Jonti Bloomberg

A pressing question for the history of philosophy concerns whether or not the German philosopher Immanuel Kant can be considered to have offered an adequate response to the Scottish philosopher David Hume’s so-called “predicament of causation”. The present dissertation illustrates that Hume propounds two forms of scepticism concerning the principle of causation. One form pertains to causation in a general sense (commonly considered to be found solely in the first book of Hume’s principal work, A Treatise of Human Nature), which maintains that causality is entirely mind-dependent. Another form expresses scepticism about causation in a particular sense (ordinarily considered to be found solely in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding), according to which it is impossible to know with certainty that one phenomenon is indeed causally connected to another. The study indicates that in spite of the fact that Kant seems to have intended to supply a satisfactory response to Hume’s particular instantiations predicament of causation, he ultimately fails to do so. However, Kant can be considered to have supplied in both the Critique of Pure Reason and the Prolegomena a seemingly fortuitous (for it appears that it was unintended) response to the general reading of Hume’s predicament. The dissertation argues, though, that it also ultimately does not succeed in offering a cogent response to the general predicament. For all that Kant says, Hume’s sceptical challenge is ultimately unmet, such that we cannot know any causal claims for certain.

Arthur Schopenhauer, a nineteenth-century German philosopher, advocated a unique theory of immortality (athanasia). The present study attempts to indicate that, in spite of the ingeniousness and consolatory appeal of his theory, it is ultimately – according to an orthodox interpretation which wholly identifies the Will with the so-called “thing- in-itself” – untenable and erroneous. In arriving at the aforementioned conclusion, the study attempts to argue that the two pillars upon which Schopenhauer’s theory of athanasia is based are flawed, viz., that the world cannot be entirely mind-dependent and that the Will cannot be considered an explication of the elusive Kantian “thing-in- itself”. The study explores, among other topics, Schopenhauer’s arguments for radical idealism, the compatibility of Schopenhauer’s evolutionary views with that of his radical idealism, the status of the mind within his philosophy, the notion of the Will as a concept and as a product of intellectual intuition, as well as the Will being susceptible to the influences of time, space and causality. The study has been divided into two primary sections: in the first part, a detailed overview of Schopenhauer’s philosophy is presented; this is necessary in so far as Schopenhauer is a systematic thinker, hence, in order for one to fully comprehend his theory of athanasia, it is necessary for one to first acquaint oneself with his two most significant and fundamental notions, viz., his radical idealism and his claim that the Will is the “thing-in-itself”. Once these matters have been presented and discussed, the study turns in earnest to a consideration of Schopenhauer’s theory of immortality. In the second part of the study, the two fundamental pillars of Schopenhauer’s philosophy are subjected to a thorough critique in order to ultimately illustrate the untenability of his theory of athanasia. As part of this enterprise, the study includes an appendix which attempts to illustrate that the Will as “thing-in-itself” is not insusceptible to the law of causation, thereby undermining one of Schopenhauer’s claims for its indestructibility.