studies. I show that understanding what makes a discourse African is foundational to the project of African studies as a whole if without this much, we may not be able to differentiate our project from those of the Westerners and the Easterners. I contend that all traditions might be universal but they were first particulars rooted in different systems of logic. The universal in this sense is a collection of particulars with distinct methodical and logical nuances.

In this chapter, I aim to discuss the philosophy of African logic from the perspective of Ezumezu (an African) logic. In the first section, I will present some principles of African logic and show how they justify system of African logic. The interesting thing to note here is that these principles, in addition to being articulated from the African background ontology and world-view, will be universalised. I contend that this is where African philosophical assessment of African logic ought to begin because most critics of the idea of African logic agitate that an African system of logic, if it is ever possible will necessarily lack the tincture of universal applicability. I will narrow my inquiry down to the appraisal of African logic with an example of Ezumezu system. I will discuss some emergent issues in the scope and nature of African logic. This point is especially critical because it purveys a demonstration of a prototype system of an African logic. I will conclude by throwing further light on the merits, nature and promises of an African logic tradition.

Here, I hold conversations with the Nigerian philosopher Udo Etuk and the American philosopher W. V. O. Quine whose respective essays “The Possibility of African Logic” and “Carnap and Logical Truth” have stoked the fire of exciting conversations among some philosophers on the nature of logic within African intellectual landscape. I will demonstrate the potency of Etuk’s stimulation as an African philosopher of African origin and transcend the possibility question in African logic. I will further clarify the concept of African logic in order to answer the questions some colleagues and students have put across to me in the recent time. Some peers have continued to confront me with the question, is there any justification for the African logic project? I will attempt to provide them with some justifications. Thereafter, as part of the justifications, I will undertake a more rigorously committed exercise of investigating the structure: ‘q na abughi q’ which I suppose to be the hub of all controversies surrounding the logic question in African philosophy in this contemporary time. I will conclude following the insight of W. V. O. Quine that bad translators are responsible for the creation of what may be called the ‘pre-logicality’ thesis and adduce that ‘q complements not q’ which Africans accept as true is the correct translation of ‘q na abughi q’ rather than the contradiction ‘q and not q’.

Do we need new methods for African philosophy? Or, are the methods of Western philosophy adequate for African philosophy? These questions are not some of the easiest to answer in African philosophy. In charting the course of future direction in African philosophy, one must be confronted with these questions. On the one hand, if one agrees that we sure need new methods for African philosophy, a serious but perhaps not far reaching implication could be drawn: does it mean that all we have been doing using methods developed in Western philosophy is not African philosophy? On the other hand, if one says that Western-developed methods are more than adequate for African philosophy, a further implication could be drawn: does it mean that African philosophy is not truly African as yet?In this chapter, I seek to, in practical terms, undertake the task of methodological reconstruction in African philosophy through the framework of Ezumezu. To accomplish this task, I seek to mount a defence for postmodern thinking and then project Ezumezu from this methodological purview. To do all this, I will first demolish the pretensions of European philosophy weaved into the modern mindview which erroneously projects the European methodological particular as a synonym for the universal.

I identify three schools of thought in the African logic debate namely, the apologists, the polemicists and the system builders. I show that while the first two are haunted by the essentialist ideologies of Afrocentricism and Eurocentricism, it is the last school that is actually doing the correct thing. I highlight the individual positions or contributions from members of each school and show where they failed or succeeded. I conclude by identifying system building, the type I propose to do in Ezumezu logic as the proper direction of African logic project.

My main aim in this chapter is to lead a charge against the Western methodological hegemony and lay down principles that will demonstrate the independence of African philosophy and intellectual tradition. To do this, I will first identify and discuss three pillars of thought in Ezumezu methodology namely, nwa-nju, nwa-nsa and nwa-izugbe. I will show how they play foundational roles in the construction of the system of Ezumezu logic. Second, I will unveil and discuss the two main methods or modes of inference or reasoning in Ezumezu logic namely, Arumaristic and Ohakaristic. I will further identify the concept of nmeko easily translated as our notion of relationship and use it as a twine to bind the three pillars as epistemic agents and employ the latter to bring about a functional release of the two methods. Finally, I will show with the examples of five leading theories in contemporary African philosophy namely, Afro-communitarianism, ubuntu, complementary reflection, consolation philosophy and conversational philosophy, the cenrality of nmeko to the methodology of African philosophy tradition.

