In this commentary on Joshua May's Neuroethics: Agency in the Age of Brain Science, I consider some of the implications of May's analysis for clinical neuroethics. In particular, in view of May's appeal to the power of valid consent to deal with some of the issues raised by neuro-interventions, I begin by highlighting that clinical neuroethicists often have to navigate a number of complexities in seeking to facilitate the valid consent of individuals who are potentially subject to various forms …
Read moreIn this commentary on Joshua May's Neuroethics: Agency in the Age of Brain Science, I consider some of the implications of May's analysis for clinical neuroethics. In particular, in view of May's appeal to the power of valid consent to deal with some of the issues raised by neuro-interventions, I begin by highlighting that clinical neuroethicists often have to navigate a number of complexities in seeking to facilitate the valid consent of individuals who are potentially subject to various forms of vulnerability. I go on to consider whether May's claim that neuro-interventions can elicit transformative experiences raises any problems for his appeal to consent in this context. In the latter half of the commentary, I consider May's analysis of mental disorder and raise some potential areas of contrast between the concepts of responsibility in criminal justice and autonomy in the medical context. I conclude by suggesting that 'nuanced neuroethics' should not only be vigilant about the sources of empirical evidence it relies upon, it should also attend to the nuances of the particular contexts in which neuroethical arguments are made, and neuroethical concepts deployed.
