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Jonathan Paul Mitchell

University College Dublin
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    5
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    4

 More details
  • University College Dublin
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies
    Administrator (Part-time)
University College Dublin
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2022
Homepage
Areas of Specialization
The Concept of Disability
Disability Rights
Feminism: Disability
Disability and Well-Being
Feminist Philosophy
Biotechnology Ethics
Maurice Merleau-Ponty
Gilles Deleuze
Michel Foucault
4 more
Areas of Interest
The Concept of Disability
Disability Rights
Feminism: Disability
Disability and Well-Being
Feminist Philosophy
Biomedical Ethics, Miscellaneous
Biotechnology Ethics
Maurice Merleau-Ponty
Gilles Deleuze
Michel Foucault
5 more
  • All publications (5)
  •  28
    The sensory dimension of episodic recollection
    Episodic recollection often involves some kind of awareness of the sensory features or properties of what is remembered. Episodically recollecting that sunset last summer on the Greek island of Ios, involves some kind of awareness of how it looked, that is its deep blood-red colour. This is suggestive that for those episodic recollections that possess this sensory phenomenology, it is not a mere accompaniment, that is something those types of experiences could do without and maintain their ident…Read more
    Episodic recollection often involves some kind of awareness of the sensory features or properties of what is remembered. Episodically recollecting that sunset last summer on the Greek island of Ios, involves some kind of awareness of how it looked, that is its deep blood-red colour. This is suggestive that for those episodic recollections that possess this sensory phenomenology, it is not a mere accompaniment, that is something those types of experiences could do without and maintain their identity as precisely those types of experiences. Rather their sensory phenomenology is constitutive of there being the type of experiences they are.If such thoughts are along the right lines, then getting clearer about the character of the sensory phenomenology of episodic recollection is essential to better understanding these types of memory experiences. We can frame the pertinent question as follows: in what does the sensory dimension of episodic recollection consist. My goal here is to detail the problems with the existing imagistic-representationalism and Relationalism accounts of the sensory dimension of episodic recollection and in response to sketch out a third way. The guiding idea of my positive proposal will be that episodic recollection involves a positive phenomenology of sensory absence, whereby we represent, from our current temporal perspective, the lack or absence of a sensory perception of the relevant object and its properties, such that what is remembered is absent-qua-past, as I will put it.
  •  942
    Review of Thomas Stern (ed.), The New Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, Cambridge
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. forthcoming.
    Naturalism and IntentionalityNormativity and NaturalismNietzsche's WorksArthur SchopenhauerThe Natur…Read more
    Naturalism and IntentionalityNormativity and NaturalismNietzsche's WorksArthur SchopenhauerThe Nature of Analytic PhilosophyNietzsche, MiscThe Value of PhilosophyNietzsche: Metaphysics and EpistemologyThe Role of PhilosophyNietzsche: Value Theory
  •  809
    Review of Jean Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling.
    Philosophical Quarterly. forthcoming.
    Review of Jean Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling.
    Moral Realism and IrrealismPhilosophy of ConsciousnessEmotions, MiscVarieties of EmotionMoral Emotio…Read more
    Moral Realism and IrrealismPhilosophy of ConsciousnessEmotions, MiscVarieties of EmotionMoral EmotionPerceptionIntentionalityAspects of EmotionTheories of Emotion
  •  202
    Liking That It Hurts: The Case of the Masochist and Second-Order Desire Accounts of Pain’s Unpleasantness
    American Philosophical Quarterly (2): 181-189. 2022.
    Recent work on pain focuses on the question ‘what makes pains unpleasant’. Second-order desire views claim that the unpleasantness of pain consists in a second-order intrinsic desire that the pain experience itself cease or stop. This paper considers a significant objection to second-order desire views by considering the case of the masochist. It is argued that various ways in which the second-order desire view might try to account for the case of the masochist encounter problems. The conclusion…Read more
    Recent work on pain focuses on the question ‘what makes pains unpleasant’. Second-order desire views claim that the unpleasantness of pain consists in a second-order intrinsic desire that the pain experience itself cease or stop. This paper considers a significant objection to second-order desire views by considering the case of the masochist. It is argued that various ways in which the second-order desire view might try to account for the case of the masochist encounter problems. The conclusion is that until there is a convincing explanation of how second-order desire views can handle masochistic psychology, theorists should look elsewhere for an account of pains unpleasantness.
    Value TheoryIntentionalityLocation of PainPain and Pain Experience
  •  36
    Disability and the Inhuman
    In Fred Cummins, Anya Daly, James Jardine & Dermot Moran (eds.), Perception and the Inhuman Gaze: Perspectives from Philosophy, Phenomenology and the Sciences, Routledge. pp. 298-307. 2020.
    Feminism: DisabilityPhilosophy of Technology
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