In this final chapter, I take up one of the most menacing problems confronting Africa in our time: the curriculum problem. The curriculum of education in Africa has two fundamental problems namely; it is colonial and thus stifles creative originality of a child, and it is fitted with alien background logic which estranges and condemns its victim to a life time of imitation. To transform this colonial curriculum and construct a new one on the basis of African logic thus becomes the most urgent task which is the focus of this chapter. I will formulate a theory of curriculum transformation in Africa based on Ezumezu logic that utilises the twin strategies of decolonisation and Africanisation. I will argue that it is only a transformed curriculum that can, among others, develop critical and creative thinking abilities in the African child. Further, I will identify some objections that have been levelled against the effort to transform curriculum in Africa and address them.

A system of logic is a formal theory equipped with laws and elementary syntactic and semantic definitions specifying ways of applying those laws in reasoning and revising assumptions out of which certain conclusions could be drawn from certain premises. Here, I shall discuss the universe of discourse to a variant of three-valued logic called Ezumezu and show that the traditional laws of thought are inadequate hence, I will discuss the three new supplementary laws of thought which were introduced in chapter six. Having already formulated some of its syntactic and semantic rules in the previous chapters, I will show that in logic, Ezumezu system is comparable to systems developed by the likes of Lukasiewicz, Graham Priest, Stephen Read and other alternative logics. I will discuss two important theses namely, ontological and logical theses that will enable us to further understand the three pillars of Ezumezu logic namely, nwa-nsa, nwa-nju and nwa-izugbe already discussed in the preceding chapter. Finally, I will demonstrate the formal structure of Ezumezu logic using its two argument types called arumaristic and ohakaristic to show how conclusions could be drawn from premises.

I argue that the manifestation of reason in Africa’s intellectual space has been logocentric since colonial times which is detrimental to the development of the African idea. I propose a transition from logocentricism to okwucentricism as a reconstruction of the identity of reason in African philosophy. To do this, we are compelled to ask: what constitutes the foundation of African philosophy and by extension, the sundry disciplines in African studies? It is this innocent question that can lead us into the ultimate justification for the study of African philosophy as a distinct tradition. I argue that we do not study African philosophy to prove a point (that we can philosophise exactly as the Westerners do) or defend a territory (that we have a unique and culture-bound system)—this would be myopic to say the least. I contend that when we take up a handful of literature in African philosophy these days, hardly do we find anymore reason for their creation besides proving a point and a defence of some territory. I show that the purpose of the study of African philosophy has to be narrowed down to the use of reason in resolving social, political, economic and environmental challenges facing the continent and the management of its interaction with other peoples of the world—things that are acutely phenomenological rather than perverse encounters.

My aim here is to revisit the identity question using what I dub sense-phenomenalism as a model to offer an explanation to personal identity problem. The following are some of the popular questions philosophers have raised: Why does the same person continue to exist overtime, despite bodily changes? How do we differentiate person A from person B? How do we know that we are today, the persons we were yesterday? Why am I me instead of not me? And most importantly, what identifies the person, is it the body, brain/soul/mind, or the attributes of the brain/mind such as memory and consciousness? These questions may appear superficial at surface level but deep down, they are the basis for diversity and for the self and other dichotomy. I contend that were we all the same, then, we would not talk of we, but I. I employ ‘sense-phenomenalism’, a body-only model to show that identity is a social factor and that a person’s identity lies in their bodily features. To do this, I utilise the tool of conversational thinking, a methodological development in African philosophic tradition to engage with extant literature/theories as well as with the positions in the other two essays in this book.

In this paper, we argue that Pantaleon Iroegbu’s Uwa ontology can be employed as a framework for conceptualizing an ecocentric environmental philosophy that grounds moral consideration in the intrinsic value of the ecosystem itself. The theory we will develop will not treat the ecosystem as a unique entity different or that subsumes other entities in it. It will be one that regards the ecosystem as a network composed of biotic and abiotic entities. To reach this objective, we will identify and highlight the anthropocentric and bio-centric frameworks as contrasting but limited approaches, which seek to protect the environment for the sake of humanity’s well-being and the wellbeing of living things, respectively; unlike the ecocentric vision that covers the welfare of the ecosystem as a whole. For their limitations, we will argue that the anthropocentric and bio-centric orientations have not helped to improve and sustain the ecosystem, hence the gap that our research will attempt to fill. As a remedy, we here deploy Iroegbu’s Uwa ontology, which holds that being is belonging, to tap into the underexplored African notion of relationship to construct an ecocentric philosophy that conceives the ecosystem as a globe of interconnected and interdependent realities without any prejudice.