Joo Woo

This paper develops a naturalistic and reductionist account of human agency and ethics grounded in the causal closure of the physical domain. It argues not only that free will is illusory, but that the concept of will is explanatorily redundant and should be eliminated. Ethical systems are reconstructed as functional regulatory mechanisms shaped by evolutionary and game-theoretic constraints rather than truth-apt domains. The paper situates this framework within contemporary debates on free will, moral responsibility, and naturalism, and defends it against major objections, including compatibilism and charges of self-defeat.

This paper develops a naturalistic and reductionist account of human agency and ethics grounded in the causal closure of the physical domain. It argues not only that free will is illusory, but that the concept of will is explanatorily redundant and should be eliminated. Ethical systems are reconstructed as functional regulatory mechanisms shaped by evolutionary and game-theoretic constraints rather than truth-apt domains. The paper situates this framework within contemporary debates on free will, moral responsibility, and naturalism, and defends it against major objections, including compatibilism and charges of self-defeat.