Jonathan Wurtz

Memphis, Tennessee is the Blackest city with a Philosophy for/with Children (P4/WC) program in the United States, making it a unique site of engagement for practitioners. The city faces deeply historically rooted structural problems that continue to manifest themselves, in housing, food security, hate crimes, police brutality, workplace inequality, and segregation; all of which are present in our classrooms where we practice P4C. In this chapter, we illustrate some of the challenges we have faced while practicing P4/WC in Memphis, and the ways in which these obstacles have transformed the practice and mission of the Philosophical Horizons (PH) outreach program. We have found that many of the methods and assumptions of traditional P4C can sometimes be harmful or alienating to some of our students if not properly reformed. We here outline the history of our program Philosophical Horizons (PH) and discuss some of the obstacles we have faced teaching in our specific context. We further provide a discussion of why the typical methods and assumptions of P4C do not serve us well in the context of Memphis. Additionally, we describe our own approach to philosophy for/with children and our primary mission within the city as an anti-racist practice. Finally, we discuss two case studies that exemplify some of the dynamics that we outline in this chapter.

This essay is an attempt to consider the possibility of an ethical encounter between childhood and philosophy in philosophy for children (P4C). The difficulty that P4C faces in its endeavor to introduce childhood and philosophy to one another is not only cognitive in nature, but ethical as well. The child is an Other whose future points beyond me, towards a reality that I will never get to experience. The question which I am interested in answering here is: how do I philosophically interact with a child in such a way as to not overshadow its radical otherness? In other words, how can I—and other P4C practitioners—face childhood ethically?

As the story is often told, P4C was established after Matthew Lipman, then a professor of education at Columbia University, observed a deficiency in reasoning skills among his students and colleagues during the student protest of April 1968. Lipman pondered whether there might be a way to enhance the critical thinking skills of individuals through an educational reform; and thus, P4C was born. Consequently, Lipman and P4C are frequently presented as beacons of hope for a more sustainable democratic future in the face of systemic discrimination, pervasive private interests and corruption, and the erosion of justice. I contend that this narrative relies on the delegitimization of a successful grassroots anti-racist campaign against the aggressive gentrification of Black and Puerto Rican families that Columbia had undertaken. Building on Darren Chetty’s critique of reasonableness in P4C, I present the conventional narrative of P4C’s origin as an instance of reasonableness' gatekeeping function in philosophy for children. I specifically argue that the narrative of Columbia 1968 serves as an explicit example of how reasonableness can silence successful pro-Black educational reforms by labeling the actions of students as “unreasonable”. In other words, this paper highlights a significant oversight in P4C practitioners' awareness of their own discipline, particularly in relation to the racial politics of the 1960s.

Many P4/WC practitioners and theorists privilege the school as a space for thinking and practicing philosophy for/with children. Despite its coercive nature, thinkers such as Jana Mohr Lone, David Kennedy, and Nancy Vansieleghem argue that P4C is a Trojan horse intended to reform the education system from within. I argue, however, that the Trojan horse argument requires us to internalize an incomplete and historically decontextualized understanding of public schools that in turn can reify histories of white supremacy within our CPIs – a consequence that can be particularly harmful when practicing P4C with minority youth. To accurately adjudicate the value of public school classrooms for P4C – especially for those CPIs whose members are primarily Black, Latinx, Indigenous, or other youth of color — I contextualize the Trojan horse argument in the history of race and education in the United States. Through this historical analysis, I conclude that the reformist position becomes increasingly more untenable and that the material history of race and education in fact supports a pessimistic understanding of P4C in education. I end by reflecting on P4C’s need to rethink its privileging of schools as a primary site for philosophical inquiry and caution practitioners against using “social progress” as a justification for how and where they practice their craft. Instead, I encourage them to rethink how and where they practice P4C, based on the local historical and material conditions of the participants.