Joonho Lee

In Mencius 孟子 1A7, Mencius advises King Xuan of Qi 齊宣王 to extend his compassion toward his people—what is now widely known as “Mencian moral extension.” Scholars have long debated what is extended in this process. This essay instead examines how extension works in terms of its directionality by developing two psychological models. Drawing on Amos Tversky’s contrast model of similarity, I propose a “thin cognition” model: a selective and patterned weighting in recognizing shared features. Drawing on empirical studies on emotional intelligence, I then propose an “affective hypersensitivity” model: intensified emotional sensitivity to morally salient features across circumstances. Together, these models resolve structural discrepancies within extension and explain how moral responses can be extended more reliably along different directions. This structurally articulated account illuminates Mencius’ commitment to sustaining the vitality of relevant emotional experiences in moral life, even with certain emotional and practical costs.

According to Aristotle and Neo-Aristotelians, a fully virtuous person knows what she should do in given circumstances and rationally chooses to act virtuously. She does not feel conflicted while acting virtuously. She always feels, thinks, and does virtuous acts in a virtuous way. However, this view is not the only plausible depiction of a virtuous person’s psychology. This dissertation aims to offer an alternative picture by discussing Mencius’ conception of virtue and moral exemplars. I sort out significant characteristics of Mencian moral exemplars and compare them to those of a fully virtuous person on neo-Aristotelian account. I argue that unlike a neo-Aristotelian virtuous person, Mencian moral exemplars could have false beliefs and be tempted to act wrongly because of their virtue; indeed, some of their virtuous actions flow from lack of moral understanding. Based on this comparative analysis, I reconstruct Mencius’ conception of virtue in comparison with different ways of conceiving virtue found in contemporary virtue theories. By doing so, I show how Mencius’ conception of virtue could solve certain puzzles about moral motivation that beset other views. Some contemporary philosophers have been worried that we may end up being motivated improperly if we merely follow predominant normative ethical theories. Mencius’ conception of virtue could relieve this worry by allowing an agent to possess something other than true beliefs, judgments, and wisdom as the dominant element in one’s virtuous state. This invites us to consider Mencius’ virtue ethical theory as a promising alternative to previous approaches.

The truth thesis of virtue, widely adopted by Neo-Aristotelians, holds that virtue requires accurate beliefs about what is going on in given circumstances and what actions or values should be pursued, beliefs that constitute or at least inform the right reason that virtuous people follow when choosing to act virtuously. However, is this theoretical commitment indispensable for virtue theory? This essay aims to challenge the attractiveness of that thesis by examining the story of Shun 舜, a moral exemplar, in Mengzi 孟子 5A2. In this passage, Mengzi approvingly recounts how Shun trusted his vicious brother Xiang 象 and showed hospitality to him, despite knowing that Xiang had just tried to murder him. I argue that given its phenomenological and epistemic features, Shun’s psychological state is best understood as involving self-deception, and that given Shun’s status as an exemplar of virtue, Mengzi’s virtue theory supposes there to be a particular sort of epistemic cost for being virtuous, contrary to the truth thesis of virtue. This observation will shed light on how epistemic irrationality could play an important role in one’s moral motivation.

The harmony thesis about a virtuous person, widely held by neo-Aristotelians, supposes that someone highly vulnerable to temptation is not virtuous at all. However, is that the only plausible picture of a virtuous person’s psychology? This essay aims to offer an alternative picture by discussing the account of virtue in the thought of Mengzi 孟子 and his conception of moral exemplars. First, I analyze the Mengzian moral exemplar as depicted in _Mengzi_ 1A7—specifically, the susceptibility of the nobleman (_junzi_ 君子) to compassion and the relevant temptation. Then, I explain how this differs from neo-Aristotelian virtue ethical theories. This passage shows that there is a certain price to being virtuous in Mengzi’s virtue theory. By examining various ways of addressing this challenge, I explore Mengzi’s solution to it, which will shed light on Mengzi’s own way of specifying virtue and its significant advantage as a potential alternative to certain other approaches.